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ABSTRACT
I examine the effect of creditor control rights on borrowers’ financing policy both ex-ante and ex-
post. The novelty introduced by this thesis is the use of an investor protection variable reflecting the
pledgeability of a firm’s assets, both at industry and country level, alongside the contractual allocation of
control rights, in understanding financial contracting and capital structure mechanics. At industry level,
the empirical analysis is first motivated with a model that allows debt contracts to allocate control rights
over the reorganization or liquidation decision of distressed firms and where cash flow pledgeability
can vary. The model delivers two main predictions: (1) Ex-post, creditor control should be associated
with an increased likelihood of resolving financial distress out of court relative to filing for bankruptcy,
particularly in industries where assets are easier to collateralize; (2) Ex-ante, creditor control should be
associated with an increased use of leverage, particularly in industries where assets are easier to collater-
alize. Empirical results provide evidence consistent with these two predictions. At country level, strong
judicial effectiveness is found to alleviate the effect of the contractual enforcement of rights by creditors
on financing policy. Net debt issuing activity declines sharply following a covenant violation, when cred-
itors use their contractual acceleration and termination rights to increase interest rates or halt any further
supply of credit. The decline is however found to be less pronounced in countries with stronger legal
enforcement. This result is also observable for a variety of financial and investment policy measures
including capital expenditures, asset growth and cash holdings, therefore highlighting the importance
of strong contract enforcement in reducing financial and investment conservatism following a covenant
violation and improving firm performance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The optimal contracting theory defines how financial contracts should be written in a way that best
serves the interests of all parties involved. In a world where entrepreneurs need to rely on external
investors, the allocation of control rights to the latter emerges as an efficient mechanism to mitigate the
conflict of interest that may arise between the agent and the principal and ease the access to financing
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Warner, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1988;
Aghion and Bolton, 1992). Control rights are defined differently depending on the type of contract and
the type of investors, and can in many ways alter managerial decision making, financial policy and firm
performance. The contribution of this thesis is to examine how control rights in credit agreements affect
borrowers’ access to external financing ex-ante, and to identify the role played by controlling creditors in
the resolution of financial distress and in affecting borrowers’ financial policy when influenced by legal
and institutional factors.
At the heart of the optimal contracting theory lies the agency theory. An agency relationship is
defined as a contract where the principal delegates certain tasks to an appointed agent and grants the latter
some decision making authority. Agency problems arise under the assumption that both the principal and
the agent are looking to maximize their own utility and hence, under such an assumption, the agent has
incentive not to act in the best interest of the principal. The costs associated with such problems can
be mitigated through the creation of incentives that would limit the divergence of the agent’s interest
from the interest of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In defining these incentives, the optimal
contracting theory creates a setting where an entrepreneur is seeking funding from a wealthy investor in
order to finance a project. To ensure that the entrepreneur does not engage in value destructive activities,
the investor can acquire some control rights. With the imposition of such rights to be able to secure
financing, entrepreneurs have either the option to finance their project through equity, which will mean
that they’d have to share voting rights with the new shareholders, or through debt, which keeps them in
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full control of the firm as long as they meet their debt obligations (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and
Moore, 1988; Aghion and Bolton, 1992); capital structure therefore serves as a disciplinary device for
entrepreneurs and an incentive scheme for external investors (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994).
1.1 Control Rights in Equity Contracts
The empirical interest in the agency theory and the optimal allocation of control rights in financial
contracts is fairly recent. The primary research focus in this area was directed towards shareholders’
rights in equity contracts and the conflicts of interest between the owners and the managers of a firm.
The power-sharing relationship between owners and managers in firms is defined by specific rules of
governance; and at the two extremes lie two ”regimes”, one which reserves ultimate power to sharehold-
ers in choosing and replacing management, and another which reserves extensive power to management
and restricts shareholders’ ability to make any organizational changes (Gompers et. al, 2003).
Shareholder agreements are an important aspect of the allocation of control rights to shareholders.
Shareholder agreements are common in private companies and come as a substitute to laws and reg-
ulations in specifying the rights and duties of shareholders and also play a role in conflict resolution,
controlling the transfer of shares and the allocation of different types of options (Chemla et al., 2007).
A heavily researched type of shareholder agreements is agreements between venture capitalists and en-
trepreneurs. Venture capitalists can have a role in the resolution of conflicts of interest and information
asymmetries through the intervention in optimal investment decisions when they are allocated a fraction
of projects’ payoffs (Admati and Pleifderer, 1994). Venture capitalists also seem to have a tendency
toward convertible securities. Convertible securities are important because they allow venture capitalists
to design the firm’s capital structure in a way that alleviates the distributional conflicts associated with a
future sale of the firm (Berglof, 1994). Convertible securities also endogenously allocate cash flow rights
as a function of the realization of the state of the world and the entrepreneur’s effort (Schmidt, 2003).
Through such properties, venture capitalists can protect their claims against dilution (Berglof, 1994), and
can also use these convertible securities to give incentive to the entrepreneur to only engage in efficient
investment (Schmidt, 2003). Venture capitalists can also steer the future of the firm in the direction that
seems most suitable to them using the control rights they acquire during the financing cycle. In that
regard, if venture capitalists deem the company successful they head toward a payoff determined by the
market through an IPO, otherwise, venture capitalists try to redeem the initial value of their investment
through liquidation (Schmidt, 2003).
Empirical studies examining the effect of shareholder protection on firm performance find that the
level of shareholder rights is strongly correlated with stock returns and firm operating performance, and
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inversely related to firm vulnerability to the market for corporate control (Gompers et. al, 2003; Cre-
mers and Nair, 2005; Core et. al, 2006, Larcker et. al, 2007). Empirical studies also examined private
equity agreements, defining control rights between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. In such kind of
investments, the business plans, internal analyses of investment valuations, information on subsequent
performance and the contractual agreements underlying the different financing rounds are all provided
by the venture capitalists. Because of such involvement, venture capitalists have the opportunity to sep-
arately allocate cash flow rights, board rights, voting rights, liquidation rights, and other control rights
which could be contingent on both financial and non-financial measures of performance. Hence, if the
firm performs badly, all control rights (board, voting and liquidation) are entirely shifted to the venture
capitalist; however, if performance improves the entrepreneur can gradually gain back control of his firm
(Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). Such findings reiterate the importance of the allocation of control rights
in financial contracts and the role it plays in securing financing from external sources and preserving
investors’ interests.
1.2 Control Rights in Debt Contracts
Control rights in debt contracts are mainly devised to restrict managerial behaviour and resolve the
conflict of interest that exists between shareholders and bondholders. Under the assumption that the in-
terests of shareholders and managers are aligned, misalignment of incentives with bondholders can stem
from four major sources of conflict: excessive distributions to shareholders at the expense of bondholders,
additional issuance of debt securities which would cause the dilution of the value of the bondholders’
claims, asset substitution into high-risk investments, and finally, underinvestment in safe positive net
present value projects. To avoid incentive misalignment and limit managerial misbehaviour which result
in the reduction of the bonds value, bondholders have the option to include various covenant restrict-
ing managerial behaviour in the bond indenture provisions. These provisions could impose restrictions
on managerial decisions affecting investments, dividends, future debt issues, repayments and working
capital requirements among others, and should generally be very well detailed and specified to cover
most operating aspects of the firm including the riskiness of any projects undertaken. The presence
of covenants in debt agreements can therefore reduce the costs associated with the conflict of interest
between bondholders and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Smith and Warner,
1979).
Empirical studies have found that interest rates on debt are lower for firms whose credit agreements
include covenants (Bradley and Roberts, 2004). This finding is consistent with the optimal allocation
of control rights under the agency theory which asserts that the costs incurred by the firm due to the
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restrictiveness of covenants should be offset by some benefits to the bondholders, which translate in the
reduction of agency costs and hence the cost of debt (Smith and Warner, 1979). Evidence also shows
that high-growth firms are more likely to issue loans with dividend restrictions, security requirements
and financial constraints. In addition, although these firms tend to have covenants that put limitations on
the use of raised funds, they are not generally subject to covenants that restrict their access to additional
funds in the future. A positive relationship also exists between the maturity of the loan and both the pres-
ence of covenants on that loan and the prevailing credit spread. This suggests that, first, covenants act
as a warning signal to creditors to reduce the maturity of the loan early on during the term, and second,
that an increase in the agency costs of debt is associated with an increase in the probability of financial
distress. In addition, loans made during stock market downturns are more prone to restrictive covenants
as a form of compensation to lenders for increased risk taking. Moreover, the number and identity of
lenders largely affects the presence of covenants in credit agreements because they could proxy for risk
which can be mitigated through diversification among lenders but not fully eliminated through the insti-
tution of covenants (Bradley and Roberts, 2004). The agency theory is therefore capable of explaining
the bulk of the determinants of corporate debt covenants.
The analysis of debt covenants was mostly prevalent in the accounting literature and focused on the
manipulation of accruals and accounting changes in the presence of restrictive covenants in credit agree-
ments. When defining financial covenants in credit agreements, lenders specify thresholds for a number
of accounting ratios that borrowers cannot cross as a way of protecting their claims. A covenant viola-
tion, also known as a technical default, occurs when borrowers’ observed accounting ratios fall short of
the specified thresholds. Such defaults entail the transfer of control rights from borrowers to creditors
who can take a range of actions to preserve the value of their claims. The Debt Covenant Hypothesis
states that managers make accounting choices in a way that helps them avoid violating accounting based
debt covenants or at least reduce the probability of such occurrences. Empirical evidence shows that
effectively very few firms actually have financial measures below covenant thresholds while a signifi-
cant number of firms have their financial measures equal to or just above covenant thresholds, indicating
that managers have incentive to avoid covenant violations just as they are nearing the cut-off threshold
(Dichev and Skinner, 2002). Other research also finds that abnormal accruals in firms are positive and
significant both in the year prior to a covenant violation and the year of violation itself after control-
ling for management changes and auditor “going concern”qualifications (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994).
Firms approaching covenant violations are also found to be subject to income-increasing discretionary
accounting changes as a way to mitigate the effects of the increased tightness of accounting-based restric-
tions when a technical default is near (Sweeney, 1994). Other studies also examine the costs imposed on
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firms following covenant violations and which generally result in additional covenants being put in place,
an increase in bond yields, or restrictions limiting the access to additional financing (Beneish and Press,
1993; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994). The costs incurred by such violations negatively
impact abnormal returns which translates into significant losses to shareholders’ wealth. The costs of
restrictions on additional financing and new investment and the costs of renegotiation are also found to
heavily outweigh the benefits of increased monitoring by creditors (Beneish and Press, 1995).
It is not until recently that the interest in the relation between creditor control rights and borrowers’
financial policy started to materialize in the empirical literature. Because control rights are transferred
from borrowers to creditors following a covenant violation, there is reason to believe that creditors can
directly or indirectly influence borrowers’ financing and investment decisions with the different actions
they can take to protect their claims. Evidence suggests that, indeed, borrowers’ investment policy is
affected by creditor control as reflected in the sharp decline in capital expenditures following a covenant
violation (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2012). These findings are largely consis-
tent with the theory predicting that the transfer of control rights from borrower to creditor following a
covenant violation restrains investment activity since creditors intervene to restore performance and in
a way punish managers for bad performance and misbehaviour (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Dewatripont
and Tirole, 1994; Gorton and Kahn, 2000). Also consistent with theoretical predictions, investment
activity is found to decline more severely following a violation for firms where incentive conflicts and
information asymmetries between borrowers and creditors are more pronounced. The type and quality
of investments undertaken by firms following a violation also change as creditors select and manage
investments in a way that would result in a fair return on their investment as soon as they seize control
of the firm (Chava and Roberts, 2008). In addition, The transfer of control rights to creditors severely
affects the debt issuing activity of borrowers which falls significantly following a violation and persists
for two years (Roberts and Sufi, 2009a; Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2012). Moreover, the effect of creditor
control on borrowers’ financial policies is exacerbated by a deteriorating credit quality (Nini, Smith and
Sufi, 2009). However, the presence of creditor control in financing agreements is found to be positively
correlated with market and operating performance of borrowers, and the actions taken by creditors are
observed to increase on average the value of violating firms (Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2009; Nini, Smith and
Sufi, 2012).
1.3 Thesis Overview
The main goal of this thesis is to fill the gaps in the literature in understanding the empirical impli-
cations of the financial contracting theory and the relationship between creditor control rights and the
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financing policy of borrowers. Theory often associates creditor control with a bias toward liquidation.
Recent theoretical work however and empirical findings have provided evidence suggesting that credi-
tors in control promote the efficient out-of-court reorganization of viable firms as opposed to liquidation.
No study in the literature however examines whether the ex-ante allocation of control rights to credi-
tors is associated with different patterns of resolution of financial distress ex-post. This thesis examines
the role of creditor control in deciding on the resolution of financial distress out-of-court vs. filing for
bankruptcy. In addition, previous research suggests that managerial discretion is correlated with security
issuance and that the allocation of control rights in debt contracts should ease the access of borrowers
to financing and reduce the cost of debt. No empirical evidence however documents the implications
of the ex-ante allocation of control rights to creditors on capital structure as a function of the ease of
pledgeability of a firm’s assets. This thesis also focuses on how the effect of creditor control on capital
structure is dependent on the level of collateralizability of a firm’s assets at industry level. Finally, this
thesis extends the empirical findings of the effect of the transfer of control rights to creditors on the fi-
nancing and investment policy of borrowers to an international setting. While a large literature examines
the effect of the level of the legal protection of creditors on the access of firms to external financing and
on the borrowing terms that creditors impose, no study examines what happens to borrowers’ financial
policies after control rights have been transferred to creditors. And while studies of U.S. samples have
largely focused on the financial policies of borrowers following a technical default, none of these studies
have tried to mirror their findings on an international sample. This thesis bridges the gap between these
two strands of the literature.
Chapter 2 investigates the role of the ex-ante allocation of control rights on the resolution of financial
distress ex-post. The chapter introduces a model of financial contracting in which the pledgeability of
cash flows varies across industries. The model delivers two predictions: (1) Ex-post, creditor control
should be associated with an increased likelihood of resolving financial distress out of court relative to
filing for bankruptcy, particularly in industries where cash flows are easier to collateralize; and (2) Ex-
ante, creditor control should be associated with an increased use of leverage, particularly in industries
where cash flows are easier to collateralize. The chapter also tests Prediction (1) of the model empirically
by examining two unique samples of financially distressed firms collected based on different distress in-
dicators. The first sample examines a group of poor performing firms that attempt to restructure their
debt, and the second sample surveys a group of firms that issue high-yield (“junk”) bonds and have trou-
ble satisfying their interest expense on these bonds. The main goal of the analysis is to determine the
effect of creditor control on the probability of resolving financial distress out of court relative to filing
for bankruptcy. Empirical results corroborate model predictions and are consistently observable across
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both samples: firms with creditor control are more likely to restructure out of court rather than undergo
bankruptcy proceedings, more so in industries where asset collateralizability is easier. A closer scrutiny
of the way in which firms resolve financial distress in and out of court in both samples reveals that credi-
tors in creditor may actually see the upside of reorganization and promote debt restructuring accordingly,
and that the presence of creditor control fosters the successful emergence of firms from bankruptcy.
In Chapter 3, empirical evidence is presented in support of Prediction (2) of the model developed
in Chapter 2. The chapter examines the effect of creditor control on capital structure choices ex-ante
using a large sample of private credit agreements. Results show that firms with creditor control have
higher leverage ratios than firms without creditor control, indicating that indeed the ex-ante contractual
allocation of control rights to creditors helps firms secure more financing. This result is robust to the
inclusion of a wide range of control variables used in the capital structure literature as cross-sectional
determinants of leverage. Also, to address endogeneity concerns, creditor control is instrumented by an
indicator of a firm’s inclusion in the S&P500 index as tested in the literature. The results remain robust
and with high economic significance. More importantly, results also show that leverage ratios of firms
with creditor control are even higher in industries where the ease of collateralizability of assets is high.
This finding directly confirms the theoretical predictions presented in Chapter 2 and is also robust to a
number of statistical tests and estimation methods. This chapter and Chapter 2 are a collaboration with
my supervisor, Dr. Stefano Rossi.
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to examine whether the quality of institutions in a country substitutes
for or complements the contractual control that creditors exert on borrowers upon the occurrence of a
technical default. As mentioned earlier, studies of U.S. samples of firms have shown that creditors play a
role in affecting borrowers’ financing decisions as translated by a sharp and persistent decline in net debt
issuing activity following a covenant violation (Roberts and Sufi, 2009a; Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2012).
Other studies of international data have found evidence that in countries with better institutional quality,
borrowers are able to secure loans at better terms, such as longer maturity, higher amounts and lower
interest spreads (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009). This chapter tests the hypothesis that
a strong institutional framework in a certain country substitutes for the need of creditors to step up to
protect their claims when they are alarmed by deteriorating borrower performance. A measure of the
effectiveness of the judicial system in enforcing contracts is used as a proxy for institutional quality. The
empirical analysis provides support for the proposed hypothesis in that a strong judicial system allevi-
ates the need for the contractual enforcement of rights by creditors. Results reveal that net debt issuing
activity declines sharply in the year following a financial covenant violation, when creditors use their
contractual acceleration and termination rights to increase interest rates or halt any further supply of
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credit. The response of creditors to a covenant violation is however observed to be less pronounced in
the presence of stronger legal enforcement. In addition to net debt issuance, this chapter’s results are also
observable for a number of financial and investment policy variables, including asset growth, capital ex-
penditures and cash holdings, implying that strong judicial enforcement reduces financial and investment
conservatism following a violation and improves performance. These findings also hold when using dif-
ferent proxies for institutional quality and contract enforcement.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes by summarizing the main findings of this thesis and their implications.
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Chapter 2
Control Rights and Financial Distress
Debt contracts are a key engine of economic growth, as they represent a major source for firms to
finance investment. Accordingly, a variety of legal institutions is available to enforce debt contracts,
both in and out of courts. The modern economic theory of financial contracting has had striking success
in describing the key trade-offs in the relationship between borrowers who have entrepreneurial human
capital and access to an investment opportunity but no money to finance it, and lenders who have money
but no human capital to take advantage of the investment opportunity. In particular, a large literature
surveyed in Hart (1995) and Tirole (2006) among others has identified the factors that affect the extent
of debt capacity ex-ante and the way in which financial distress is resolved ex-post (Aghion and Bolton,
1992; Hart and Moore, 1994, 1998; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990, 1996; Diamond, 1989, 1991; Dewa-
tripont and Tirole, 1994; Berglof and Von Thadden, 1994; Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991).
In stark contrast, the accomplishments of financial contracting theories in terms of helping under-
stand the empirical evidence are currently limited to a few special cases. For example, in the specific
context of venture capital Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) have shown that ex-ante financing contracts
allocate control rights contingent on ex-post events that are linked to firm performance, consistent with
the model of Aghion and Bolton (1992). In terms of the ex-post exercise of control rights, a recent and
growing literature has focused on the violations of contractual covenants, and shown that control does
shift from equity holders to creditors upon the violation of such covenants (Chava and Roberts, 2008;
Roberts and Sufi, 2009a , 2009b; Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2009, 2012). Recently, Denis and Wang (2013)
study renegotiations of covenants and find that creditors in control do not necessarily tighten the terms
of the lending contract, but often loosen them, particularly when firms have viable prospects but lack
liquidity in the short run.
As a result, to assess the ultimate relevance of financial contracting theories for a broad cross section
of firms clearly much remains to be done. On the theory side, one challenge is that much of the financial
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contracting theory associates creditor control with a bias toward the liquidation of viable firms. Such
bias may counteract borrowers’ incentives to default strategically, thereby boosting ex-ante financing, or
may simply reflect creditors’ lack of interest in reorganization (Hart, 1995). Either way, however, by
linking creditor control to pervasive liquidation, conventional theories do not explain the frequent use of
creditor control in the real world, and most importantly they do not explain the fact that such creditors
in control often do promote the out-of-court restructuring of viable firms (Denis and Wang, 2013). In
reality, this presumed bias toward liquidation has famously motivated the introduction of bankruptcy pro-
cedures, such as Chapter 11, which help avoid winding up viable firms just because of a momentary cash
shortfall through the use of such provisions as the automatic stay and debtor-in-possession (DIP) financ-
ing. However, while in the 1980s and 1990s Chapter 11 was characterized as being “equity-friendly”as
it also allowed to reorganize firms that were worth more in liquidation (Franks and Torous, 1993), it is
now often described as “creditor-friendly”(Ayotte and Morrison, 2009; Adler, Capkun, and Weiss, 2013;
Bharath, Panchapegesan, and Werner, 2013). These issues will be discussed throughout this chapter.
The purpose of this chapter is to help bridge the gap between the theory of financial contracting and
the empirical evidence on resolutions of financial distress and capital structure. I ask two sets of ques-
tions: does the ex-ante allocation of control rights affect the way in which financial distress is resolved
ex-post? And in turn, does the way in which control rights affect financial distress resolutions ex-post
correspond to capital structure decisions ex-ante?
To organize the discussion, I begin by presenting a stylized model of financial contracting based on
the work of Aghion and Bolton (1992), Hart and Moore (1994, 1998), and Gennaioli and Rossi (2013).
As in Aghion and Bolton (1992), I allow debt contracts to allocate control rights over the reorganiza-
tion versus liquidation decision. As in Hart and Moore (1994, 1998), I assume that cash flows are less
pledgeable than liquidation proceeds. As in Gennaioli and Rossi (2013), I allow the pledgeability of
cash flows to vary. Here, the pledgeability of cash flows is interpreted as a proxy for the importance of
relationship-specific investments, which has a clear empirical counterpart that has been shown to vary
across industries and to shape the patterns of trade (Nunn, 2007), and therefore allows me to generate
empirical predictions.
The model delivers two key predictions: (1) Ex-post, creditor control should be associated with an
increased likelihood of resolving financial distress out of court relative to filing for bankruptcy, partic-
ularly in industries where cash flows are easier to collateralize; (2) Ex-ante, creditor control should be
associated with an increased use of leverage, particularly in industries where cash flows are easier to
collateralize.
This chapter also examines the role of creditor control in the resolution of financial distress empiri-
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cally. To study resolutions of financial distress, one long-standing challenge is that financial distress may
reflect lack of investment opportunities and therefore economic distress. The literature has developed
two main complementary procedures to identify sizeable samples of firms that are financially distressed
but economically viable. The first procedure is to focus on firms with poor financial performance that
attempt to restructure their debt (Gilson, John, and Lang, 1990). The idea here is that only economically
viable firms should attempt to restructure their debt. The second procedure is to focus on firms with
outstanding junk bonds issues that have trouble repaying the interest on such bonds (Asquith, Gertner,
and Scharfstein, 1994). The idea here is that for highly indebted firms a small drop in profitability is
enough to trigger financial distress. I follow both procedures and end up with two non-overlapping sam-
ples of financially distressed firms, a sample of 161 “poor performers”and another sample of 99 “junk
bond issuers”.
The main focus of the ex-post analysis is on whether creditor control affects the probability of re-
solving financial distress out of court relative to filing for bankruptcy. I define a firm as having allocated
control ex-ante to a creditor, i.e. I define the firm as a “creditor control”one, if the firm has 1) at least
an outstanding private credit agreement, and 2) at least one such private credit agreement has at least
one covenant. Indeed, as shown by Roberts and Sufi (2009a) and others, covenants in private lending
agreements do trigger control shifts to creditors upon violation. Furthermore, unlike those in public debt
agreements, covenants in private lending agreements are both commonplace and tight, as the distance
between the covenant threshold and the actual accounting measure is larger in public bond indentures
(Kahan and Tuckman, 1995).
Consistent with my first theoretical prediction, the key finding of the ex-post analysis is that firms
with creditor control are more likely to restructure out of court in industries where the pledgeability
of cash flows is higher. Remarkably, this result holds both in the sample of “poor performers”and in
the sample of “junk bond issuers”. In addition, I find that in the sample of “poor performers”, firms
with creditor control are significantly more likely to restructure out of court rather than file for Chapter
11, consistent with the intuition that it is less costly for creditors in control to restructure out of court
rather than become exposed to the vagaries of Chapter 11 such as violations from absolute priority. In
the sample of “junk bond issuers”on the other hand firms with creditor control are if anything slightly
more likely to file for Chapter 11 than restructure out of court, although the finding is not statistically
significant. This difference across the two samples is likely to reflect differences in firm characteristics,
most notably the fact that junk bond issuers have much more complex capital structures, and therefore
bargaining among creditors is more likely to break down relative to the sample of poor performers, pre-
cipitating filing for Chapter 11, consistent with the analysis of Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994).
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As a result, creditors in control of firms with junk bonds outstanding may require higher contractual
protection from Chapter 11 filing.
I explore this possibility by documenting in detail the resolution of financial distress for both the
“poor performers”and the “junk bond issuers”. I examine the outcomes of restructuring in both Chapter
11 filings and out-of-court restructurings, both in terms of whether senior creditors (whether in control or
not) are repaid in full or they receive equity, and the extent to which junior creditors are impaired in the
process. I study both liability side restructurings, such as loosening or tightening of private (bank) debt
and public debt exchanges; and asset side restructurings, such as large asset sales, reductions in capital
expenditures, and mergers. I also examine whether firms emerge from the restructuring with different
CEOs.
I find that firms with creditor control restructure their debt consistent with my model, and in par-
ticular with the theoretical insight of Gennaioli and Rossi (2013) that creditors in control may see the
upside of reorganization and help restructure the firm accordingly. Consistent with the idea that firms
with creditor control may require high contractual protection, particularly if the firm has junk bonds out-
standing, I find that firms with creditor control are more likely to emerge successfully from Chapter 11,
are more likely to emerge with the senior creditor (in control) repaid in full, and are more likely to have
DIP financing, either from the previous senior creditor or from a new senior creditor.
Interestingly, the details of these restructurings differ in the two samples. In the sample of “junk
bond issuers”, on the asset side firms with creditor control are less likely to experience a decline in cap-
ital expenditures or be taken over. On the liability side, firms with creditor control are more likely to
restructure their private debt by tightening it and less likely to attempt a public debt restructuring than
firms without creditor control. In the sample of “poor performers”, firms with creditor control are more
likely to restructure both private and public debt, and private debt restructuring takes both the form of
loosening and tightening. In the sample of “junk bond issuers”, firms with creditor control are less likely
to experience large asset sales than firms without creditor control; the opposite is true for the sample of
“poor performers”.
In sum, the evidence on resolutions of financial distress highlights two key ideas of my model: cred-
itors in control do see the upside of efficient reorganization, and this is true both in Chapter 11 and in
out-of-court restructurings; and creditors in control prefer out-of-court restructurings to Chapter 11 in
industries where the firms’ assets are easier to collateralize. The empirical implications of the second
theoretical prediction of my model are tested in Chapter 3 that follows.
This chapter contributes to the empirical literature on the resolution of financial distress by focusing
on the role of creditor control in the choice to resolve financial distress out of court relative to filing
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for bankruptcy. Gilson (1990) studies the restructurings of bank claims; Gilson, John, and Lang (1990)
study the choice of debt restructurings versus bankruptcy; Brown, James and Mooradian (1993) study
the choice of public debt restructurings versus bank debt restructurings; Brown, James, and Mooradian
(1994) study asset sales; Franks and Torous (1989), Weiss (1990), and Hotchkiss (1995) study the Chap-
ter 11 process; Franks and Torous (1994) study distressed exchanges and Chapter 11 reorganizations;
Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006) study Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11; Tashjian, Lease, and McConnell (1996)
study pre-packaged Chapter 11. None of these papers focuses on whether the ex-ante allocation of con-
trol rights is associated to different patterns of resolution of financial distress ex-post.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 presents the model and develops the hypotheses. Section
2 describes the sample selection procedure. Section 3 describes the variables involved in the empirical
analysis and the model used. Section 4 presents some preliminary statistics. Section 5 describes the main
findings. Section 6 concludes.
2.1 Theory and Hypotheses
To motivate the empirical analysis, in this section I provide a theoretical framework which is based
on Gennaioli and Rossi (2013) and generates two empirical predictions.
2.1.1 The Basic Framework
There are three dates, t = 0, 1, 2. At t = 0, a penniless entrepreneur, E, seeks funding to set up the
physical assets of a firm at a cost K > 0. I first consider the case of one investor, I, who has money but
no human capital to run the firm. I discuss my results in the case of multiple creditors in the following
subsection. Under E’s management the firm generates cash flow yt(ω) at t = 1, 2, where ω ∈ Ω is the
state of nature, realized at t = 1. There are three possible states, Ω ≡ {G,U,B}.
With probability pi the state is ω = G. In this case, performance is “good”in both the interim date t = 1
and the final date t = 2: the cash flows are y1(G) = y1 > 0 and y2(G) = y2 > 0 .With probability
(1−pi)
2 the
state is ω = U. In this case, the firm “underperforms”in date 1, before recovering to good performance in
the final date: cash flows are y1(U) = 0 and y2(U) = y2. Therefore, state U can be understood as a state
of “financial distress”, in that the firm is temporarily insolvent, i.e. unable to repay any debt outstanding
in the interim date; the firm is however ultimately viable as date 2 cash flows are high. With probability
(1−pi)
2 the state is ω = B. In this case, performance is “bad”in both dates: cash flows are y1(B) = 0 and
y2(B) = y2 > 0, where y2 < y2. Therefore, state B can be understood as a state of both financial and
economic distress, as the firm is underperforming in both periods.
At the end of t = 1 and before t = 2, the physical assets of the firm can be liquidated, yielding L. One
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can think of L as representing the value of the firm in a piecemeal liquidation or under the management
of the investor I, as opposed to the value y2 (ω) generated by a reorganization. The reorganization value
y2 (ω) can be interpreted as the value of the firm under E’s management or under an alternative manage-
ment team with the same managerial skills as E.
With respect to the information structure, I assume that parties have symmetric information through-
out. In particular, nobody knows the state ω at t = 0, and both E and I perfectly learn ω -and thus the
firm’s reorganization value- at t = 1.
Parties write an optimal contract subject to two frictions. The first crucial friction captures the extent
of legal protection of investors against managerial tunneling. This is measured by the share α ∈ [0,1] of
the firm’s cash flows yt(ω) that E can be legally compelled to pay to I ex-post, and which E can therefore
credibly pledge to I ex-ante. The remaining share (1 - α) of cash flows is retained by E, and as a result
cannot be pledged to I. Legal protection against tunneling increases in α. Therefore, the model nests the
Hart and Moore (1998) case of unverifiable cash flows as a special case when α = 0. When α > 0, the
cash flows are partially verifiable. One can interpret (1 - α).yt(ω) as the nondissipative private benefits
generated under limited investor protection α (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). In the spirit of Hart and
Moore (1998), physical collateral L can be fully pledged to I. My results are obtained even if physical
assets can be only partially pledged to I, as long as they remain more pledgeable than cash flows.
Under these assumptions, at t = 1, E can be compelled to pay to I at most L + α y1(ω); namely, the
value of physical assets L plus the amount αy1(ω) of first-period cash flows that E is unable to divert.
At t = 2 the entrepreneur can be compelled to pay to I up to αy2(ω). As a result, when α > 0 there is a
potential incentive for I to reorganize, unlike in models where cash flows are fully nonverifiable and α =
0.
The second contracting friction in my model is that courts cannot verify the realization of ω. Courts
can only observe the realization of cash flows ex-post, which is an imperfect signal of ω. In particular,
following a realization of first-period cash flows y1(ω) = 0, courts cannot distinguish between states U
and B. Therefore, a contract mandating reorganization if the state is U and liquidation if it is B cannot be
enforced by courts. This friction creates the scope for providing parties with the incentive to reveal their
information about ω. By contrast, courts perfectly verify whether the firm is reorganized or liquidated.
2.1.2 Empirical Predictions
In this framework, Gennaioli and Rossi (2013) show that the optimal contract involves undercollat-
eralization, that is, the optimal contract stipulates that, upon deciding for liquidation, the creditor is not
entitled to the full liquidation proceeds, L, but to the lower amount L − S, whereby S is the amount of
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undercollateralization that is determined in equilibrium to make sure that the creditor prefers efficient
continuation as opposed to liquidation:
αy2 ≥ L−S≥ αy2 (2.1)
With one creditor, a variety of contingent control contracts can implement the efficient outcome
of continuation in state U and liquidation in state B. Gennaioli and Rossi (2013) show that, however,
with multiple creditors, a creditor control contract dominates other contracts that give control to the en-
trepreneur, or that allocate control stochastically. The intuition is that, while under entrepreneur control
and other stochastic contracts the optimal contract involves some money burning, i.e. the amount S is
not returned to the creditor thereby reducing debt capacity, with creditor control, one can set up a second
class of creditors, without the control rights to decide whether the firm should be liquidated or reorga-
nized, and which is pledged the amount S if the firm is liquidated. In other words, upon continuation,
the creditor in control gets the full continuation proceeds αy and the creditors not in control get 0, and
upon liquidation the creditor in control gets L - S and the other creditors get S. Gennaioli and Rossi
(2013) show that this arrangement achieves ex-post efficiency, while at the same time maximizing the
proceeds to the creditors, and therefore debt capacity. Furthermore, Gennaioli and Rossi (2013) show
that this arrangement is robust to allowing for renegotiation, and to allowing for consolidation of claims
in secondary markets, that is, such optimal debt structure is also renegotiation-proof. Therefore, in what
follows I focus on the creditor control contract; and to keep the discussion easy to follow, I keep the
framework with one creditor, keeping in mind how the arrangement generalizes to allowing for multiple
creditors.
The key decision arises ex-post at date 1 after cash flows y = 0 are realized. The party in control
can decide whether to restructure out of court, or whether to file for Chapter 11. Restructuring out of
court is done at a bargaining cost c, and ends up in the firm not being liquidated and continuing until
date 2. Filing for Chapter 11 involves the judge deciding whether the firm is reorganized or liquidated.
Because the judge cannot verify the state, the judge will pick the “wrong”state with probability (1 - p).
The possibility that the judge picks the “wrong”state captures the cost of judicial discretion in corporate
bankruptcy, as studied by Gennaioli and Rossi (2010). It is straightforward to derive the first result:
Proposition 1 [Ex-post]: In state 2, creditors in control will choose to resolve financial distress rela-
tive to filing for Chapter 11 as long as the following condition holds:
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α(y2− y2)≥
c
(1− p) (2.2)
which generates the following prediction:
Prediction 1 (Ex-post): Creditors in control are more likely to aim to resolve financial distress out
of court relative to filing for bankruptcy, particularly in industries where cash flows are more easily
pledgeable to creditors, i.e. in industries with higher α.
On ex-ante financing, it is easy to see that creditor control is feasible as long as:
pi(αy1+ y2)+
1−pi
2
[αy2+(L−S)]≥ K (2.3)
which generates the following prediction:
Prediction 2 (Ex-ante): Creditors in control allow firms to borrow more, particularly in industries where
cash flows are more easily pledgeable to creditors, i.e., in industries with higher α.
2.2 Data and Sample Selection
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of creditor control in the way financially distressed
firms restructure their assets and liabilities. One difficulty in studying the resolutions of financial distress
empirically is that firms may be simultaneously in economic distress. As a result, it is challenging to
identify a sample of firms that are financially distressed but at the same time economically viable. To ad-
dress these issues, the literature has focused on two procedures. The first procedure relies on identifying
firms with poor financial performance that take active steps in restructuring their liabilities (Gilson, John,
and Lang, 1990). The idea here is that, while in general poor financial performance may reflect poor eco-
nomic performance, only firms with relatively better economic performance would take active steps to
restructure their debt, whether out of court or in Chapter 11. The second procedure relies on identifying
firms with high-yield (“junk”) bonds outstanding that later become financially distressed. The idea here
is that for highly levered firms with public bonds outstanding a small decline in profitability will be suf-
ficient to trigger financial distress.
As the literature has discussed (Senbet and Seward, 1995), the two procedures are highly complemen-
tary, in that from an a priori perspective there is no reason to believe that either procedure is superior, and
in that the two procedures typically identify very different sets of firms. As a result, conclusions reached
by studying a sample of firms constructed by following one procedure do not necessarily carry over the
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other (Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein, 1994; Senbet and Seward, 1995).
I therefore select two separate samples of firms, a sample of “poor performers”, following Gilson,
John and Lang (1990), and a sample of “junk bond issuers”, following Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein
(1994). To the extent that my results hold across the two samples, I am more confident of their gener-
alizability. To the extent that my results differ across the two samples, I hope to gain insights into the
economics of creditor control and resolution of financial distress from the different sample compositions
and firm characteristics.
2.2.1 Poor Performers
Selecting a sample of poor performers is a two-step process, following Gilson, John and Lang (1990).
First, I compute a measure of financial performance, and I focus on the left tail of the distribution. Sec-
ond, among firms in the left tail of the distribution, I search through several sources, including SDC,
Factiva, and the LoPucki UCLA bankruptcy database for any reference to a default, bankruptcy or debt
restructuring. I start by merging Compustat and DealScan, and then I impose that the cash flow pledge-
ability measure from Nunn (2007) is available [This is also the baseline sample for the ex-ante analysis
that will follow, and it is described in more detail in Chapter 3]. I then compute my measure of financial
performance for all firms, namely the Altman (1968) Z-score, as follows:
Z = 3.3×Pretax Income+1.0×Sales+1.4×Retained Earnings+1.2× Net Working Capital
Total Assets
+0.6×Market Value of Equity
Total Liabilities
It is worth noting though that Gilson, John and Lang (1990) use a different measure of financial
performance, namely unadjusted common stock returns at year end cumulated over three years, and then
focus on the bottom 5% of the distribution. If I use their measure and their procedure, however, I end
up with very few firms that can be credibly described as “financially distressed”. The reason is that in
my sample period many of the worst performers in terms of cumulative stock returns are internet and
high-tech firms with little or no debt. In fact, for firms in the bottom 5% of the distribution of cumulative
stock returns in my sample period, median book leverage is a mere 11.8% of firms’ assets and median
interest coverage is 8.3. Only 7 of these firms file for bankruptcy.
Following the computation of the Z-score for all observations in my sample, I drop all firm-year
observations with Z-score > 1.8. The resulting sample has 2,825 firms. For these firms, I check annual
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reports of all firms from the SEC to confirm distress. I search for keywords such as “financial distress”,
“liquidity needs”, “default”, “history of losses”, “operating loss”, “financial loss”, “insufficient capital/-
funds”, “cash flow deficit”. Following this procedure, 657 firms are classified as not being in financial
distress and therefore discarded. For the remaining 2,168 firms: I search the Thomson Financial database
SDC for debt issuances; I search the LoPucki database at UCLA for Chapter 11 filings, to extract firms
that file for Chapter 11 following distress; and I check if the firm is in violation of a covenant on interest
coverage or on the current ratio. For all these firms, I read the annual reports (10k) starting from the
year of distress to check for any reference to financial restructuring and how distress is resolved. The
resulting sample has 161 financially distressed firms that engage in some kind of financial restructuring.
2.2.2 Junk Bond Issuers
I identify all firms that have high-yield (“ junk”) bonds outstanding over the 1998-2011. My defi-
nition of financial distress is then based on the interest coverage ratio, following Asquith, Gertner, and
Scharfstein (1994). I classify a firm as financially distressed if, in any two consecutive year, starting from
the year after the junk bond issuance, the interest coverage ratio is less than 1, i.e. the firm’s earnings be-
fore interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) are less than the reported interest expense;
or, if in any one year, the interest coverage ratio is less than 0.8. The first year in which the firm is in
financial distress according to this criterion is then denoted by year 0. Furthermore, I exclude firms with
a financial industry as their primary SIC code; I exclude firms with an interest coverage ratio between
0.8 and 1 in only one year, as these firms took no visible action in response to distress; I exclude firms
with coverage shortfalls in the year of a junk bond issue as interest expense in that year may just reflect
issuing fees, while proceeds may be used to repay interest; and I require that firms have publicly traded
equity, so no firms in the sample issued junk bonds as part of a leveraged buyout. This procedure results
in a sample of 99 firms, of which 93 engage in some financial restructuring.
2.3 Creditor Control and Collateral Intensity
In studying the role of creditor control in the resolution of financial distress ex-post, I focus on the
probability of resolving financial distress out of court relative to filing for bankruptcy, and I estimate a
probit model:
Out-of-Court Restructuringi,t =

1 Y ∗ ≥ 0
0 Y ∗ < 0
(2.4)
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where:
Y ∗ = β1 (Creditor Control) i,t−1+β2 (Creditor Control) i,t−1 .(Collateral Intensity) i,t−1+β3Xi,t−1+ εi,t
εi,t ∼ N(0,1)
My main coefficient of interest is β2, which I expect to be positive from Prediction (1) of the previous
section. I also expect β1 > 0. In the theoretical benchmark, creditor control is a contract whereby the
entrepreneur or CEO is running the firm on behalf of the equity holders as long as outstanding debt
is repaid, but control shifts to the creditors upon failure to repay. The empirical literature (Chava and
Roberts, 2008; Roberts and Sufi, 2009a; Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2012) has identified such creditors in
control as the lenders that are protected by debt covenants in the context of private credit agreements.
Upon violation of such covenants, these papers document that control shifts to creditors, as creditors
typically threaten to accelerate the loan and as a result capital investment declines sharply following a
financial covenant violation (Roberts and Sufi, 2009a).
A growing literature has established that such creditors exercise control in a variety of ways, not just
in the case of a covenant violation (or technical default). For example, covenants are often renegotiated
well before a violation occurs (Roberts and Sufi, 2009b; Denis and Wang, 2013). Therefore, covenants
in private lending agreements are a contractual feature that makes sure that control shifts to creditors
upon violation. Covenants in private lending agreements differ from those in public debt agreements
in two major ways. First, evidence in Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) suggests that fewer than 5% of
public bond indentures contain an explicit restriction on firm investments. Second, even when present,
the covenants in public bond indentures are generally less tight than their counterparts in private credit
agreements, in the sense that the distance between the covenant threshold and the actual accounting mea-
sure is larger in public bond indentures (Kahan and Tuckman, 1995).
As a result of the above, I identify firms as having a “creditor control”contract if the firm in both the
year prior to entering financial distress and the year of financial distress has 1) at least one outstanding
private credit agreement, and 2) one of such private credit agreements has at least one covenant. I search
the DealScan database of private credit agreements to determine if my sample firms fulfill these condi-
tions, and I classify as creditor control 86 of my poor performers (out of 161), and 34 of my junk bond
issuers (out of 93).
The other variable needed to estimate model (2.4) is the importance of collateral across industries,
that is, collateral intensity. I proxy for collateral intensity by 1 minus the contract intensity measure con-
structed by Nunn (2007), which in turn proxies for the importance of relationship-specific investments.
My collateral intensity measure therefore captures the extent of the collateralizability of the firm’s assets,
33
Table 2.1
The Twenty Least and Twenty Most Collateral Intensive Industries
The table lists the twenty least and twenty most intensive industries in terms of collateral out of a pool
of 281 industries in total from a sample of 4,598 distinct firms (34,655 firm-year observations) between
1996 and 2011. Coll.Int. refers to Collateral Intensity and is calculated as (1 - Contract Intensity)
whereby Contract Intensity measures are taken from Nunn (2007). AT represents average asset tangibility
by industry.
Least Collateral Intensive Most Collateral Intensive
SIC Coll.Int. Industry Description AT SIC Coll.Int Industry Description AT
3711 0.023 Motor Vehicles & Passenger
Car Bodies
0.166 2090 0.827 Miscellaneous Food Prepa-
rations - Coffee & Tea
0.278
3571 0.044 Electronic Computers 0.097 3390 0.838 Miscellaneous Primary
Metal Products
0.324
7372 0.053 Services-Prepackaged Soft-
ware
0.099 2070 0.856 Fats & Oils 0.517
3572 0.058 Computer Storage Devices 0.115 2810 0.862 Industrial Inorganic Chemi-
cals
0.496
6411 0.069 Insurance Agents, Brokers
& Service
0.069 3580 0.864 Refrigeration & Service In-
dustry Machinery
0.253
3575 0.084 Computer Terminals 0.166 2990 0.870 Miscellaneous Products of
Petroleum & Coal
0.236
3576 0.099 Computer Communications
Equipment
0.100 2090 0.875 Miscellaneous Food Prepa-
rations & Kindred Products
0.512
3721 0.107 Aircraft 0.200 3341 0.879 Secondary Smelting & Re-
fining of Nonferrous Metals
0.305
3663 0.109 Radio & TV Broadcasting
& Communications Equip-
ment
0.138 3330 0.889 Primary Smelting & Refin-
ing of Nonferrous Metals
0.508
3812 0.112 Search, Detection, Naviga-
tion, Guidance, Aeronauti-
cal Sys
0.129 3270 0.892 Concrete, Gypsum & Plaster
Products
0.504
2790 0.113 Service Industries For The
Printing Trade
0.213 2040 0.901 Grain Milling Products -
Rice
0.436
3760 0.115 Guided Missiles & Space
Vehicles & Parts
0.333 3334 0.908 Other Aluminum Rolling &
Drawing
0.528
3661 0.120 Telephone & Telegraph Ap-
paratus
0.122 5190 0.913 Wholesale-Miscellaneous
Non-durable Goods
0.453
3825 0.127 Instruments For Meas &
Testing of Electricity & Elec
Signals
0.137 3350 0.917 Rolling Drawing & Extrud-
ing of Nonferrous Metals
0.409
3728 0.128 Aircraft Parts & Auxiliary
Equipment, NEC
0.219 3334 0.942 Primary Production of Alu-
minum
0.537
2750 0.128 Commercial Printing 0.136 3845 0.947 Electromedical & Elec-
trotherapeutic Apparatus
0.338
2451 0.146 Mobile Homes 0.197 2040 0.964 Grain Milling Products -
Wet corn
0.531
3931 0.146 Musical Instruments 0.307 2911 0.964 Petroleum Refining 0.586
2082 0.149 Malt Beverages 0.459 2040 0.976 Grain Mill Products - Flour 0.438
3760 0.150 Guided Missiles & Space
Vehicles & Parts
0.145 2015 0.976 Poultry Slaughtering and
Processing
0.512
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both the physical and the non-physical ones, and varies by industry. It has a direct theoretical counterpart
in my model parameter alpha. When collateral intensity is high then alpha is high and assets are easy to
collateralize.
Importantly, unlike asset tangibility, collateral intensity is an industry characteristic, so it reflects
the industry’s economic conditions and does not depend on the firm’s actual decisions. Table A3 in the
Appendix shows that collateral intensity correlates positively with asset tangibility, but the coefficient is
only 53%. Table 1 reports the twenty least and the twenty most collateral intensive industries. It shows
that electronics and computers are among the least collateral intensive industries; and that petroleum re-
fining and electromedical and electrotherapeutic are among the most collateral intensive ones. The table
also reports average asset tangibility in those industries, clearly showing the lack of a perfect correspon-
dence between the two measures. For example, the petroleum and coal products industry has low asset
tangibility but high collateral intensity.
2.4 Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 2 provides summary statistics for my sample of 161 poor performers. Sample size
is similar to that of Gilson, John, and Lang (1990), who study a sample of 169 firms that restructure
their private debt over 1978-1987. After adjusting for inflation, my firms are about 20% larger, with total
assets of $1,253 million on average, and less levered than theirs. Median leverage, computed at market
values of equity, is 40% of assets in my sample, in comparison to Gilson, John and Lang (1990) who
compute leverage at book values and record a median long-term debt of about 50% of assets. Average
operating profitability is 1.4% of assets. Debt structure is similar to that of Gilson, John and Lang (1990),
as about 50% of total debt is private, and 40% of total debt is secured by collateral. Relative to firms
without creditor control, firms with creditor control are slightly smaller, have higher leverage (41.6%
vs. 34.2%), lower market-to-book ratio (1.46 vs. 1.64), lower profitability (0.005 vs. 0.023), and a
higher proportion of private debt (53.3% vs. 48.1%) and secured debt (45% vs. 32.7%). None of these
differences are statistically significant.
Table 2 Panel B provides summary statistics for the sample of junk bond issuers. Sample size is
similar to that of Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994), who study a sample of 102 junk bond issuers
who became distressed over the period of 1976-1989. After adjusting for inflation, my firms are about
40% larger in terms of sales, with total sales of $980 million and total assets $1,542 million. The financial
structure of my sample is remarkably similar to that of Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994): Book
leverage in my sample is only slightly larger (59% of assets vs. 56%), while interest coverage is slightly
worse (-0.4 vs. -0.3). Within my junk bond issuers sample and relative to firms without creditor control,
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Table 2.2
Characteristics of Distressed Firms
The table presents summary statistics for a group firms that were experiencing financial distress between 1996 and 2011. Panel A examines a sample of
161 firms from the intersection between Compustat and DealScan that score below 1.8 on the Altman Z-score, and either issue debt according to the SDC
database, or file for Chapter 11 according to the UCLA database, or violate an interest coverage or current ratio covenant. Panel B reports statistics for a
sample of 93 firms from the intersection between Compustat and DealScan that issue junk bonds, and have an interest coverage ratio that is smaller than
1 in two consecutive years or smaller than 0.8 in any one year. The statistics were run on the Full Sample and then repeated by group of Creditor Control
and No Creditor Control firms. Public Debt Issues reports the number of outstanding bonds and notes at the time of distress. Private Debt is the fraction of
bank debt out of total debt. Public Debt is the fraction of bonds and notes of total debt. Secured Debt is the fraction of total debt that is collateral-backed.
SD is the standard deviation. N is the number of observations. Variables are defined in the Appendix.
Panel A: Distressed Firms – Poor Performers
Full Sample Creditor Control No Creditor Control
Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N
Leverage 0.382 0.401 0.171 161 0.416 0.438 0.158 86 0.342 0.319 0.177 75
Market-to-Book Ratio 1.543 0.996 2.082 161 1.459 0.850 1.986 86 1.640 1.156 2.197 75
Asset Tangibility 0.305 0.266 0.200 161 0.309 0.260 0.195 86 0.300 0.270 0.207 75
Profitability 0.014 0.060 0.154 161 0.005 0.049 0.154 86 0.023 0.071 0.156 75
Firm Size 6.168 6.223 1.590 161 5.953 6.058 1.581 86 6.416 6.523 1.574 75
Public Debt Issues 2.459 2.000 3.713 157 2.012 1.000 2.423 85 2.986 2.000 4.778 72
Private Debt 0.509 0.473 0.350 157 0.533 0.507 0.351 85 0.481 0.461 0.349 72
Public Debt 0.478 0.503 0.352 157 0.446 0.476 0.356 85 0.515 0.539 0.346 72
Secured Debt 0.394 0.293 0.390 157 0.450 0.432 0.382 85 0.327 0.087 0.391 72
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Table 2.2 – Continued
Panel B: Distressed Firms – Junk Bond Issuers
Full Sample Creditor Control No Creditor Control
Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N
Leverage 0.446 0.521 0.195 93 0.480 0.517 0.158 34 0.426 0.521 0.213 59
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.929 0.213 2.272 93 0.541 0.026 1.460 34 1.152 0.282 2.615 59
Asset Tangibility 0.447 0.488 0.278 93 0.465 0.503 0.246 34 0.436 0.476 0.297 59
Profitability -0.029 0.003 0.122 93 -0.004 0.007 0.073 34 -0.043 -0.002 0.141 59
Firm Size 5.876 5.856 1.608 91 6.175 6.172 1.240 34 5.697 5.670 1.778 57
Public Debt Issues 2.860 2.000 3.024 93 2.912 2.000 2.906 34 2.831 2.000 3.114 59
Private Debt 0.330 0.192 0.343 88 0.371 0.302 0.346 32 0.306 0.184 0.342 56
Public Debt 0.714 0.798 0.455 88 0.688 0.776 0.329 32 0.729 0.808 0.516 56
Secured Debt 0.556 0.520 0.399 88 0.633 0.695 0.388 32 0.512 0.427 0.401 56
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firms with creditor control are somewhat larger, have higher leverage (48% vs. 42.6%), and a smaller
market-to-book ratio (0.541 vs. 1.152). In terms of debt structure, and perhaps unsurprisingly, firms
with creditor control have a higher proportion of private debt (37% vs. 31%) and a higher proportion
of secured debt (63% vs. 51%) than firms without creditor control. While none of these differences are
statistically significant, they all go in the same direction as in the sample of poor performers.
2.5 Results
Table 3 provides summary statistics on how the companies in my samples cope with financial distress.
I divide the samples into six non-mutually-exclusive categories: bank loosening, bank tightening, public
debt restructuring, large asset sales, large capital expenditures reductions relative to the firm’s industry,
and Chapter 11 filings.
Panel A of Table 3 focuses on poor performers. Out-of-court restructuring is achieved by 110 firms,
while the remaining 51 firms end up filing for Chapter 11. Of the firms with creditor control, 63 of 86
restructure out of court, as compared with 47 out of 75 for firms without creditor control. The difference
in proportion, 73.3% vs. 62.7%, is statistically significant and shows that firms with creditor control are
more likely to restructure out of court. The opposite is to true for Chapter 11 filings.
All restructuring outcomes are quite common. Bank loosening is done by 35 firms, bank tightening
by 31 firms, and public debt restructuring by 35 firms, i.e. each type of liability side restructuring is
done by around 20% of sample firms. Creditor control firms are more likely to engage in any of these
types of restructurings than firms without creditor control. The picture is similar with respect to asset
side restructuring, in which reductions of capital expenditures are more common (42% of the sample
firms), and large asset sales are relatively uncommon (4% of the sample firms). Both of these asset-side
restructurings are more common for firms with creditor control. One exception are mergers, which are
more common among firms without creditor control.
Panel B of Table 3 focuses on junk bond issuers, and shows that out-of-court restructurings and
Chapter 11 filings are more evenly spread both among each other (46% vs. 54%) and also across firms
with creditor control vs. non creditor control, with the latter somewhat more likely to restructure out of
court although the difference is not statistically significant. Panel B of Table 3 shows that also for junk
bond issuers all outcomes are quite common. On the liability side, perhaps unsurprisingly given the debt
structure of these firms, one third of junk bond issuers experience a public debt restructuring, which is
significantly more likely among firms without creditor control. Bank debt restructuring, both tightening
and loosening, is by contrast much less likely than among poor performers. Firms with creditor control
are more likely to restructure their private debt by tightening it and less likely to attempt a public debt
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Table 2.3
Anatomy of Financial Distress and Creditor Control
The table presents restructuring characteristics for a group of firms that were experiencing financial
distress between 1996 and 2011. Panel A examines a sample of 161 firms from the intersection between
Compustat and DealScan that score below 1.8 on the Altman Z-score, and either issue debt according to
the SDC database, or file for Chapter 11 according to the UCLA database, or violate an interest coverage
or current ratio covenant. Panel B reports statistics for a sample of 93 firms from the intersection between
Compustat and DealScan that issue junk bonds, and have an interest coverage ratio that is smaller than 1
in two consecutive years or smaller than 0.8 in any one year. The statistics were run on the Full Sample
and then repeated by group of Creditor Control and No Creditor Control firms. N is the number of firms
that undertake the corresponding kind of restructuring and Obs is the total number of firms that attempt
any kind of restructuring. Variables are defined in the Appendix.
Panel A: Distressed Firms – Poor Performers
Full Sample Creditor Control No Creditor Control
N Obs Mean N Obs Mean N Obs Mean
Liability-Side Restructuring
Bank loosening 35 161 0.217 29 86 0.337 6 75 0.080
Bank tightening 31 161 0.193 26 86 0.302 5 75 0.067
Public debt restructuring 35 161 0.217 22 86 0.256 13 75 0.173
Asset-Side Restructuring
Large asset sales 6 161 0.037 6 86 0.070 0 75 0.000
CapEx decline relative to industry 67 161 0.416 44 86 0.512 23 75 0.307
Merger 23 161 0.143 7 86 0.081 16 75 0.213
Chapter 11 51 161 0.317 23 86 0.267 28 75 0.373
Out-of-Court 110 161 0.683 63 86 0.733 47 75 0.627
Panel B: Distressed Firms – Junk Bond Issuers
Full Sample Creditor Control No Creditor Control
N Obs Mean N Obs Mean N Obs Mean
Liability-Side Restructuring
Bank loosening 11 93 0.118 5 34 0.147 6 59 0.102
Bank tightening 9 93 0.097 5 34 0.147 4 59 0.068
Public debt restructuring 31 93 0.333 6 34 0.176 25 59 0.424
Asset-Side Restructuring
Large asset sales 14 93 0.151 5 34 0.147 9 59 0.153
CapEx decline relative to industry 45 93 0.484 16 34 0.471 29 59 0.492
Merger 6 93 0.065 1 34 0.029 5 59 0.085
Chapter 11 43 93 0.462 21 34 0.618 22 59 0.373
Out-of-Court 50 93 0.538 13 34 0.382 37 59 0.627
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restructuring than firms without creditor control. On the asset side, again declines in capital expenditures
are the most common outcome, followed by asset sales and mergers. Firms with creditor control are
significantly less likely to experience a decline in capital expenditures, to be taken over, or to experience
a large asset sale.
In Table 4, I estimate equation (2.4). Consistent with my first theoretical prediction I find that firms
with creditor control are more likely to restructure out of court relative to filing for Chapter 11, particu-
larly in industries with high collateral intensity. This result holds in both the sample of poor performers
and in the sample of junk bond issuers. For illustration purposes, the results in the table are presented
using a constant set of control variables. Sample size among the junk bond issuers subsample, which
drops to 29 when I impose availability of the collateral intensity measure, limits the number of control
variables that I can include in a single regression model. The results are however robust to adjusting
for a wide variety of control variables. The result indicates that firms with creditor control are more
successful at resolving financial distress out of court in industries where the firms’ assets are easier to
pledge as collateral. The control variables have the predicted sign although they are seldom statistically
significant. Firms with more tangible assets are more likely to resolve financial distress out of court.
Firms whose senior creditors, whether in control or not, have protection in reorganization are less likely
to resolve distress out of court. The number of public debt issues and the proportion of secured debt are
not significantly related to the probability of resolving financial distress out of court.
While my main prediction on ex-post resolutions of distress holds in both samples, the mechanism
appears different. Among poor performers, specification (1) of Table 4 shows that firms with creditor
control are indeed more likely to restructure out of court, consistent with theoretical predictions and with
the univariate evidence of Table 3 Panel A. Among junk bond issuers, however, while creditors in control
are more likely to resolve distress out of court in industries with better collateral intensity, as in specifi-
cation (4), they are if anything less likely to restructure out of court than firms without creditor control,
as in specification (3). This is consistent with the univariate evidence of Table 3 Panel B. While neither
the univariate evidence of Table 3 Panel B nor the multivariate evidence of Table 4 specification (4) are
statistically significant, they do point to the fact that firms with creditor control among junk bond issuers
appear to have a slight preference for filing for Chapter 11. This finding suggests that filing for Chapter
11 might not be conducive for these creditors to a worse outcome than out-of-court restructuring. To
shed light on this possibility, in what follows I examine in greater detail the outcomes of restructuring
for both of my sample firms.
Table 5 reports summary statistics on the firms with creditor control and no creditor control that file
for Chapter 11. These statistics mirror those in Table 2 for all financially distressed firms, and they show
40
Table 2.4
Creditor Control and Financial Distress
Probit regressions results of the effect of creditor control and other control variables on the reorganization
of financially distressed firms between 1996 and 2011. Poor Performers is a sample of 161 firms from the
intersection between Compustat and DealScan that score below 1.8 on the Altman Z-score, and either
issue debt according to the SDC database, or file for Chapter 11 according to the UCLA database, or
violate an interest coverage or current ratio covenant. Junk Bond Issuers is a sample of 93 firms from
the intersection between Compustat and DealScan that issue junk bonds, and have an interest coverage
ratio that is smaller than 1 in two consecutive years or smaller than 0.8 in any one year. The dependent
variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm reorganizes out of court as opposed
to chapter 11 proceedings. Senior Creditor Protected in Reorganization is a dummy that takes the value
of 1 if the senior creditor is either repaid in full or is given equity. Public Debt Issues reports the number
of outstanding bonds and notes at the time of distress. Secured Debt is the fraction of total debt that is
collateral-backed. p-values are between parentheses. Variables are defined in the Appendix. Omitted
variables are replaced by -.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Creditor Control * Collateral Intensity – 0.504 – 0.771
– (0.003) – (0.075)
Creditor Control 0.191 0.044 -0.133 -0.956
(0.005) (0.654) (0.330) (0.002)
Collateral Intensity – -0.106 – -0.743
– (0.299) – (0.011)
Asset Tangibility 0.034 0.095 0.082 0.704
(0.813) (0.491) (0.739) (0.103)
Senior Creditor Protected in Reorganization -0.028 -0.025 -0.150 -0.450
(0.632) (0.620) (0.261) (0.049)
Public Debt Issues 0.003 0.004 0.005 -0.010
(0.601) (0.494) (0.809) (0.733)
Secured Debt -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.725
(0.953) (0.986) (0.991) (0.003)
Sample Poor Performers Poor Performers Junk Bonds Junk Bonds
Robust Standard Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 127 127 68 29
R2 0.102 0.119 0.032 0.480
that there are no significant differences between firms that emerge from Chapter 11 and firms that do not:
they are all very similar in terms of size, profitability, market-to-book ratio, and asset tangibility.
Table 6 reports outcomes of Chapter 11 for firms with and without creditor control. Panel A focuses
on the sample of poor performers and Panel B focuses on the sample of junk bond issuers. The main
finding of Table 6 is that, in the sample of junk bond issuers, creditors in control are significantly more
likely to be protected in Chapter 11 reorganization than creditors in firms without creditor control. Such
protection is defined by collateral before the bankruptcy procedures; and does translate into a higher
probability of being repaid in full, or being given a majority of the equity of the firm upon reorganiza-
tion. This finding is large in economic terms (from Panel B, 72% of firms without creditor control vs.
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Table 2.5
Characteristics of Chapter 11 Firms
The table presents summary statistics for a group of firms that filed for Chapter 11 between 1996 and 2011. Poor Performers is
a sample of 161 firms from the intersection between Compustat and DealScan that score below 1.8 on the Altman Z-score, and
either issue debt according to the SDC database, or file for Chapter 11 according to the UCLA database, or violate an interest
coverage or current ratio covenant. Junk Bond Issuers is a sample of 93 firms from the intersection between Compustat and
DealScan that issue junk bonds, and have an interest coverage ratio that is smaller than 1 in two consecutive years or smaller
than 0.8 in any one year. Full Sample consists of 179 bankruptcy cases and was constructed by merging the UCLA Bankruptcy
Research Database with the intersection between Compustat and DealScan. The statistics were done on the full sample (All)
and on the subsample of firms that successfully emerge from bankruptcy (Emerge). All statistics are repeated by group of
creditor control (CC) and no creditor control (No CC) firms. Variables are defined in the Appendix. Each entry reports the
mean, the median and the standard deviation (in parentheses below the mean respectively).
Panel A : Poor Performers
All Emerge
All CC No CC All CC No CC
Leverage 0.367 0.417 0.326 0.372 0.413 0.334
(0.404) (0.438) (0.307) (0.409) (0.438) (0.327)
(0.180) (0.148) (0.197) (0.183) (0.163) (0.197)
Market-to-Book Ratio 1.826 1.371 2.199 2.049 1.640 2.415
(1.080) (1.040) (1.312) (1.194) (1.189) (1.199)
(2.595) (2.319) (2.788) (2.967) (2.642) (3.258)
Asset Tangibility 0.282 0.271 0.291 0.295 0.265 0.322
(0.255) (0.242) (0.288) (0.284) (0.220) (0.344)
(0.176) (0.145) (0.201) (0.179) (0.157) (0.197)
Profitability -0.002 0.022 -0.023 0.012 0.032 -0.006
(0.002) (0.029) (0.003) (0.040) (0.055) (0.013)
(0.138) (0.101) (0.161) (0.144) (0.112) (0.169)
Firm Size 6.242 6.393 6.117 6.384 6.627 6.167
(6.178) (6.178) (6.187) (6.454) (6.610) (6.331)
(1.454) (1.473) (1.452) (1.497) (1.492) (1.508)
Number of Observations 51 23 28 36 17 19
Panel B: Junk Bond Issuers
All Emerge
All CreditorC No CC All CC No CC
Leverage 0.477 0.463 0.490 0.485 0.463 0.507
(0.560) (0.494) (0.572) (0.562) (0.520) (0.587)
(0.184) (0.174) (0.196) (0.186) (0.184) (0.190)
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.615 0.136 1.073 0.540 0.159 0.921
(-0.016) (-0.016) (-0.015) (-0.017) (-0.026) (-0.015)
(2.655) (0.633) (3.643) (2.764) (0.679) (3.868)
Asset Tangibility 0.416 0.415 0.417 0.429 0.431 0.428
(0.400) (0.437) (0.362) (0.441) (0.444) (0.415)
(0.268) (0.245) (0.293) (0.268) (0.248) (0.294)
Profitability -0.009 -0.004 -0.015 0.002 -0.001 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
(0.092) (0.072) 0.110 (0.071) (0.076) (0.068)
Firm Size 5.943 6.550 5.364 6.043 6.729 5.357
(5.871) (6.523) (5.581) (6.201) (6.752) (5.723)
(1.792) (1.194) (2.085) (1.859) (1.163) (2.183)
Number of Observations 43 21 22 36 18 18
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Table 2.5 - Continued
Panel C: Full Sample
All Emerge
All CC No CC All CC No CC
Leverage 0.295 0.320 0.266 0.295 0.325 0.255
(0.300) (0.332) (0.249) (0.299) (0.348) (0.236)
(0.233) (0.236) (0.228) (0.237) (0.237) (0.232)
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.371 0.426 0.304 0.375 0.453 0.269
(0.004) (-0.000) (0.190) (-0.005) (-0.001) 0.000
(1.273) (1.550) (0.828) (1.398) (1.683) (0.880)
Asset Tangibility 0.394 0.419 0.364 0.407 0.419 0.390
(0.386) (0.425) (0.328) (0.403) (0.431) (0.358)
(0.233) (0.218) (0.250) (0.241) (0.224) (0.264)
Profitability 0.004 0.049 -0.052 0.007 0.056 -0.061
(0.041) (0.050) (0.010) (0.044) (0.060) (0.030)
(0.203) (0.090) (0.277) (0.222) (0.091) (0.315)
Firm Size 6.531 6.790 6.210 6.528 6.834 6.107
(6.614) (6.743) (6.242) (6.603) (6.795) (6.136)
(1.386) (1.102) (1.623) (1.391) (1.146) (1.585)
Number of Observations 179 98 81 141 81 60
44% of firms without creditor control), and statistically significant. By contrast, in the poor performers
sample examined in Panel A the difference in the extent of such protection between firms with creditor
control and firms without creditor control is small and statistically insignificant.
These findings rationalize my earlier finding of specification (3) in Table 4 that among junk bond is-
suers firms with creditor control are not more likely to restructure out of court than firms without creditor
control. As I have just found in Table 6, the reason is that in firms with complex debt structures that in-
clude junk bonds outstanding, creditors in control require additional collateral and contractual protection
than in firms with more simple debt structures.
I also examine a large set of other outcomes of Chapter 11 in great detail in Table 6. I focus on
whether the senior creditor is repaid in full or not, given equity, renegotiates contractual terms, prolongs
maturity. I examine whether junior creditors are impaired in the restructuring, whether the firm under-
goes a distressed exchange, whether the CEO is replaced, whether a DIP financing is extended, by the
current senior creditor or by some other creditor. The consistent picture painted by my findings is that
creditors in control are not less likely to be associated with actions aimed at a successful restructuring
of the firm than firms without creditor control. For most measures, firms with creditor control are if
anything more likely to pursue a successful restructuring than firms without creditor control.
In Panel C I examine the full sample of Chapter 11 filings for which the collateral intensity measure
is available. Here, the picture is the same as before, the only difference is that thanks to the larger sample
size I am able to detect statistically significant differences. Firms with creditor control are more likely
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Table 2.6
Outcomes of Chapter 11
The table presents the different outcomes faced by a group of firms that filed for Chapter 11 between 1996 and 2011. Poor
Performers is a sample of 51 firms from the intersection between Compustat and DealScan that score below 1.8 on the Altman
Z-score, and either issue debt according to the SDC database, or file for Chapter 11 according to the UCLA database, or
violate an interest coverage or current ratio covenant. Junk Bond Issuers is a sample of 43 firms from the intersection between
Compustat and DealScan that issue junk bonds, and have an interest coverage ratio that is smaller than 1 in two consecutive
years or smaller than 0.8 in any one year. Full Sample consists of 179 bankruptcy cases and was constructed by merging the
UCLA Bankruptcy Research Database with the intersection between Compustat and DealScan. The outcomes of Chapter 11
were collected manually from firm filings with the SEC. Senior Creditor Protected in Reorganization is a dummy that takes the
value of 1 if the senior creditor is either repaid in full or is given equity. Senior Creditor Renegotiates is a dummy that takes
the value of 1 if the senior creditor prolongs maturity or suffers a distressed exchange where Distressed Exchange takes the
value of 1 if the senior creditor is given a new security in exchange of the old one. DIP refers to debtor-in-possession financing.
Percentage of firms is presented between parentheses below the actual count. p-values for the results of the test of difference in
proportions are in parentheses in the last column.
Panel A: Poor Performers
Creditor Control No Creditor Control Z-Test
Emerge 17 19 (0.318)
(73.91%) (67.86%)
Conditional On Emergence
Senior Creditor Protected in Reorganization 6 7 (0.462)
(35.29%) (36.84%)
Senior Creditor Repaid in Full 2 6 (0.181)
(11.76%) (31.58%)
Senior Creditor Given New Equity 4 1 (0.027)
(23.53%) (5.26%)
Percent of Equity to Senior Creditor (Mean) 41.36% 9.44% (0.067)
– –
Senior Creditor Unaffected 0 2 (0.112)
(0.00%) (10.53%)
Senior Creditor Repaid Less Than Full and No Equity 0 1 (0.201)
(0.00%) (5.26%)
Senior Creditor Renegotiates 4 3 (0.279)
(23.53%) (15.79%)
Senior Creditor Prolongs Maturity 3 2 (0.146)
(17.65%) (10.53%)
Junior Impaired 2 7 (0.018)
(11.76%) (36.84%)
Distressed Exchange 1 1 (0.381)
(5.88%) (5.26%)
CEO Turnover 6 6 (0.132)
(35.29%) (31.58%)
DIP Facility 6 7 (0.222)
(35.29%) (36.84%)
DIP From Senior Creditor 2 2 (0.324)
(11.76%) (10.53%)
DIP From New Creditor in Control 4 3 (0.258)
(23.53%) (15.79%)
DIP From Other Creditor 0 2 (0.088)
(0.00%) (10.53%)
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Table 2.6 - Continued
Panel B: Junk Bond Issuers
Creditor Control No Creditor Control Z-Test
Emerge 18 18 (0.365)
(85.71%) (81.82%)
Conditional On Emergence
Senior Creditor Protected in Reorganization 13 8 (0.046)
(72.22%) (44.44%)
Senior Creditor Repaid in Full 8 3 (0.038)
(44.44%) (16.67%)
Senior Creditor Given New Equity 5 5 (0.446)
(27.78%) (27.78%)
Percent of Equity to Senior Creditor (Mean) 55.23% 65.96% (0.341)
– –
Senior Creditor Unaffected 1 1 (0.480)
(5.56%) (5.56%)
Senior Creditor Repaid Less Than Full and No Equity 0 3 (0.026)
(0.00%) (16.67%)
Senior Creditor Renegotiates 2 5 (0.103)
(11.11%) (27.78%)
Senior Creditor Prolongs Maturity 1 2 (0.250)
(5.56%) (11.11%)
Junior Impaired 7 8 (0.273)
(38.89%) (44.44%)
Distressed Exchange 1 3 (0.140)
(5.56%) (16.67%)
CEO Turnover 8 5 (0.216)
(44.44%) (27.78%)
DIP Facility 11 8 (0.255)
(61.11%) (44.44%)
DIP From Senior Creditor 4 1 (0.095)
(22.22%) (5.56%)
DIP From New Creditor in Control 4 4 (0.500)
(22.22%) (22.22%)
DIP From Other Creditor 3 3 (0.350)
(16.67%) (16.67%)
to emerge successfully from Chapter 11, and more likely to emerge with the senior creditor (in control)
repaid in full, and more likely to extend DIP financing facilities, either from the previous senior creditor
or from a new senior creditor.
These findings are also consistent with the view that in recent years Chapter 11 has become more
pro-creditor (Ayotte and Morrison, 2009; Adler, Capkun, and Weiss, 2013; Bharath, Panchapegesan, and
Werner, 2013), relative to the 1980s and early 1990s in which Chapter 11 was commonly characterized
as pro-debtor. In addition, and in contrast with previous results, my results show that creditor control is
more likely to be associated with the restructuring of viable firms than firms without creditor control.
Finally, Table 7 reports the outcomes of out-of-court restructurings. Also in out-of-court restructur-
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Table 2.6 - Continued
Panel C: Full Sample
Creditor Control No Creditor Control Z-Test
Emerge 81 60 (0.081)
(82.65%) (74.07%)
Conditional On Emergence
Senior Creditor Protected in Reorganization 53 31 (0.017)
(65.43%) (51.67%)
Senior Creditor Repaid in Full 37 16 (0.005)
(45.68%) (26.67%)
Senior Creditor Given New Equity 19 15 (0.898)
(23.46%) (25.00%)
Percent of Equity to Senior Creditor (Mean) 86.57% 77.17% (0.474)
– –
Senior Creditor Unaffected 2 3 (0.451)
(-2.47%) (5.00%)
Senior Creditor Repaid Less Than Full and No Equity 2 6 (0.028)
(2.47%) (10.00%)
Senior Creditor Renegotiates 25 17 (0.477)
(30.86%) (28.33%)
Senior Creditor Prolongs Maturity 16 9 (0.395)
(19.75%) (15.00%)
Junior Impaired 23 28 (0.014)
(28.40%) (46.67%)
Distressed Exchange 9 8 (0.759)
(11.11%) (13.33%)
CEO Turnover 48 33 (0.336)
(59.26%) (55.00%)
DIP Facility 59 31 (0.028)
(72.84%) (51.67%)
DIP From Senior Creditor 24 12 (0.094)
(29.63%) (20.00%)
DIP From New Creditor in Control 16 0 (0.631)
-19.75% 0.00%
DIP From Other Creditor 19 19 (0.083)
(23.46%) (31.67%)
ings the picture is very similar, in that among both poor performers (Panel A) and junk bond issuers
(Panel B), firms with creditors in control are more likely to restructure successfully out of court, and
more likely to emerge having being repaid in full than senior creditors in firms without creditor control.
Interestingly, junior creditors are more likely to be impaired, and CEOs more likely to be replaced, in
firms without creditor control than firms with creditor control.
In summary, consistently across all my outcome measures, firms with creditor control appear to seek
to restructure or reorganize firms with valuable investment opportunities, in line with my model but con-
trary to traditional financial contracting models. Furthermore, and consistent with my first theoretical
prediction, firms with creditor in control are more likely to restructure out of court relative to filing for
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Table 2.7
Outcomes of Out-of-Court Restructuring
The table presents the different outcomes faced by a group of firms that experienced financial distress
between 1996 and 2011. Poor Performers is a sample of 110 firms from the intersection between Com-
pustat and DealScan that score below 1.8 on the Altman Z-score, and either issue debt according to the
SDC database, or file for Chapter 11 according to the UCLA database, or violate an interest coverage or
current ratio covenant. Junk Bond Issuers is a sample of 50 firms from the intersection between Com-
pustat and DealScan that issue junk bonds, and have an interest coverage ratio that is smaller than 1 in
two consecutive years or smaller than 0.8 in any one year. The outcomes of restructuring were collected
manually from firm filings with the SEC. Senior Creditor Protected in Reorganization is a dummy that
takes the value of 1 if the senior creditor is either repaid in full or is given equity. Senior Creditor Renego-
tiates is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the senior creditor prolongs maturity or suffers a distressed
exchange where Distressed Exchange takes the value of 1 if the senior creditor is given a new security in
exchange of the old one. Percentage of firms is presented between parentheses below the actual count.
p-values for the results of the test of difference in proportions are in parentheses in the last column.
Panel A: Poor Performers
Creditor Control No Creditor Control Z-Test
Emerge 62 47 (0.193)
(98.41%) (100.00%)
Conditional On Emergence
Senior Creditor Protected in Reorganization 11 2 (0.016)
(17.74%) (4.26%)
Senior Creditor Repaid in Full 11 2 (0.016)
(17.74%) (4.26%)
Senior Creditor Given New Equity 0 0 –
(0.00%) (0.00%)
Percent of Equity to Senior Creditor (Mean) 0.00% 0.00% –
– –
Senior Creditor Unaffected 34 30 (0.262)
(54.84%) (63.83%)
Senior Creditor Repaid Less Than Full and No Equity 0 0 –
(0.00%) (0.00%)
Senior Creditor Renegotiates 3 2 (0.443)
(4.84%) (4.26%)
Senior Creditor Prolongs Maturity 3 2 (0.443)
(4.84%) (4.26%)
Distressed Exchange 0 0 –
(0.00%) (0.00%)
Public Creditors Fully Repaid 12 12 (0.220)
(19.35%) (25.53%)
Public Creditors Given New Equity 2 0 (0.107)
(3.23%) (0.00%)
Percent of Equity to Public Creditors (Mean) 8.35% 0.00% –
– –
CEO Turnover 14 16 (0.097)
(22.58%) (34.04%)
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Table 2.7 - Continued
Panel B: Junk Bond Issuers
Creditor Control No Creditor Control Z-Test
Emerge 13 36 (0.275)
(100.00%) (97.30%)
Conditional On Emergence
Senior Creditor Protected in Reorganization 2 2 (0.134)
(15.38%) (5.56%)
Senior Creditor Repaid in Full 2 1 (0.075)
(15.38%) (2.78%)
Senior Creditor Given New Equity 0 1 (0.272)
(0.00%) (2.78%)
Percent of Equity to Senior Creditor (Mean) 0.00% 99.00% –
– –
Senior Creditor Unaffected 8 23 (0.440)
(61.54%) (63.89%)
Senior Creditor Repaid Less Than Full and No Equity 0 0 –
(0.00%) (0.00%)
Senior Creditor Renegotiates 4 4 (0.050)
(30.77%) (11.11%)
Senior Creditor Prolongs Maturity 4 4 (0.250)
(30.77%) (11.11%)
Distressed Exchange 0 0 –
(0.00%) (0.00%)
Public Creditors Fully Repaid 2 5 (0.448)
(15.38%) (13.89%)
Public Creditors Given New Equity 1 12 (0.036)
(-7.69%) (33.33%)
Percent of Equity to Public Creditors (Mean) 97.00% 31.91% (0.099)
– –
CEO Turnover 4 13 (0.406)
(30.77%) (36.11%)
bankruptcy, particularly in industries where collateralization of assets is easier. The ways in which this
outcome is achieved differs across samples. In particular, creditors in control seek more protection from
collateral and other contractual provisions in my junk bond issuers firms in which capital structure is
more complex. In the next chapter I turn to examining ex-ante capital structure choices.
2.6 Conclusion
I study theoretically and empirically the financial contracts associated with efficient resolutions of
financial distress ex-post. I have presented a financial contracting model where the pledgeability of cash
flows varies across industries. The main predictions of my model are that (1) firms with creditor control
are more likely to resolve financial distress out of court, relative to filing for bankruptcy, particularly
in industries where pledgeability of cash flows is higher, and (2) firms with creditor control can borrow
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more, particularly in industries where pledgeability of cash flows is higher. I find results consistent with
prediction (1) in two samples of financially distressed firms. Prediction (2) will be tested empirically in
the chapter that follows.
My theoretical framework departs from traditional financial contracting models, in that creditor con-
trol is not necessarily associated with a bias toward liquidation, and clarifies that creditors in control can
see the upside of efficient reorganization, particularly in industries where the firms’ assets can be posted
more easily as collateral. As such, it helps bridge the gap between the traditional literature of financial
contracting, which sees creditor control as necessarily associated with inefficient liquidation, and the
empirical evidence of a widespread use of creditor control, and particularly that creditors in control often
promote the successful out-of-court restructuring of viable firms.
While my results suggest that creditor control is on average beneficial, in that ex-post it allows firms
to resolve financial distress out of court without bearing the costs of formal bankruptcy procedures, read-
ers should be warned that my framework and results do not necessarily imply that creditor control should
be adopted by all firms, irrespective of their characteristics and investment opportunities. Well beyond
the costs of excessive liquidation, which my analysis shows to be mitigated by the pledgeability of cash
flows at the industry level, there may be other limitations that prevent firms from setting up their debt
structure so as to allocate control to the creditors. A formal modeling and empirical investigation of such
potential costs of creditor control are clearly beyond the scope of this chapter, and I leave them to future
research.
The next chapter reviews Prediction (2) of my model in an empirical setting using a large sample
of firms. The chapter tests whether the allocation of control rights to creditors ex-ante allows firms to
borrow more, with a particular focus on industries where cash flow pledgeability is high.
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Chapter 3
Control Rights and Capital Structure
For decades now, an extensive body of finance literature has been concerned with understanding the
way in which firms decide about their financial policies and what factors dictate their capital structure.
Typically, the capital structure literature was divided among three main streams in explaining corporate
financial policy: the Agency Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the Pecking Order Theory (Myer and
Majluf, 1984) and the Tradeoff Theory (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). More recent empirical work has
on the one hand examined market timing behavior (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) as a determinant of corpo-
rate financial policy and on the other hand focused on the role of contractual restrictions in affecting the
choice of capital structure. In that sense, the majority of the literature in the latter stream emphasizes the
role of debt covenant violations in determining firms’ financial leverage. Very little attention has been
given however to the question of whether the allocation of control rights to creditors affects corporate
financial policy ex-ante. This question constitutes a fundamental empirical issue because, as pointed out
by Roberts and Sufi (2009a), the possible breach of a covenant in debt contracts and the consequences
associated with such a breach may push managers to rely less on debt in their capital structure mixes
and be more conservative in that regard ex-ante. In addition, it becomes evident from Chapter 2, both
theoretically and empirically, that creditors in control see the upside of efficient reorganization and hence
can avoid the costs associated with formal bankruptcy procedures in case of distress, and this in turn may
affect capital structure decisions ex-ante.
Furthermore, it has been challenging to univocally interpret the large available evidence on capital
structure, or at least pieces of it, through the lenses of the financial contracting literature. The most
notable example is perhaps the well-known positive correlation between asset tangibility, defined as
property, plant, and equipment as a percent of total assets, and leverage, the ratio of total debt to total
assets (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). This positive correlation is consistent with the central idea of finan-
cial contracting models that the availability of physical collateral allows firms to borrow more. However,
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the mapping with theory is neither tight, nor univocal. First, asset tangibility reflects the current choice
of firms to invest in tangible assets rather than the potential of the firm’s assets to support future debt
capacity. Second, the positive association of tangibility with leverage is also consistent with real options
theory, i.e., the idea that firms holding tangible assets-in-place having active second-hand markets will
borrow more than firms holding specialized, intangible assets or valuable growth opportunities (Myers,
1977). Third, recent theory (Gennaioli and Rossi, 2013) predicts that it is the possibility of using any
asset - including non-physical ones such as future cash flows - as collateral that matters, while asset
tangibility only refers to a specific subset of the firm’s physical assets. Consequently, no conclusive
empirical evidence exists to support theories of financial contracting and much work still remains to be
done in this field.
This chapter aims at filling the gaps that exist between the financial contracting theory and the related
empirical evidence in the determination of capital structure dynamics. I use a sample of 4,598 distinct
U.S. firms (34,655 firm-year observations) between 1996 and 2011 corresponding to 3,195 loan con-
tracts, and find that roughly 74% of the financial contracts in my sample have creditor control and 60%
of all contracts are secured by collateral. Also, consistent with my model predictions, my preliminary
statistics show that firms with creditor control have on average 64% more leverage than firms without
creditor in control. The difference is significant at the 1% level. Statistics also show that in general firms
with creditor control are older, larger, more profitable, and have higher asset tangibility than firms with
no creditor control.
In addition to examining the effect of creditor control on capital structure decisions, I also control
for another dimension reflecting the degree of pledgeability of a firms’ cash flows. The pledgeability of
cash flows is represented by the collateral intensity measure which is derived from the contract intensity
measure constructed by Nunn (2007) and proxies for the importance of relationship-specific investments
in an industry. My statistics show that firms in industries with higher cash flow pledgeability have higher
leverage ratios. Combined with my previous observation where firms with creditor control were found
to have higher leverage than firms without creditor control, a two-way sort on both these dimensions
shows that as cash flow pledgeability increases, firms with creditor control have higher leverage than
firms without creditor control.
My empirical findings confirm my model predictions and univariate observations that firms with
creditor control borrow more than firms without creditor control. This finding is robust to a large number
of empirical estimation exercises, and to controlling for the many variables that have been used in the
literature as cross-sectional determinants of capital structure, most notably credit rating. In particular,
I mitigate concerns about creditor control being endogenous to capital structure choices by performing
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pooled OLS with firm fixed effects, and by instrumenting creditor control by an indicator of the firm’s
inclusion into the S&P500 index. In all of these tests, and even after all control variables are introduced,
creditor control is always positively and significantly associated with higher leverage. The economic
magnitude of the effect is very large: firms with creditor control have a level of leverage as a percentage
of firms’ assets that is 4.5% points higher than firms without creditor control.
These findings fall under the very extensive literature on capital structure. By focusing on how the
effect of creditor control rights on capital structure depends on the industry-level ease of collateraliz-
ability of the firms’ assets this chapter contributes to two strands of the literature, one that shows that
the extent of managerial discretion is correlated with security issuance decisions (Jung, Kim, and Stulz,
1996; Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 1997; and Garvey and Hanka, 1999); and a recent strand that shows
that the supply of capital affects financial policy (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Leary, 2006; Billett,
King, and Mauer, 2007; Sufi, 2009; Lemmon and Roberts, 2010; and Murfin, 2012). None of these
papers examines how the ex- ante allocation of control rights has implications for capital structure that
depend on the ease of collateralizability of the firms’ assets.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: section 1 describes the data selection and sample
construction process, section 2 describes the literature related to the main control variables used in the
statistical analysis, section 3 provides some descriptive statistics, section 4 summarizes the main findings
and resulting implications, and finally, section 5 concludes.
3.1 Data and Sample Selection
My starting sample is the universe of all Compustat firms between 1996 and 2011 excluding financial
firms (SIC 6000-6999). I choose 1996 because prior to that year information on loan covenants is scarce;
in addition, 1996 is the year where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) imposed that all
firms submit their filings electronically, and this mitigates data availability problems. For data continuity
purposes, I impose that all observations have data available at time t and t-1 for all the variables consid-
ered in my analysis. All variable definitions are available in the Appendix. Also, to remove outliers and
mitigate the effect of data errors, I winsorize all variables at the 5th and 95th percentiles. The conditions
I impose on my data result in a dataset of 98,768 unique firm-year observations from Compustat, down
from an initial size of 135,804 observations.
I augment the Compustat data with loan data from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) DealScan
database. I focus on private debt issues as they are subject to both stricter and more frequent covenant
occurrences when compared to public debt issues (Kahan and Tuckman, 1995). The strictness of bond
covenants is defined as the distance between the threshold specified by the covenant and the actual ac-
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counting measure at the time of the issue. DealScan lists information on dollar-denominated private
loans issued by both commercial and investment banks, as well as insurance companies, pension funds
and other nonbank institutions to U.S. firms starting from 1981 up to the present date (Chava and Roberts,
2008).
Consistently with the Compustat dataset, I collect loan data starting from 1996 as loan coverage in
DealScan is more extensive after that year and includes a bigger fraction of all commercial loans. The
majority of the loan information is gathered from SEC filings (13Ds, 14Ds, 13Es, 10Ks, 10Qs, 8Ks,
and registration statements) while the remainder of the data is obtained through contacts with the credit
industry as well as borrowers and lenders. The unit of observation in DealScan is the loan, also known
as facility or tranche. Loans however may be grouped into deals or packages (Chava and Roberts, 2008).
I refer to these packages as financial contracts throughout my analysis.
Among the information contained in DealScan about loan issues, I focus my attention exclusively on
restrictive covenant information. Therefore I filter on contracts containing covenant information only. I
download all contracts within the same time range as Compustat. The majority of covenants are tabu-
lated in DealScan except for Capital Expenditures and EBITDA covenants which I extract by searching
through contract remarks. The matching between Compustat and DealScan is done in two stages: first,
I match the DealScan dataset with the DealScan-Compustat link file provided by Chava and Roberts
(2008) by Borrower Name. This allows for each loan from DealScan to be attributed the correspond-
ing unique company identifier GVKEY from Compustat, which is used in the second stage, along with
the year of the contract agreement, to match the DealScan dataset to the Compustat dataset. The full
DealScan sample contains 15,353 financial contracts (19,794 loans). Out of this total, 9,518 financial
contracts (11,990 loans) are merged with Compustat for 4,027 unique firms.
Because in DealScan several loans appear under the same contract, the above matching results in
the duplication of unique firm-year observations from Compustat to match all individual loans. Con-
sequently, to preserve the uniqueness of my firm-year observations, I group all loans within a single
contract into one firm-year observation reflecting the characteristics of all loans under that contarct. For
that purpose, I add up all covenants under each loan to create one series of covenants corresponding to
the main contract. In case a covenant is missing in one loan but available in another, this covenant is
reported under the main contract. If however the same covenant exists in more than one loan, the main
contract’s covenant is considered to be the average of each individual loan’s covenant threshold weighted
by loan amount. The contract amount is computed as the sum of all individual loan amounts. Where
loans under one contract have overlapping creditors, the maximum number of creditors on a single loan
is assigned to the main contract; if no overlap exists however, the number of creditors of the main con-
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Table 3.1
Creditor Control in Credit Agreements
The table presents descriptive statistics of the characteristics of credit agreements. Panel A presents
statistics for the whole DealScan universe of 19,794 loans between 1996 and 2011. Panel B repeats the
same statistics for a sample of 3,944 loans matched with Compustat and Nunn (2007) contract intensity
measure. Creditor Control states whether the credit agreement contains at least one covenant imposed
by the lender. Secured refers to whether the financial contract is collateral-backed. Maximum CapEx
covenants specify the maximum capital expenditures amount beyond which no further investments may
be undertaken. Minimum EBITDA covenants impose a floor on cash earnings which can be used to
repay obligations. Minimum Net Worth covenants insure that the liquidation value of the firm’s asset
provides enough coverage in case of default. Minimum Fixed Charge, Debt Service and Interest Cover-
age covenants measure the ease with which a firm can cover its interest obligations through cash from
operating activities and must not fall below a certain predetermined threshold. Maximum Debt to Cash
Flow and Debt to Tangible Net Worth covenants put a ceiling on the maximum percentage of debt the
company can have in its capital structure. Minimum Current Ratio covenants impose a lower bound on
the current ratio and describe a company’s ability to meet its short term obligations. Sweep covenants
indicate the percentage of proceeds obtained through excess cash flows, asset sales, debt issuance and
equity issuance that must be used to repay the loan. %Contracts represents the percentage of the whole
sample having the corresponding covenant in their credit agreement.
Panel A: All DealScan Loans – 19,794 Loans
Covenant Variables %Contracts Mean Median SD
Contract Amount – 764,136,240 175,000,000 11,729,691,982
Maturity (years) – 3.770 3.830 2.070
Creditor Control 74.18% – – –
Secured 62.04% – – –
Maximum CapEx 22.18% 57,967,793 20,000,000 148,677,021
Minimum EBITDA 7.75% 99,874,253 18,000,000 1,357,181,753
Minimum Fixed Charge Coverage 24.77% 1.437 1.250 0.555
Minimum Debt Service Coverage 2.97% 1.468 1.250 0.561
Minimum Interest Coverage 11.60% 2.294 2.000 0.904
Maximum Debt to Cash Flow 36.47% 4.138 3.750 1.734
Maximum Debt to Net Worth 3.24% 2.693 2.000 3.995
Minimum Current Ratio 2.42% 1.290 1.150 0.530
Minimum (Tangible) Net Worth 11.70% 1,214,261,183 235,800,000 7,292,345,856
Excess Cash Flow Sweep 5.25% 61.690 50.000 15.540
Asset Sales Sweep 24.26% 98.400 100.000 8.300
Debt Issuance Sweep 18.52% 97.860 100.000 9.560
Equity Issuance Sweep 15.96% 79.520 100.000 24.080
tract is computed as the sum of all creditors on all individual loans. The number of lead arrangers of the
main contract is defined as the number of distinct arrangers on all individual loans. The same applies to
the number of syndicates. Finally, the main contract inherits its maturity from the loan with the longest
maturity. In addition , all firm-years subsequent to the date of initiation of a certain contract are filled
with the same covenant information of that contract until maturity.
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Table 3.1 - Continued
Panel B: Compustat-Matched Loans Sample – 3,944 Loans
Covenant Variables %Contracts Mean Median SD
Contract Amount – 456,742,861 125,000,000 1,660,515,064
Maturity (years) – 3.610 3.170 2.130
Creditor Control 74.16% – – –
Secured 59.94% – – –
Maximum CapEx 23.02% 43,736,226 15,000,000 116,537,142
Minimum EBITDA 9.86% 39,078,041 12,500,000 101,944,041
Minimum Fixed Charge Coverage 23.25% 1.440 1.250 0.616
Minimum Debt Service Coverage 2.31% 1.487 1.250 0.605
Minimum Interest Coverage 10.45% 2.493 2.500 0.946
Maximum Debt to Cash Flow 38.80% 3.706 3.500 1.376
Maximum Debt to Net Worth 4.56% 1.655 1.500 1.106
Minimum Current Ratio 2.79% 1.519 1.500 0.678
Minimum (Tangible) Net Worth 10.62% 672,133,308 165,000,000 2,249,913,285
Excess Cash Flow Sweep 4.21% 58.430 50.000 15.590
Asset Sales Sweep 21.81% 98.160 100.000 9.590
Debt Issuance Sweep 16.68% 98.850 100.000 6.51%
Equity Issuance Sweep 14.71% 80.210 100.000 24.110
Finally, I complement the resulting dataset with the industry-level contract intensity measure as cal-
culated by Nunn (2007). Nunn (2007) studies international trade and relationship-specific investments,
and examines whether countries with better contract enforcement benefit from a comparative advantage.
The author classifies data into 342 distinct manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries. The contract
intensity measure is constructed using the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)’s United States I-O Use
Table and 1997 I-O Industry Classification to determine which and how much intermediate inputs are
used and how many of these require relationship-specific investments. The final measure reflects the
degree of contract enforcement at industry level and is computed as the product of the proportion of the
value of a certain input out of the total inputs used in that one industry by the proportion of the same
input that is neither bought nor sold on an exchange.
With the inclusion of the contract intensity measure, my final sample consists of 34,655 firm-years
observations between 1996 and 2011 for 4,598 distinct firms containing 3,195 financial contracts (3,944
loans).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics at the loan level for the financial contracts in my sample. Panel
A of the table reports statistics for the full DealScan sample consisting of 19,794 loans. The Panel
shows that roughly 74% of all contracts in the sample allocate control rights to creditors through the
imposition of restrictive covenants and 62% of contracts are secured by collateral. Covenants that are
mostly recurrent in the sample are the maximum debt to cash flow covenant (36%), the minimum fixed
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Table 3.2
Financial Contracts Characteristics
The table examines 3,195 financial contracts between 1996 and 2011. A contract is defined as the ag-
gregation of loans issued in the same year to the same firm. The sample was constructed by merging
DealScan with Compustat and Nunn (2007)’s Contract Intensity measure. Panel A of the table presents
statistics for the 3,195 financial contracts at initiation; while Panel B presents the same statistics for a
sample of 34,655 firm-year observations representing the outstanding financial contracts throughout the
sample duration. Creditor Control states whether the financial contract contains at least one covenant
imposed by the lender. Number of Loans is the number of loans aggregated under each financial con-
tract. Number of Covenants is the total number of covenants in a certain contract. Contracts (Firm-Years)
represents the number of financial contracts initiated (outstanding) under each category.
Panel A – Financial Contracts at Initiation
By Firm-Year Contracts Mean Median 90th Percentile Max 10th Percentile Min
Creditor Control 1,144 – – – – – –
Number of Loans 3,195 1.23 1.00 2.00 7.00 1.00 1.00
Number of Covenants 3,195 1.70 1.00 4.00 8.00 0.00 0.00
Number of Creditors 3,195 7.18 4.00 18.00 114.00 1.00 1.00
Number of Syndicates 3,195 2.52 1.00 2.00 134.00 1.00 1.00
Number of Lead Arrangers 3,195 1.06 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00
Maturity (Years) 3,195 3.59 3.08 5.08 23.00 1.00 0.17
Panel B – Financial Contracts Outstanding
By Firm-Year Firm-Years Mean Median 90th Percentile Max 10th Percentile Min
Creditor Control 5,175 – – – – – –
Number of Loans 34,655 1.23 1.00 2.00 7.00 1.00 1.00
Number of Covenants 34,655 1.77 1.00 4.00 8.00 0.00 0.00
Number of Creditors 34,655 7.07 4.00 17.00 114.00 1.00 1.00
Number of Syndicates 34,655 2.57 1.00 2.00 134.00 1.00 1.00
Number of Lead Arrangers 34,655 1.07 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00
Maturity (Years) 34,655 2.09 1.83 5.00 23.00 0.00 0.00
charge coverage ratio (24.77%) which reflects the firm’s ability to satisfy fixed financing expenses, the
asset sale sweep covenant (24.26%), which specifies the percentage of the proceeds of any asset sale
that creditors require to be used to service debt, and finally the maximum CapEX covenant (22.18%).
Broadly speaking, 43% of contracts contain a financial covenant imposing accounting restrictions with
debt in the numerator and 32% are subject to ratios concerning the amounts of interest payments. Overall,
over 58% of the credit agreements in my sample have covenants that somehow influence debt issuance or
repayments and this reflects the importance of covenants in affecting borrowers’ capital structure. Panel
B repeats the same statistics on the sample of 3,195 financial contracts for which a collateral intensity
measure is available. The percentages shown in this panel closely compare to the percentages examined
in Panel A.
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Table 2 presents summary statistics at the firm-year level for the 3,195 financial contracts (Panel A),
and for the 34,655 firm-years in my final sample (Panel B), of which 5,175 are classified as creditor
control ones. The table shows that on average financial contracts in my sample contain 2 covenants
while the maximum number of covenants per contract is 8. The maximum number of loans per contract
is 7 loans, while the average contract is made up of 1 loan. The average number of lead arrangers per
contract is 1, while the average number of syndicates is 2 and the average number of lenders is 7. The
maximum number of lead arrangers goes up to 3 per contract, while the maximum number of creditors
and syndicate can go as high as 114 and 134 respectively in one contract.
3.2 Determinants of Leverage
My main dependent variable is (quasi-)market leverage, defined as book debt divided by the result
of total assets (Compustat item 6) minus book equity plus market equity. Book debt is defined as the
sum long-term debt (Compustat item 9) and debt in current liabilities (Compustat item 34). Book eq-
uity is defined as total assets minus total liabilities (item 181) and preferred stock liquidating value(item
10) plus deferred taxes (item 35) and convertible debt (item 79) if preferred stock liquidating value is
available, otherwise the latter is replaced with preferred stock redemption value (Compustat item 56) .
Market equity is defined as common shares outstanding (item 25) times the stock price (item 199). I
also perform my tests with book leverage defined as book debt divided by total assets as the dependent
variable.
My main focus is on creditor control and on collateral intensity as independent variables. I focus
on the control variables that a large literature has found to correlate with leverage. To organize the
analysis, I group such variables into two sets, a first set containing the variables that have the longest
tradition of being examined in capital structure studies, as summarized in Rajan and Zingales (1995),
namely market-to-book ratio, profitability, asset tangibility, and firm size. Market-to-book may relate
to investment opportunities and real option theory, or to equity market mispricing. It is defined as the
ratio of market equity to book equity. Tangible assets may reflect active second hand markets, consistent
with real option theory, or may be better used as collateral, consistent with financial contracting models.
Tangibility is defined as net property, plant and equipment (item 8) divided by total assets. Profitability
is associated with the availability of internal funds and may be associated with lower leverage under
pecking order theory; alternatively, it may also reflect a tax-advantaged retention of earnings in a more
realistic tax environment. Profitability is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (i.e.
EBITDA, item 13) divided by total assets. Size may increase leverage if larger firms are less likely to
enter costly financial distress. It is measured as the log of sales.
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Table 3.3
Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the unbalanced panel of 4,598 firms from 1996 to 2011. Panel
A presents statistics for the main control variables used in the analysis for the full sample of 34,655 firm-
year observations. Panel B presents statistics for additional control variable for a subsample of 9,231
firm-year observations. Variables are defined in the Appendix. Each entry reports the mean, the median
and the standard deviation (in parentheses below the mean respectively). In the Difference column, the
p-value for the t-test of difference in means at the 99 percent confidence level is reported first, followed
by the p-value of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
Full Sample Creditor Control No Creditor Control Difference
Dependent Variable
Leverage 0.142 0.212 0.129 (0.000)
(0.075) (0.177) (0.058) (0.000)
(0.168) (0.179) (0.163) –
Panel A: Main Control Variables
Market-to-Book Ratio 2.381 2.131 2.425 (0.000)
(1.670) (1.606) (1.683) (0.002)
(2.836) (2.189) (2.933) –
Asset Tangibility 0.216 0.259 0.209 (0.000)
(0.156) (0.206) (0.146) (0.000)
(0.189) (0.186) (0.189) –
Profitability -0.050 0.106 -0.077 (0.000)
(0.085) (0.116) (0.074) (0.000)
(0.393) (0.119) (0.418) –
Firm Size 4.605 6.102 4.336 (0.000)
(4.612) (6.172) (4.266) (0.000)
(2.396) (1.593) (2.417) –
Number of Observations 34,655 5,175 29,480 –
The second set of control variables have been focused on by a more recent literature, of which no-
table recent examples are Fama and French (2002), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), and Saretto and
Tookes (2013). These variables are R&D expenditures (item 46) divided by total assets; R&D dummy,
a dummy equal to one if R&D expenditures is missing; credit rating, a dummy equal to one if the firm
has a credit rating from S&P (item 280); advertising expenses (item 45) divided by sales (item 12); firm
age, the log of one plus the number of years since the oldest between IPO year or years since first link
with CRSP; volatility, defined as the standard deviation of annual changes in earnings, divided by total
assets, over years t-1 through t-4; tax credit (item 208) divided by assets; abnormal earnings per share,
defined as the change in operating earnings per share from year t-1 to year t, divided by the share price;
book dividends, defined as common dividends (item 21) divided by book equity; and market dividends,
defined as common dividends divided by market equity. Fama and French (2002) regard book dividends
as a proxy for profitability, and market dividends and R&D expenditures as proxies for investment op-
portunities. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) regard credit rating as a proxy for access to public bond
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Table 3.3 - Continued
Panel B: Additional Control Variables
Full Sample Creditor Control No Creditor Control Difference
R&D/Assets 0.087 0.036 0.099 (0.000)
(0.049) (0.010) (0.064) (0.000)
(0.106) (0.058) (0.111) –
Advertising/Sales 0.008 0.008 0.008 (0.946)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.820)
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) –
Firm Age 2.318 2.446 2.290 (0.000)
(2.303) (2.485) (2.303) (0.000)
(0.482) (0.427) (0.489) –
Volatility 0.024 0.007 0.028 (0.000)
(0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.000)
(0.049) (0.017) (0.053) –
Tax Credit 0.000 0.000 0.001 (0.000)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) –
Abnormal EPS 0.027 -0.002 0.034 (0.004)
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
(0.488) (0.450) (0.496) –
Dividends /Book Equity 0.006 0.008 0.006 (0.000)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) –
Dividends /Market Equity 0.003 0.005 0.004 (0.000)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) –
Number of Observations 9,231 1,662 7,569 –
markets, and R&D and advertising as proxies for investments in brand name and intellectual capital.
Saretto and Tookes (2013) regard increased earnings volatility as a proxy for increased default proba-
bilities and expect it to decrease debt capacity; and abnormal earnings per share as capturing signaling
effects of leverage choice and expect it to be positively associated with leverage.
3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3 presents summary statistics for my sample. In the univariate comparison, it shows that firms
with creditor control have leverage as 21.2% of assets, as compared with firms without creditor control
that have leverage of 12.9% of assets. The difference is significant at the 1% level.
Table 3 also shows that firms with creditor control differ from those without creditor control in a
number of dimensions, which will need to be controlled for in the empirical analysis. The table shows
that firms with creditor control are larger, have lower market-to-book ratio, higher asset tangibility, higher
profitability, invest less in R&D, are more likely to have a credit rating, are older, have lower stock price
volatility, lower tax credit, lower abnormal earnings per share, and pay more dividends than firms with
60
Table 3.4
Average Market Leverage by Creditor Control and Industry
The table surveys a panel of 34,655 firm-year observations between the years 1996 and 2011. The obser-
vations were matched with Nunn (2007)’s Contract Intensity measure. Collateral Intensity is calculated
as (1 - Contract Intensity) and proxies for the degree of investor protection. Observations are grouped by
quintiles in descending order of Collateral Intensity and appear in the table as Q5-1. The table presents
average market leverage sorted by industry’s collateral intensity and creditor control. Creditor control is
a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the firm has at least one covenant in its credit agreement. Yes and
No refer to whether the firm does or does not have Creditor Control restrictions respectively. All refers
to the whole panel data with available industry measure. The number of observations under each sort is
shown between parentheses.
Creditor Control
Industry All No Yes
All 0.142 0.129 0.212
(34,655) (29,480) (5,175)
Collateral Intensity Q5 0.221 0.203 0.290
(6,931) (5,531) (1,400)
Collateral Intensity Q4 0.175 0.164 0.217
(6,931) (5,560) (1,371)
Collateral Intensity Q3 0.128 0.119 0.174
(6,931) (5,840) (1,091)
Collateral Intensity Q2 0.116 0.107 0.181
(6,931) (6,051) (880)
Collateral Intensity Q1 0.068 0.065 0.108
(6,931) (6,498) (433)
no creditor control. Even though many of these differences are small, they are all significant at the 1%
level, possibly reflecting the large sample size. I will control for all of those variables in the regression
analysis.
Table 4 reports the two-way sort of my sample, by whether the firm is creditor control or not, and by
the quintile of the extent of collateral intensity. Consistent with my theoretical prediction (2) in Chapter
2, I find that 1) firms with creditor control have higher leverage than firms without creditor control; 2)
firms have higher leverage in industries where collateral intensity is higher - in fact, leverage increases
monotonically by the quintile of collateral intensity, being lowest in the bottom quintile, and highest in
the top quintile; and 3) within each quintile of collateral intensity, firms with creditor control have higher
leverage than firms without creditor control. The economic significance of these differences is very large:
the leverage of firms without creditor control in the bottom quintile of collateral intensity is only 6.5%,
as compared with the 29% by firms with creditor control in the top quintile of collateral intensity.
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Table 3.5
Regression Estimations of the Determinants of Capital Structure
OLS Regressions of market leverage on creditor control, collateral intensity, market-to-book ratio, asset tangibility, profitability, firm size, book dividends,
market dividends, R&D expenditures, credit rating, advertising expense, firm age, volatility, tax credit and abnormal returns. Coefficients are estimated on
a sample of 34,655 firm year observations resulting from the intersection of all Compustat firms excluding financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), all DealScan
firms and Nunn (2007)’s contract intensity measure between 1996 and 2011. Models (1) and (5) are simple OLS regressions. Models (2) and (6) estimate
Fama-MacBeth regressions with Newey-West standard errors. Models (3) and (7) fix industry effects with robust standard errors clustered by industry.
Models (4) and (8) run fixed firm effects with robust standard errors clustered by firm. All models have time fixed effects. p-values are between parentheses.
All independent variables are all lagged. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Omitted variables are replaced by -.
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Creditor Control 0.058 0.053 0.045 0.023 0.034 0.035 0.030 0.020
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.005)
Collateral Intensity 0.095 0.091 – – 0.067 0.064 – –
(0.000) (0.000) – – (0.000) (0.000) – –
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.012 -0.013 -0.010 -0.005 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Asset Tangibility 0.168 0.166 0.164 0.121 0.124 0.129 0.133 0.114
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Profitability -0.037 -0.050 -0.044 -0.045 -0.046 -0.055 -0.045 -0.044
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.002) (0.000)
Firm Size 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.020 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.020
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.006) (0.002) (0.041) (0.000)
R&D – – – – -0.207 -0.204 -0.156 -0.065
– – – – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.056)
R&D Dummy – – – – 0.037 0.035 0.027 0.005
– – – – (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.641)
Credit Rating – – – – 0.095 0.093 0.098 0.052
– – – – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Advertising/Sales – – – – -0.215 -0.173 -0.407 -0.278
– – – – (0.059) (0.113) (0.010) (0.171)
Firm Age – – – – -0.007 -0.007 -0.012 0.053
– – – – (0.202) (0.259) (0.140) (0.000)
Volatility – – – – 0.125 0.184 0.200 -0.011
– – – – (0.027) (0.017) (0.002) (0.906)
Tax Credit – – – – -10.361 -15.818 -9.572 -1.997
– – – – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.364)
Abnormal EPS – – – – -0.002 -0.008 0.002 0.000
– – – – (0.790) (0.397) (0.552) (0.930)
Book Dividends – – – – -1.014 -1.133 -1.076 0.115
– – – – (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.626)
Market Dividends – – – – 0.965 0.693 0.942 0.314
– – – – (0.010) (0.145) (0.014) (0.296)
Robust Standard Errors Yes Newey-West Yes Yes Yes Newey-West Yes Yes
Robust SE Clustering By Time – By Industry By Firm By Time – By Industry By Firm
Year Fixed Effects Yes – Yes Yes Yes – Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No – No Yes No – No Yes
Industry Fixed Effects No – Yes No No – Yes No
Estimation – Fama-MB Within Within – Fama-MB Within Within
Number of Observations 33,776 33,776 33,117 33,776 9,231 9,231 9,155 9,231
R2 20.78% 19.91% 18.98% 13.44% 28.79% 31.14% 27.64% 16.21%
63
3.4 Results
The univariate comparisons so far provide a consistent picture that creditor control is associated with
higher leverage, particularly in industries with higher collateral intensity. Next, I submit these findings
to a more systematic statistical scrutiny. Table 5 presents regressions of market leverage on creditor con-
trol, collateral intensity and my other control variables in a variety of empirical models and estimation
procedures based on equation (3.1) below, where I expect β > 0:
(
D
A
)
i,t
= α+β1 (Creditor Control) i,t−1+β2Xi,t−1+ εi,t (3.1)
Consistent with my prediction, the central finding of Table 5 is that creditor control is strongly as-
sociated with higher market leverage. This finding is very robust: I perform a large number of different
estimation exercises, such as pooled OLS with standard errors clustered by time (Specifications (1) and
(5)), Fama-MacBeth estimations with Newey-West standard errors (Specifications (2) and (6)), panel
regressions with industry fixed effects and standard errors clustered by industry (Specifications (3) and
(7)), and panel regressions with firm fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm (Specifications
(4) and (8)). In all these models, the coefficient on creditor control is positive and strongly statistically
significant at the 1% level. The economic magnitude is large and implies that firms with creditor control
have between 2% and 5.8% more leverage than firms without creditor control. I obtain very similar re-
sults in tests where book leverage is the dependent variable, reported in Table A4 in the Appendix.
In specifications (1), (2), (5), and (6) where I exclude industry or firm fixed effects, I add collateral
intensity and I find that, as predicted, it is positively and significantly associated with leverage. In partic-
ular, a one standard deviation increase in collateral intensity is associated with 2.28% higher leverage.
Next, I move on to empirical tests of my theoretical Prediction (2) that creditor control should be as-
sociated with higher debt capacity particularly in industries with higher collateral intensity by estimating
equation (3.2) below:
(
D
A
)
i,t
= α+β1 (Creditor Control) i,t−1 .(Collateral Intensity) i,t−1+β2Xi,t−1+ εi,t (3.2)
I expect β1 > 0. Table 6 presents regressions results from estimating equation (3.2). I perform panel
regressions controlling for industry fixed effects, and with standard errors clustered by industry. My find-
ings strongly support Prediction (2). I find that the interaction of creditor control and collateral intensity
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Table 3.6
Regression Estimations of the Determinants of Capital Structure
OLS Regressions of market leverage on creditor control, collateral intensity, the interaction of creditor control and collateral
intensity, market-to-book ratio, asset tangibility, profitability, firm size, book dividends, market dividends, R&D expenditures,
credit rating, advertising expense, firm age, volatility, tax credit, abnormal returns and the interaction of the market-to-book
ratio, asset tangibility, size and profitability with creditor control . Coefficients are estimated on a sample of 34,655 firm year
observations resulting from the intersection of all Compustat firms excluding financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), all DealScan
firms and Nunn (2007)’s contract intensity measure between 1996 and 2011. All models are with industry fixed effects, time
fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by industry. p-values are between parentheses. All independent variables are
all lagged. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Omitted variables are replaced by -.
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Creditor Control * Collateral Intensity 0.045 0.050 0.070 0.107
(0.011) (0.024) (0.003) (0.001)
Creditor Control 0.029 0.012 0.050 0.077
(0.000) (0.156) (0.000) (0.003)
Collateral Intensity 0.014 0.076 0.013 0.080
(0.605) (0.197) (0.625) (0.169)
Market-to-Book Ratio * Creditor Control – – -0.005 -0.003
– – (0.001) (0.261)
Asset Tangibility * Creditor Control – – -0.072 -0.098
– – (0.013) (0.013)
Profitability * Creditor Control – – -0.090 -0.022
– – (0.073) (0.630)
Firm Size * Creditor Control – – 0.002 -0.009
– – (0.483) (0.061)
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.010 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Asset Tangibility 0.164 0.133 0.175 0.150
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
Profitability -0.044 -0.045 -0.042 -0.045
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Firm Size 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.006) (0.036) (0.008) (0.024)
R&D – -0.155 – -0.154
– (0.000) – (0.000)
R&D Dummy – 0.027 – 0.028
– (0.006) – (0.004)
Credit Rating – 0.096 – 0.099
– (0.000) – (0.000)
Advertising/Sales – -0.411 – -0.403
– (0.009) – (0.008)
Firm Age – -0.012 – -0.013
– (0.135) – (0.127)
Volatility – 0.202 – 0.209
– (0.002) – (0.002)
Tax Credit – -9.444 – -9.406
– (0.000) – (0.000)
Abnormal EPS – 0.000 – 9.580
– (0.367) – (0.330)
Book Dividends – -1.078 – -1.029
– (0.000) – (0.000)
Market Dividends – 0.932 – 0.837
– (0.014) – (0.030)
Robust Standard Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust SE Clustering By Industry By Industry By Industry By Industry
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 33,117 9,155 33,117 9,155
R2 19.76% 28.43% 20.15% 28.76%
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is strongly positively associated with leverage, and the estimates imply that an increase by one standard
deviation of collateral intensity for a creditor control firm is associated with a 2.7% increase in leverage
relative to a firm without creditor control. Importantly, my results are very robust to controlling for al-
ternative channels. In addition to including all the control variables reported above, I also control for the
interaction of the control variables with creditor control. These controls are important, because Billett,
King, and Mauer (2007) document that the negative impact of the market-to-book ratio on leverage is
attenuated by the presence of covenants, consistent with the idea that covenants can reduce the agency
costs of debt for firms with high growth opportunities. I also control for the interaction of market-to-
book ratio and creditor control, and I still find that creditor control is positively associated with leverage,
particularly in industries with higher collateral intensity. I also repeat my analysis with book leverage
as dependent variable, and I obtain similar results, both qualitatively and quantitatively. I report them in
Table A5 in the Appendix.
Finally, to conclude this section I address more directly the potential endogeneity of creditor control
to the choice of leverage by using instrumental variables. The first stage in instrumental variables esti-
mation is to estimate the endogenous variable, creditor control, as a function of the exogenous variables
in the second stage plus an additional instrument. The instrument captures the variation as to which firms
allocate control rights to creditors. I report the first-stage results in Table 7 Panel A. Notice that some
of the firm characteristics that are correlated with higher leverage ratios also are associated with creditor
control.
For instrument, I need variables that are correlated with whether a firm has creditor control, but un-
correlated with the firm’s desired level of leverage (i.e., the net benefit of debt). My conjecture is that,
the better the firm is well known to the financial markets, the easier it will be to access public markets,
and the less it will need to allocate control to creditors in private credit agreements. As a measure of
whether the firm is widely known to the markets, I use an indicator variable of whether the firm is in the
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 Index. S&P includes firms in the index to make it representative of the
important industries in the economy, not based on the value of the debt tax shield or the costs of financial
distress. As a result, the S&P500 dummy variable is a good candidate for an instrument. The S&P500
dummy is strongly negatively and significantly associated with creditor control, and the F-Test is very
large, suggesting the instrument is unlikely to be weak.
In Table 7 Panel B I report the second stage regression results of leverage on (instrumented) creditor
control. I find that creditor control is still positive and significantly associated with leverage, and once
instrumented, the magnitude of the correlation increases tenfold with respect to the analogous tests of
Table 5, suggesting that, if anything, endogeneity understates the true relation of leverage and creditor
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Table 3.7
2SLS Regression Estimations
Two-stage least squares regressions of market leverage on creditor control, collateral intensity, S&P inclusion, market-to-book
ratio, asset tangibility, profitability, firm size, book dividends, market dividends, R&D expenditures, credit rating, advertising
expense, firm age, volatility, tax credit and abnormal returns. In the first stage presented in Panel (A) the dependent variable is
creditor control. In the second stage presented in Panel (B) the dependent variable is market leverage, the endogenous variable
is creditor control in Models (1)-(4) and credit rating in Model (5), and the instrument is the S&P500 inclusion. Coefficients
are estimated on a sample of 34,655 firm year observations resulting from the intersection of all Compustat firms excluding
financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), all DealScan firms and Nunn (2007)’s contract intensity measures between 1996 and 2011. In
Panel (A), Models (1), (3) and (5) are simple OLS regressions while Models (2), (4) and (6) are estimated with fixed industry
effects and robust standard errors clustered by industry. In Panel (B), Models (1) and (3) and (5) are simple regressions while
Models (2) and (4) and (6) are with industry fixed effects. All models have time fixed effects. p-values are between parentheses.
All independent variables are all lagged. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Omitted variables are replaced by -.
Panel A: First Stage Regressions
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
S&P500 – – -0.087 -0.075 -0.128 -0.082
– – (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.262)
Collateral Intensity 0.063 -0.035 0.060 -0.038 0.116 -0.062
(0.000) (0.472) (0.000) (0.444) (0.000) (0.456)
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.261) (0.663)
Asset Tangibility 0.031 0.044 0.029 0.042 0.045 0.051
(0.012) (0.151) (0.018) (0.168) (0.091) (0.315)
Profitability 0.033 0.018 0.020 0.007 0.019 0.013
(0.000) (0.164) (0.000) (0.502) (0.055) (0.466)
Firm Size 0.034 0.035 0.040 0.039 0.033 0.035
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D – – – – -0.154 -0.130
– – – – (0.000) (0.047)
R&D Dummy – – – – 0.062 -0.130
– – – – (0.000) (0.722)
Credit Rating – – – – 0.145 0.123
– – – – (0.000) (0.000)
Advertising/Sales – – – – 0.575 0.527
– – – – (0.013) (0.321)
Firm Age – – – – 0.053 0.034
– – – – (0.000) (0.046)
Volatility – – – – -0.126 0.073
– – – – (0.023) (0.417)
Tax Credit – – – – -12.536 -9.974
– – – – (0.000) (0.085)
Abnormal EPS – – – – 0.001 0.002
– – – – (0.875) (0.823)
Book Dividends – – – – -0.606 -0.141
– – – – (0.180) (0.858)
Market Dividends – – – – -2.216 -2.031
– – – – (0.002) (0.064)
Robust Standard Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust SE Clustering Time Industry Time Industry Time Industry
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of Observations 33,776 33,117 33,776 33,117 9,231 9,155
F-Test 258.98 17.07 248.00 17.05 55.19 7.83
Prob > F (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Table 3.7 - Continued
Panel B: Second Stage Regressions
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Creditor Control 0.415 0.434 0.313 0.354 0.048
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000)
Collateral Intensity 0.073 0.032 0.033 0.100 0.087
(0.000) (0.091) (0.021) (0.014) (0.000)
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Asset Tangibility 0.157 0.147 0.109 0.114 0.123
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.049 -0.051 -0.053 -0.050 -0.081
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Size -0.007 -0.009 -0.005 -0.006 0.019
(0.000) (0.000) (0.102) (0.206) (0.000)
R&D – – -0.162 -0.111 -0.240
– – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D Dummy – – 0.020 0.023 0.035
– – (0.008) (0.001) (0.000)
Credit Rating – – 0.057 0.059 –
– – (0.000) (0.001) –
Instrumented Credit Rating – – – – -0.065
– – – – (0.134)
Advertising/Sales – – -0.370 -0.574 -0.264
– – (0.004) (0.000) (0.010)
Firm Age – – -0.021 -0.023 -0.005
– – (0.000) (0.000) (0.134)
Volatility – – 0.166 0.182 0.208
– – (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Tax Credit – – -6.553 -6.118 -13.939
– – (0.005) (0.014) (0.000)
Abnormal EPS – – -0.002 0.002 -0.001
– – (0.633) (0.664) (0.731)
Book Dividends – – -0.799 -1.009 -0.970
– – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market Dividends – – 1.525 1.566 0.912
– – (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No
Estimation IV IV IV IV IV
Number of Observations 33,776 33,117 9,231 9,155 9,231
control. Other variables have the predicted sign. Interestingly, Faulkender and Petersen (2006) also use
S&P500 as an instrumental variable. In their setting, S&P500 instruments for whether the firm has access
to public bond markets, i.e., for credit rating. In specification (5) of Panel B, I thus present a regression
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with creditor control not instrumented, and credit rating as instrumented by S&P500. I find that creditor
control is still positive and strongly significantly associated with leverage, but instrumented credit rating
is not significantly associated with leverage, and its sign is actually negative. I interpret these findings
as suggesting that creditor control is a robust predictor of leverage, and that its explanatory power sur-
vives, and actually increases, once the potential endogeneity of creditor control on leverage is taken into
account.
In summary, this section has shown that first, consistent with my theoretical model, both creditor
control and collateral intensity are positively and strongly associated with leverage; and second, consis-
tent with Prediction (2) in Chapter 2, my key finding is that creditor control is positively associated with
leverage particularly in industries with higher collateral intensity.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the role of creditor control rights in capital structure through the channel
of covenants in credit agreements. After the findings of Chapter 2, where creditor control is found to
promote the efficient resolution of financial distress out of court and away from costly bankruptcy, this
chapter explored how the allocation of control rights to creditors affects capital structure decisions ex-
ante knowing the way in which creditors in control handle the resolution of financial distress ex-post.
Over a sample covering the period between 1996 and 2011, I find that around 74% of credit agree-
ments have at least one restrictive covenant. Preliminary statistics show that firms with a creditor in
control are on average more levered than firms with no creditor control. Statistics also show that lever-
age levels are affected by the ease of pledgeability of cash flows in a firm. Combined together, I observe
that with increased levels of cash flow pledgeability, leverage ratios are higher for firms with a creditor
in control. These observations are corroborated by my empirical findings that show that firms with a
creditor in control have leverage ratios 4.5% higher than firms with no creditor control. These results
are robust to the inclusion of a number or control variables and a range of robustness tests. More im-
portantly, consistent with predictions from my model, my results show that creditor control is associated
with higher leverage ratios particularly in industries where firms’ assets are easier to collateralize.
The analysis in this chapter is a novel to the literature on control rights and capital structure as it is the
first to examine empirically how the ex-ante allocation of control rights affects capital structure decisions
that depend on the ease of pledgeability of a firm’s cash flows. The next chapter examines the effect of
the ex-ante allocation of control rights to creditors on capital structure ex-post depending on institutional
and environmental factors dictating the quality of contract and legal enforcement in a country.
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Chapter 4
Control Rights, Capital Structure and Legal
Enforcement
The determinants of capital structure have captured a lot of interest in the finance literature in the
last few decades. Recent empirical research went in two directions in explaining the determination of
financing policy and debt contract characteristics. The first stream of research focuses on the allocation
of control rights in debt contracts and how the transfer of these rights from borrowers to creditors affects
the supply of debt in borrowing firms(Roberts and Sufi, 2009a; Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2012). The second
stream, on the other hand, looks at cross-country variations in creditor legal protection and how this af-
fects the determination of debt contract characteristics such as amount, maturity or interest rate spreads
(Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009). A missing link in the literature however is the effect
of the transfer of control rights to creditors on financing policy in a cross-country setting. The goal of
this study is to explore this link by examining the response of financing policy to a covenant violation,
often referred to as a “technical default”, in different legal environments. More specifically, this study
addresses the question of whether the quality of the legal system in a country amplifies or mitigates the
impact of creditors’ response to a technical default on net debt issuing activity.
Related theoretical research has primarily focused on the contractual resolution of financial distress
through the allocation of control rights to creditors over the reorganization vs. liquidation decision in
the event of default. These financial contracting models nonetheless find a bias toward liquidation that is
inherent in the allocation of creditor rights (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart and Moore, 1998). More re-
cent theoretical work however argues that the presence of strong investor protection allows large creditors
with control rights to pledge a significant share of the borrowers’ reorganization value, hence eliminat-
ing any liquidation bias. Investor protection therefore plays a role in mitigating much of the inefficiency
often associated with creditor control in financial distress (Gennaioli and Rossi, 2013). A large body of
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empirical research has also shown that creditors tend to extend loans in smaller amounts, shorter maturi-
ties and higher spreads in countries with inefficient creditor protection. A more efficient judicial system
on the contrary helps secure a bigger flow of external financing into capital markets, increase loan size
and maturity, capitalize on a more concentrated ownership and reduce interest rate spreads (Laeven and
Majnoni, 2005; Jappelli, Bianco and Pagano, 2005; Esty, 2004; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal,
2009). These findings therefore raise an important question as to whether the legal protection of investors
and creditor contractual control rights complement or substitute for one another.
Using an international dataset of 810 loan contracts (518 firms) in 28 different countries between
1996 and 2011, I find that the average number of covenants in a single contract is highest among coun-
tries coming from a French legal origin, where creditor protection is weakest. I also find that violations
are quite common and occur in more than one quarter of the total number of firms in the sample at any
point in time. This large incidence of covenant violations is consistent with previous evidence reporting a
similar percentage of firms violating a covenant in private credit agreements (Dichev and Skinner, 2002;
Chava and Roberts, 2008; Roberts and Sufi, 2009a; Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2012). This being said, the
fraction of covenants violated is also highest for countries with a French legal origin, with 15% of the
total number of covenants being violated at any point in time during my sample period.
Covenant violations are important in understanding the relationship between creditor control rights
and financing policy for a number of reasons. First, the establishment of financial covenants in debt
contracts serves as a mechanism through which incentive conflicts can be mitigated (Jensen and Meck-
ling, 1976; Smith and Warner, 1979) and this helps secure financing through providing creditors with
a tool for disciplining borrowers in case of misbehavior (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Dewatripont and
Tirole, 1994). Second, the transfer of control rights upon the occurrence of a covenant violation gives
creditors the right to accelerate repayment and restrict any further financing, hence providing them with
a mechanism through which the misalignment of incentives can directly affect financing policy (Tirole,
2006). Finally, covenant violations occur quite frequently (Dichev and Skinner, 2002) and in very rare
cases signal payment defaults or bankruptcy (Gopalakrishnan and Parkash, 1995) implying that covenant
violations are not specific to a set of special circumstances but are rather common, and hence constitute
an important concern for firms in deciding their financing policies well outside of default states (Chava
and Roberts, 2008; Roberts and Sufi, 2009a).
Covenant violations also permit to use a regression discontinuity design as described by Chava and
Roberts (2008) to mitigate the concern that financing policy and covenant thresholds might me jointly
allocated. Violations are identified in this context by comparing the reported values of financial ratios
to the thresholds specified for these ratios in the credit agreement. I focus my attention on covenants
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restricting the current ratio, the net worth, capital expenditures or EBITDA because of their frequent re-
currence in credit agreements, and most importantly because their measurement is unambiguous. Due to
their discrete nature, covenant violations prove quite useful in determining the variation in the distance to
the covenant threshold exogenously and hence facilitate the estimation of the effect of technical defaults
on financing policy. However, since the breakage point at which control rights are transferred from the
borrower to the creditor is the violation itself, regardless of the amount by which the actual ratio misses
the threshold, the distance to the covenant threshold is therefore irrelevant to creditors. This irrelevance
provides a means to isolate the effect of the violation to the discontinuity which can be recorded exactly
at the covenant threshold (Chava and Roberts, 2008).
My results reveal a sharp and persistent drop in the stock of debt capital after a covenant violation.
Particularly, net debt issuance scaled by total assets decreases by 2.9% in the year following a covenant
violation. Compared to a 3% average net debt issuance in non-violation states, this estimate represents
an overall decline in the issuance of debt of almost 97%. This result is both statically and economically
significant and reiterates, in an international setting, the robustness of the evidence provided in a U.S.
setting of the effect of covenant violation on financing policy.
More importantly, consistent with model predictions by Gennaioli and Rossi (2013), I find that in
countries with strong legal enforcement, the effect of a covenant violation on net debt issuance is not as
pronounced as in countries with weaker enforcement. I use the Judicial/Legal Effectiveness Index (JLEI)
to proxy for legal enforcement in a country. This index was developed and published by the World Bank
in 2004 and measures the level of judicial independence and bribery, the quality of the legal framework,
the protection of private property and the effectiveness of both the parliament and the police. My results
show that while net debt issuance is observed to decline in the year following a covenant violation, the
strength of the judicial system provides a cushion for that decline. A one standard deviation increase in
judicial efficiency offsets a 10.4% decline in net debt issuance observed as a result of a covenant violation
by approximately 1.5%. These results suggest that covenant violations affect net debt issuance more for
firms in countries with worse legal systems. Thus, consistent with prior research (Laeven and Majnoni,
2005; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009), my results show that when contracts are properly
enforced and investor rights are strongly protected, creditors find themselves less compelled to react to
a breach in financial covenants and hence the pressure they exert on borrowers’ financing policy is less
pronounced and less detrimental.
These results are statistically and economically significant, and robust to the inclusion of a number of
control variables in the regression specifications, fixed industry and time effects, higher order terms and
smoothing functions of the distance to the covenant threshold. The results are also robust to the use of
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alternative proxies of legal enforcement and the addition of further control variables of the determinants
of capital structure. I replace JLEI with a number of variables that are interchangeably used in the liter-
ature to measure legal enforcement. The outcomes of the use of these proxies are closely comparable to
one another and to the original results employing JLEI. I also include additional control variables in my
specifications to test the robustness of my results. These controls have either been previously used in the
literature as determinants of capital structure or relating to the debt covenant literature. My findings and
resulting conclusions are not altered at all by the inclusion of these additional controls.
I also test the impact of covenant violations on various corporate policies. I find that borrowers
generally have more conservative investment and financial policies following a violation, though less
conservatism is observed for countries with better legal enforcement. The size of the asset base, new
expenditures on property, plant and equipment, as well as investments drop sharply following a covenant
violation indicating more control on investment policy. The same applies to financial policy where sharp
declines are also observed for balance sheet debt, total cash and payments to shareholders following a
violation. Sales and net income also decline following a covenant violation. The negative effect of viola-
tions on various corporate policies is however mitigated by a sound enforcement system which alleviates
the restraint on financial and investment policies following a technical default.
My main contribution to the literature is to show that cross-country institutional factors affect capital
structure ex-post through the channel of covenant violations. My study is the first of which I am aware
to examine the changes in capital structure in response to a covenant violation in an international setting.
In that regard, my study is related to empirical research conducted by Roberts and Sufi (2009a) and Nini,
Smith and Sufi (2012) who find sharp and persistent declines in net debt issuance and a corresponding
decline in leverage ratios subsequent to a covenant violation. These studies however focus on a sample
of U.S. firms while I tackle the relation between the allocation of control rights and financing policy from
an international perspective.
My study is also related to the body of literature which investigates the change in loan contract terms
as a function of a country’s legal origin (Laeven and Majnoni, 2005; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and
Goyal, 2009). While such studies generate important results with respect to the characteristics of loan
contracts in terms of maturity, spreads and loan amounts, their results only focus on the role played by
a country’s legal institutions in affecting financing policy ex-ante. My study is the first to examine how
the legal system in a country shapes financial contracts and financial policy ex-post, in conjunction with
the occurrence of a technical default.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 reviews the relevant literature. Sec-
tion 2 describes the data sources and the sample construction. Section 3 presents some preliminary
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statistics of firm and country level variables. Section 4 introduces the empirical strategy and presents
the main findings of this study. Section 5 performs some robustness checks using alternative proxies for
legal enforcement and additional control variables. Section 6 replicates the main numerical model for
different measures of corporate policies. Section 7 concludes.
4.1 Literature Review
4.1.1 Financial Covenants in Credit Agreements
Debt covenants can be classified into two main categories: covenants that aim at preventing value
destruction, and covenants that define control rights (Gorton and Winton, 2003; Tirole, 2006). The first
classification stems from the agency theory which solely focuses on the conflict of interests between
shareholders and bondholders. If such circumstances arise, managers, acting on behalf of shareholders,
may undertake actions that potentially hurt the interests of bondholders. For example, managers may
engage in excessive risk-taking, benefiting shareholders in case of success but increasing the probability
of default for bondholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), or may underinvest in low-risk positive NPV
projects that would benefit bondholders (Myers, 1977). Managers may also harm the interests of bond-
holders through large dividend payouts, through the dilution of the bondholders’ claim value by issuing
additional debt with the same or higher seniority, through asset substitution (Smith and Warner, 1979),
and finally, through leveraged buyouts which increase debt levels and affect debt seniority (Warga and
Welch, 1993).
In such instances, bondholders have the option to include various covenants restricting managers’ be-
havior in the bond indenture in order to avoid incentive misalignment and limit managerial misbehavior.
Such restrictions could affect management’s decisions regarding investment policy, dividend payouts,
future financing policy, working capital requirements and the resolution of takeover bids and financial
distress (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Where a conflict of interest exists between bondholders and share-
holders, the presence of covenants can help mitigate the risk of the reduction in value.
The second classification is motivated by the same misalignment of incentives between managers and
bondholders theory but derives from the optimal contracting literature, which is at the core of this study.
Under this classification, agency costs can be minimized through an endogenous security design based
on the optimal allocation of control rights between the different players in a firm (Aghion and Bolton,
1992; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Hart, 1995). In this setting, covenants define instances whereby
a transfer of control between management and bondholders can occur and give the latter the right to
intervene in the decision making of the firm. Such an intervention is designed as part of the incentive
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package offered to management which links performance with behavior: conditional on good financial
performance, management can keep control of the firm; otherwise, bad performance could entice loss of
control along with the associated benefits. The positive correlation between performance and behavior
gives covenants the role of state-contingent control mechanisms that help increase pledgeable income
and ease the access to financing (Chava and Roberts, 2008). For the purpose of this study, I focus my
attention on this classification where covenants are considered as tripwires, an early warning system to
bondholders that an intervention might be necessary (Aghion and Bolton, 1992).
Three types of covenants are typically recurrent in credit agreements: affirmative covenants, which
require the borrower to take certain actions (e.g. the timely filing of financial statements, the compliance
with accounting reporting standards, the payment of taxes, etc . . . ), negative covenants, which prevent
the borrower from taking certain actions (e.g. asset sales, dividend payments, change in management,
investments, etc . . . ), and financial covenants which are performance indicators based on a number of
accounting ratios and require the maintenance of a specified threshold for each ratio that shall not be
crossed (Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2012) . Considering that covenant levels are positively correlated with
performance, low levels of covenant ratios may indicate deteriorating performance. This in turn calls for
a creditor intervention and the transfer of control from borrower to creditor.
In the event of a transfer of control, creditors can decide on a best course of action to tackle the tech-
nical default, and in this case can either choose to reorganize or liquidate (Aghion and Bolton, 1992).
Liquidation may refer to modifying or cancelling certain projects and can go as far as liquidating the
firm altogether (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). Reorganization, on the other hand, often refers to a rene-
gotiation and restructuring of claims (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). More specifically, creditors may want
to accelerate loan payments, increase interest rates, include additional covenants restrictions, and reduce
the line of credit. Creditors may also choose to waive this poor performance conditional on the improve-
ment of the financial health of the firm (Beneish and Press, 1993; Chen and Wei, 1993; DeFond and
Jiambalvo, 1994; and Sweeney, 1994). In practice, creditors may also take actions including changing
the loan maturity, charging additional fees, increasing the monitoring of borrowers, increasing collateral
requirements, and the intervention in capital budgeting decisions. Overall, most technical defaults are
coupled with renegotiations between borrowers and creditors and lead to actions that vary depending on
the loan and the nature of the relationship between borrowers and creditors (Chava and Roberts, 2008).
These actions hence provide a channel through which corporate financial policy can be directly altered
(Tirole, 2006).
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4.1.2 Law and Finance
A number of studies have shown that cross-country differences in legal and institutional character-
istics largely affect the level of financial and economic development. Starting with La Porta, Lopez,
Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV henceforth, 1998), countries were classified into four legal origin groups
depending on whether their commercial law is derived from either the English, French, German or Scan-
dinavian system. Legal origins play a crucial role in determining the laws that define a country’s stance
toward shareholder rights, creditor rights, and private property rights. LLSV (1998) find that at the
two extremes lie the English law origin and the French law origin, whereby the English law offers the
strongest legal protection for both creditors and shareholders, while the French law lies at the weakest
extreme. Strong legal protection in turn naturally promotes lower corruption levels (LLSV, 1999), and
better institutions (Djankov et al, 2003).
Revisiting the optimal contracting theory and the transfer of control rights upon default, creditors
should be given more incentive to extend more favorable contract terms where they have more bargain-
ing power, i.e. where they exert greater influence in forcing repayment or taking control of the firm
following default. In this context, creditors are said to not only assess the borrower’s creditworthiness,
but also the potential risks that may arise as a result of weak laws and institutions (Demiruc,-Kunt and
Levine, 2001). Legal enforcement is said to affect creditors’ incentive to monitor and recontract. Where
legal enforcement is weak, recontracting is very costly in terms of taking action following declining
credit quality such as reducing loan maturity and credit lines, demanding more collateral and increasing
interest rates. In addition to this, recovery rates are lower, repossessing collateral takes much longer, and
creditors legal rights in reorganization and liquidation are not clear in countries were legal enforcement
is poor (Bae and Goyal, 2009). Moreover, better contract enforcement is found to lead to better contract
terms. Countries coming from stronger legal origins, i.e. which provide for strong creditor protection,
present evidence of loans having longer maturities, lower interest rates and more concentrated owner-
ships. Creditors are consequently more willing to extend credit on favorable terms ex-ante if their rights
are effectively protected by law (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009).
Other studies have also looked at how institutional factors affect external financing and lending terms.
To name a few, Laeven and Majnoni (2005) find that interest rate spreads across countries are widely af-
fected by the efficiency of the judicial system and this helps lower the cost of financial intermediation for
households and firms. Jappelli, Bianco and Pagano (2005) find that differences in judicial enforcement,
affect the volume of credit markets; better judicial efficiency increases aggregate lending by granting the
access to capital markets to borrowers with little collateral. Castelar Pinheiro and Cabral (1999) also
find that poor judicial enforcement significantly reduces the availability of credit even between different
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states within the same country. Esty and Megginson (2003) document that in the absence of reliable
legal enforcement of their rights, creditors resort to creating larger and less concentrated syndicates to
discourage strategic default. And finally, Esty (2004) finds that foreign banks are willing to supply more
credit to borrowers in countries with stronger creditor rights and stronger contract enforcement.
The bottom line evidently implies that better protection of creditor rights and stronger legal enforce-
ment measures give more incentive to creditors to extend credit and to write more favorable contract
terms ex-ante. Hence judicial efficiency can also have a role in altering financing policy by dictating
contract terms and the amounts of debt creditors are willing to extend ex-post.
4.2 Data and Sample Selection
4.2.1 Loan Data
Covenant information is obtained from the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC)’s DealScan database.
DealScan provides coverage of private commercial loans made to large corporations all over the world.
Private loan agreements are of particular interest in this study because they contain a higher number of
covenants with stricter thresholds when compared to public loans (Kahan and Tuckman, 1995) and hence
provide a unique opportunity to study covenant violations.
I start by only selecting loans containing covenant information since the primary purpose of this
study is to look at covenant violations. I also exclusively select borrowers whose country is not the
U.S. to be able to focus on international covenants characteristics. The number of available U.S. loans
is almost seven times bigger than the number of available international loans and therefore this might
drive the result in my cross-country setting. The analysis is however repeated with a sample including
both U.S. and international loans and the corresponding results are reported in the appendix. Finally, the
sample interval is set between 1996 and 2011. I choose 1996 as the starting date of the sample since
DealScan loan coverage before that date, especially when it comes to international data, is quite scarce.
I also exclude all financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) from the sample.
The above filters result in a total sample of 3,386 loans entered into by 1,661 borrowers in 64 coun-
tries over the period covering the years 1996 to 2011.
The unit of observation in DealScan is the loan, and several loans can be entered into by the same
borrower under the same contract. Because my study focuses on unique firm-year observations, I group
all related loans under the corresponding contract represented by the borrower and the year in which this
contract is entered into. This is done by adding up all covenants of related loans under the main contract
to reflect the overall characteristics of all the loans under that contract. If a covenant is missing in one
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loan but available in another, the main contract is considered to have that same covenant. If, however, the
same covenant exists in more than one loan of the same contract, I compute the average of the thresholds
of all individual loans weighted by the corresponding loan amount and add it to the main contract. The
overall contract amount is computed as the sum of the amounts of all individual loans under that contract.
The number of creditors in one contract is assigned to be either the maximum number of creditors on
one loan in the case of overlapping creditors among all loans, or the sum of creditors under all loans
in case of non-overlapping creditors. The number of lead arrangers (syndicates) of the main contract is
the number of distinct lead arrangers (syndicates) on all loans belonging to that contract. Finally, the
contract is assigned the same maturity as the loan with the longest maturity. This procedure results in a
total of 2,168 contracts incorporating the original 3,386 loans from DealScan.
The DealScan data is augmented with firm-level financial data obtained from WorldScope. World-
Scope covers international data and contains balance sheet and income statement information for large
firms that are publicly traded in a number of countries (Qian and Strahan, 2007). The information down-
loaded from WorldScope serves to compute the accounting variables used in the regression analysis.
The matching between the databases had to be done manually by firm name since the two databases use
different unique identifiers to reference firms. Every borrower name in the DealScan dataset was looked
up manually on WorldScope to be assigned the right identifier. Around half of the firms in DealScan
were matched to WorldScope using this method. The matched WorlScope identifiers were then used to
download the corresponding financial information for every borrower for every year between 1996 and
2011. Financial data downloaded from WorldScope is measured at the end of the year in which the loan
was originated.
Finally, because covenants restrain borrowers throughout the life of the contract, I roll over covenant
information and other loan characteristics from each contract at initiation date to all subsequent years
until maturity in order to have more comprehensive information about covenant violations. It is worth
noting though that while covenants may be renegotiated during the life of the contract or following a
covenant violation, DealScan does not provide updated information about covenants in loan contracts
subsequent to the initiation date and hence for the purpose of this study, I assume that the number of
covenants and the corresponding thresholds within a contract remain unchanged between initiation and
maturity.
The final sample matched between DealScan and WorldScope after all these manipulations consists
of 3,130 firm-year observation encompassing 1,103 contracts (1,808 loans) entered by 805 different bor-
rowers in 28 countries between 1996 and 2011.
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4.2.2 Covenant Violations
Since technical defaults are at the heart of this study, it would be useful to first understand what
happens in practice after the occurrence of a covenant violation. Upon the transfer of control rights fol-
lowing a technical default, creditors are granted the right to demand accelerated payment of outstanding
amounts under the corresponding contract, and go as far as revoking any unused portions of extended
lines of credits or revolving credit facilities (Roberts and Sufi, 2009a). To illustrate the types of actions
that underlie a technical default in loan contracts, the loan agreement dated December 19, 2007 between
Mexico’s Empresas Cablevisio´n and JPMorgan Chase Bank stated the following:
“Section 7.01. Events Of Default. If any of the following events (“Events of De-
fault”) shall occur: (d) the Borrower shall fail to observe or perform any covenant or
agreement contained in [the sections describing financial covenants], (e). . . and such
failure shall continue unremedied for a period of 30 days after notice . . . ;. . . Then
. . . the Administrative Agent may, and at the request of the Required Lenders shall,
by notice to the Borrower, take either or both of the following actions, at the same or
different times: (i) terminate the Commitments . . . , and (ii) declare the Loans then
outstanding to be due and payable in whole (or in part . . . ),. . . together with accrued
interest thereon and all other payment obligations of the Borrower accrued hereunder,
shall become due and payable immediately, without presentment, demand, protest or
other notice of any kind, all of which are waived by the Borrower; . . . ”
Yet, despite the acceleration and termination rights given to creditors as a result of a technical default,
research has suggested that the most common response to a technical default is generally a renegotia-
tion of the contract terms and a waiver of the violation (Beneish and Press, 1993; Chen and Wei, 1993;
Gopalakrishnan and Parkash, 1995). As an example, the following statement appeared in SMTC Corpo-
ration’s 2008 annual report:
“Subsequent to January 4, 2009, the Company received a waiver from its lenders with
respect to what would have otherwise been a covenant violation at the time of filing of
the Company’s fiscal 2008 financial statements in April 2009. In addition, the Com-
pany and its lenders have amended the lending agreements to revise the EBITDA
and leverage covenants and eliminate the fixed charge coverage ratio for the next five
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quarters including the fiscal period beginning January 5, 2009 and for the first quar-
ter of the 2010 fiscal period. The interest rate has also been increased by 200 basis
points.”
Creditors that actually exercise their acceleration rights generally try to extract amendment fees, increase
interest rates, increase reporting and collateral requirements, cancel or reduce any unused credit avail-
ability and restrict investments (Chen and Wei, 1993; Gopalakrishnan and Parkash, 1995; Sufi, 2009;
Chava and Roberts, 2009; Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2009).
While the SEC requires that all firms report any breach of covenants as part of their 10-K and 10-Q
filings, the access to international covenant violation information is not as evident. To begin with, not all
countries have clear rules about reporting requirements or electronic filings submission, let alone disclo-
sure of covenants in loan contracts and any related violation information. Moreover, not all companies
submit copies of annual reports in both the local language and English, which creates a language barrier
when searching for violation information in annual reports. In addition, many firms are not likely to
report any covenant violations that they were able to renegotiate or cure before the end of the reporting
period (Dichev and Skinner, 2002). On the other hand, some international firms are listed on a U.S.
stock exchange and are hence required to fill a 20-F form from which violation information can be ex-
tracted. Some international firms that are not listed on a U.S. stock exchange also do report violation
information; however, the majority of these firms are from countries that are listed as developed or ad-
vanced economies (IMF, 2008) and that hence have clearer reporting requirements than less developed
economies. Some emerging economies however do mention the occurrence or avoidance of a breach of
covenants in their reports. For example, in its 2011-2012 annual report, India’s Tata Power declares that:
“[. . . ] certain financial covenants in the loan agreements in respect of loans borrowed
for construction of the project have not been met as at 31st March, 2012.”
Similarly, the Philippines’ San Miguel Corporation states the following in its 2009 annual report:
“As of December 31, 2009 and 2008, the Group is in compliance with the covenants
of the debt agreements”
However, because of different reporting requirements and different levels of accounting and audit qual-
ity, as well as government corruption, it is not known to which extent the information reported in such
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emerging economies is reliable. Yet, overlooking this concern, the data gathered from annual reports is
still very scarce and insufficient to carry out a sound analysis.
As a consequence, to overcome all data caveats mentioned above, I turn my attention to the methodol-
ogy employed by Chava and Roberts (2008) in the identification of covenant violations. For this purpose,
I impose that all contracts in my sample have at least one covenant restricting the current ratio, the net
worth, the tangible net worth, capital expenditures or the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization (EBITDA) of the borrower. These covenants are selected because of their rather frequent
incidence in contracts found on DealScan (Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Chava and Roberts, 2008). As
a matter of fact, I find that roughly 73% of the contracts in my sample contain at least one of these
restrictive covenants. In addition, computing the ratios for these covenants is fairly straightforward and
standardized as opposed to covenants restricting a debt-related ratio for example, where debt could refer
to any of long-term debt, short-term debt, total debt, or any other definition of debt. The same applies
to covenants restricting leverage and interest payments (Chava and Roberts, 2008). Current ratio and net
worth covenants are readily available in DealScan, while capital expenditures and EBITDA covenants
can only be found in the contract remarks from where I extract them and tabulate them with the rest of
the covenants.
Imposing that all contracts have at least one of these covenants reduces my sample size to 2,016
firm-year observation representing 518 firms that entered into 810 contracts (1,310 loans) in 28 different
countries from 1996 to 2011.
4.2.3 Legal Enforcement
To measure the quality of legal institutions in a country, I employ the Judicial/Legal Effectiveness
Integrity Index (JLEI) developed by the World Bank in its 2004 Corporate Corruption and Ethics Indices
compilation. The JLEI measure was constructed using the Executive Opinion Survey (EOS) conducted
by the World Economic Forum under The Global Competitiveness Report. The survey is a collection
of questions about bribery, legal corruption and corporate ethics (Kauffman, 2004), and provides infor-
mation about a country’s economic and business environment and assesses the ability of the country
in achieving sustainable levels of prosperity and growth in isolation, and also in comparison to other
countries (Browne and Geiger, 2011). The JLEI is constructed by mapping questions related to the effec-
tiveness and integrity of the legal and judicial environment in a certain country. The index is constructed
by averaging the input of the relevant set of questions in the EOS and takes values between 0 and 100
where higher scores represent more effective legal environments. These values reflect the percentage of
firms in each country that answer questions about judicial independence, judicial bribery, the quality of
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the legal framework, the protection of private property, and the effectiveness of both the parliament and
the police with a satisfactory rating. A rating is deemed satisfactory if it takes values of 5, 6 or 7 on an
overall scale going from 1 to 7 where 1 is the least satisfactory (Kauffman, 2004; Browne and Geiger,
2011).
For the purpose of this study, and to be consistent with the range of other indices later used in the
analysis, the JLEI is rescaled to take values between 0 and 10, and matched, by country name, to the final
sample of 810 loan contracts in 28 countries to therefore complete the sample construction procedure.
4.3 Summary Statistics
Although this study focuses mainly on net worth, current ratio, capital expenditures and EBITDA
covenants, I first start by examining which types of covenants are mostly written in international private
credit agreements. Table 1 lists the types of covenants that appear in private credit agreements and
presents statistics about their specified thresholds and frequency of occurrence. Because the sample I
use in my analysis is restrictive in terms of covenants, Table 1 lists the covenant characteristics of the
DealScan sample both before (Panel A) and after (Panel B) imposing the covenant restrictions.
Panel A of the table shows the statistics on the full sample of 1,103 financial contracts entered into
by 810 firms in the sample resulting from the intersection of whole DealScan universe with WorldScope
between 1996 and 2011, excluding financial firms and firms from the United States. Almost 98% of
the total contracts contain at least one covenant restricting managerial behavior. As shown in the table,
the covenants with the most occurrences include coverage ratios (69%), debt to cash flow (25%), debt
to balance sheet items (31%), current ratio (43%) and net worth covenants (52%). Overall, 52% of
the financial contracts in the sample contain a covenant restricting a ratio with debt in the numerator,
and 69% of financial contracts contain a covenant restricting a ratio dictating interest payments. These
percentages reflect the importance of covenants in determining borrowers’ capital structure, because, as
becomes apparent from Table 1, at least 82% of all financial contracts in my sample impose covenants
that directly or indirectly affect borrowers’ financing decisions.
Panel B repeats the same statistics as Panel A for my main sample of 810 financial contracts (1,310
loans) having a financial covenant restricting either the current ratio, the net worth, tangible net worth,
capital expenditures or EBITDA and which I will refer to as the “Covenants Sample”. What is striking
in this panel is that, despite filtering exclusively on the aforementioned covenants, the interest coverage
ratio still appears in financial contracts with the highest frequency. As a matter of fact, 46% of all con-
tracts have covenants restricting ratios with debt in the numerator, 70% of all contracts have covenants
restricting ratios that limit the amount of interest payments, and 79% of all contracts overall have at least
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Table 4.1
Creditor Control in Credit Agreements
The table presents descriptive statistics of the characteristics of credit agreements. The statistics are performed in
Panel A on 1,103 financial contracts (1,808 loans) obtained by matching DealScan loans with data from World-
Scope; and in Panel B on 810 financial contracts (1,310 loans), out of the total 1,103 contracts, having a financial
covenant restricting the current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, capital expenditures or EBITDA. All contracts
were initiated between the years 1996 and 2011 in 28 countries excluding the United States. Secured refers to
whether the financial contract is collateral-backed. Maximum CapEx covenants specify the maximum capital ex-
penditures amount beyond which no further investments may be undertaken. Minimum EBITDA covenants impose
a floor on earnings which can be used to repay obligations. Net Worth covenants insure that the liquidation value
of the firm’s assets provides enough coverage in case of default. Minimum Fixed Charge, Debt Service, Interest
Coverage and Cash Interest Coverage covenants measure the ease with which a firm can cover its interest obliga-
tions through cash from operating activities and must not fall below a certain predetermined threshold. Maximum
Leverage, Debt to Cash Flow, Senior Debt to Cash Flow, Debt to Equity and Debt to Tangible Net Worth covenants
put a ceiling on the maximum percentage of debt the company can have in its capital structure. Minimum Current
Ratio covenants impose a lower bound on the current ratio and describe a company’s ability to meet its short term
obligations. Sweep covenants indicate the percentage of proceeds obtained through excess cash flows, asset sales,
debt issuance and equity issuance that must be used to repay the loan. Maximum CapEx, Minimum EBITDA and
Net Worth covenants are scaled by lagged total assets in order to account for currency differences. %Contracts
represents the percentage of the whole sample having the corresponding covenant in their credit agreement.
Panel A: DealScan-WorldScope Sample
Covenant Variables %Contracts Mean Median SD
Contract Amount ($) – 510,394,932 117,850,000 1,430,207,963
Contract Maturity (Years) – 4.900 5.000 4.002
Secured 43.97% – – –
Maximum CapEx 4.99% 0.081 0.038 0.173
Minimum EBITDA 1.90% 5.222 0.055 19.293
Minimum Fixed Charge Coverage 5.53% 1.534 1.250 0.706
Minimum Debt Service Coverage 7.34% 1.332 1.200 0.556
Minimum Interest Coverage 59.56% 3.059 3.000 1.445
Cash Interest 1.09% 1.775 1.500 0.757
Leverage 7.71% 1.101 0.700 0.906
Maximum Debt to Cash Flow 24.30% 4.262 3.500 3.316
Senior Debt to Cash Flow 3.08% 4.190 3.500 1.877
Debt to Equity 6.35% 2.717 1.500 9.725
Maximum Debt to Tangible Net Worth 16.86% 1.721 1.500 1.790
Tangible Net Worth 42.07% 1.133 0.018 12.425
Minimum Current Ratio 42.79% 1.037 1.000 0.167
Net Worth 9.61% 0.364 0.086 0.983
Excess Cash Flow Sweep 9.34% 49.140 50.000 30.880
Asset Sales Sweep 12.96% 89.060 100.000 28.829
Debt Issuance Sweep 10.88% 80.729 100.000 37.218
Equity Issuance Sweep 10.06% 68.990 100.000 37.637
one covenant that affects borrowers’ total debt, which further emphasizes the importance of covenants in
determining capital structure.
Table 2 presents the characteristics of the financial contracts in the main sample and the different
players that take part in the agreement. Since, as I previously mentioned, covenants and their violations
are examined over the life of the contract until maturity, the table reports statistics for the contracts at
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Table 4.1 - Continued
Panel B: Covenants Sample
Covenant Variables %Contracts Mean Median SD
Contract Amount ($) – 241,302,110 83,662,915 489,463,807
Contract Maturity (Years) – 4.781 5.000 3.283
Secured 47.16% – – –
Maximum CapEx 6.79% 0.081 0.038 0.173
Minimum EBITDA 2.59% 5.222 0.055 19.293
Minimum Fixed Charge Coverage 4.20% 1.489 1.250 0.774
Minimum Debt Service Coverage 6.42% 1.220 1.125 0.401
Minimum Interest Coverage 62.35% 3.078 3.000 1.538
Cash Interest 0.99% 1.644 1.500 0.630
Leverage 5.56% 1.043 0.800 0.616
Maximum Debt to Cash Flow 13.70% 4.386 3.500 2.533
Senior Debt to Cash Flow 1.60% 5.343 5.250 2.384
Debt to Equity 7.04% 1.518 1.500 0.686
Maximum Debt to Tangible Net Worth 21.85% 1.719 1.500 1.827
Tangible Net Worth 57.28% 1.133 0.018 12.425
Minimum Current Ratio 58.27% 1.037 1.000 0.167
Net Worth 13.09% 0.364 0.086 0.983
Excess Cash Flow Sweep 7.53% 50.536 50.000 27.566
Asset Sales Sweep 9.75% 90.200 100.000 28.050
Debt Issuance Sweep 7.90% 78.268 100.000 37.969
Equity Issuance Sweep 7.90% 66.474 75.000 35.284
year of initiation (Panel A) and for the contracts outstanding (Panel B) as they approach maturity.
Because the statistics are performed on the Covenants Sample, all contracts contain at least one
covenant restricting any of the current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, capital expenditures or
EBITDA. The average contract contains at least three covenants, while the maximum number of covenants
contained in one contract can go up to twelve covenants. The median number of loans per contract is
one loan, while the average is roughly two loans per contract, and only 10% of all contracts have three
or more loans per contract, with a maximum of seven loans in one contract in the sample. The average
and median number of lead arrangers per contract is equal to one in the bulk of the contracts, while the
number of total lenders per one contract is eleven on average, and the number of syndicates, defined as
groups of lenders, has a median of one but an average of twelve syndicates per contract.
The incidence of covenant violations in the Covenants Sample is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure
shows that the occurrence of covenant violations peaks between the years 2000 and 2002 which coincides
with the early 2000s economic recession. After this peak, the incidence of covenant violations declines
until 2006 before it surges significantly afterwards to peak between 2008 and 2009, the time of the great
recession. The number of violations slightly drops after 2009 only to jump again after 2010 at the time
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Table 4.2
Financial Contracts Characteristics
The table examines 810 financial contracts between 1996 and 2011 in 28 countries excluding the United
States. A contract is defined as the aggregation of loans issued in the same year to the same firm. The
sample was constructed by merging DealScan with data from WorldScope. The sample only consists of
financial contracts having a financial covenant restricting the current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth,
capital expenditures or EBITDA. Panel A of the table presents statistics for the 810 financial contracts
at initiation; while Panel B presents the same statistics for a sample of 2,016 firm-year observations
representing the outstanding financial contracts throughout the sample duration. Number of Loans is
the number of loans aggregated under each financial contract. Number of Covenants is the total number
of covenants in a certain contract. Contracts (Firm-Years) represents the number of financial contracts
initiated (outstanding) under each category.
Panel A – Financial Contracts at Initiation
By Firm-Year Contracts Mean Median 90th Percentile Max 10th Percentile Min
Number of Loans 810 1.62 1 3 7 1 1
Number of Covenants 810 3.43 3 5 12 1 1
Number of Creditors 810 11.31 9 21 171 3 1
Number of Syndicates 810 11.66 1 32 176 1 1
Number of Lead Arrangers 810 1.08 1 1 5 1 1
Maturity (Years) 810 4.78 5 7 42.83 3 0.42
Panel B – Financial Contracts Outstanding
By Firm-Year Firm-Years Mean Median 90th Percentile Max 10th Percentile Min
Number of Loans 2,016 1.62 1 3 7 1 1
Number of Covenants 2,016 3.38 3 6 12 1 1
Number of Creditors 2,016 11.97 9 23 171 3 1
Number of Syndicates 2,016 12.22 1 34 176 1 1
Number of Lead Arrangers 2,016 1.11 1 1 5 1 1
Maturity (Years) 2,016 3.86 3 6 42.83 1 0.25
of the Eurozone crisis. The dotted line in the figure reports the incidence of new covenant violations in
each year and roughly follows the same pattern as the solid line which reports all covenant violations
incidences.
Table 3 confirms previous empirical evidence documenting the frequent incidence of covenant vio-
lations (Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Chava and Roberts, 2008; Roberts and Sufi, 2009a; Nini, Smith and
Sufi, 2009). On a sample of 810 financial contracts entered into by 518 firms over 15 years, roughly 26%
of the firms violate a covenant at some point between 1996 and 2011. 18% of the firm-year observations
are subject to a covenant violation during the sample period, and around 8% of all firm-years correspond
to a first time violation by a borrower.
Among firms with an average book leverage ratio of greater than 5%, the percentage of violators
does not change much and is still around 26% of total firms. The industry classification of violators
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Figure 4.1. Covenant Violations from 1996 to 2011. This figure presents the number of covenant
violations per year during the years 1996 to 2011. A new covenant violation is a violation for a firm that
is violating a covenant for the first time during the sample period. The sample includes 2,016 firm-year
observations and 366 violations in total.
in Table 3 shows that, in general, firms in different industries violate covenants in similar proportions,
with the exception of the semiconductors and related devices industry where the fraction of violators
is significantly higher than the rest of the industries. Unlike previous literature however, firm size, as
measured by assets size, does not seem to play a role in the likelihood of a firm violating a covenant.
No evident pattern of violations can be distinguished from the size classifications in Table 3, and unlike
previous literature on U.S. data where bigger firms were found to be less likely to violate a covenant
(Roberts and Sufi, 2009a; Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2009), in an international setting, firms with assets
of greater than $5 billion have one of the highest rates of violations among other firms. This lack of
distinguishable pattern in firm size could be attributed to the fact that DealScan only stores information
about large firms among all syndicated contracts.
Finally, at the covenant violation level, Figure 2 reports the performance of violating firms in the
four years prior to a covenant violation up until the time of violation denoted by time 0 on the x-axis.
The figure was constructed using new violations only, in order to be able to better discern how firm per-
formance is affected in the build up to this single violation without being affected by others along the
way. The figure consists of six performance measures. Overall, all the panels within the figure indicate
that performance declines in the build up to a covenant violation and generally records its worst in the
year just before the violation occurs. Operating cash flows exhibit a decline throughout the four years
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Table 4.3
Frequency of Financial Covenant Violations
The table presents the percentage of firms that report a financial covenant violation in their filings at some
point between 1996 and 2011. The table surveys a subsample of firms for which violation information
is reported. The subsample consists of 518 firms (2,016 firm-years) of which 134 report violating a
covenant. The sample is constructed by merging DealScan with WorldScope, excluding financial firms
(SIC 6000-6999) and keeping only contracts that have a financial covenant restricting the current ratio,
net worth, tangible net worth, capital expenditures or EBITDA. The final sample consists of 810 financial
contracts (1,310 loans) from 28 countries excluding the United States. ”By Industry”, though not an
exhaustive list of sample industries, lists the industries with the most recurring violations. M, millions.
Violator Percentage
Fractions of firm-years reporting a violation 0.182
Fraction of firm-years with a new violation 0.077
Fraction of firms reporting a violation 0.259
Fraction of firms with a leverage ratio greater than 0.05 reporting a violation 0.255
By Industry
Semiconductors and related devices 0.066
General farms, primarily crops 0.044
Electronic computers 0.033
Pharmaceutical preparations 0.033
Television broadcasting stations 0.033
By Size
less than $100M 0.120
$100M - $250M 0.156
$250M - $500M 0.120
$500M - $1000M 0.112
$1000M - $2500M 0.189
$2500M - $5000M 0.131
Greater than $5000M 0.172
preceding a violation, but experience the sharpest decline in the year before the violation occurs. The
market-to-book ratio on the other hand seems to increase up until a year before the violation where it
drops very sharply to its worst level in the reported four years. Interest expense climbs in all four years
to reach its peak at the year of violation. Net worth declines in all four years prior to the violation and
experiences its steepest fall in the year immediately before the violation occurs. Liquidity also drops
considerably before a violation as depicted by the current ratio, and again records its worst drop just the
year before the violation. Finally, the leverage ratio continuously increases during the reported four years
around the covenant violation and exhibits the highest jump in value in the year right before the violation
occurs.
All plots indicate that firm performance is severely affected before a covenant violation occurs and
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Figure 4.2. Firm Performance in Years Prior to New Covenant Violation. The figure reports median
values for a number of firm performance measures in the four years leading up to a new covenant vio-
lation. A new covenant violation is a violation for a firm that is violating a covenant for the first time
during the sample period.
not only in the year leading to the violation, but also up to four years before the violation occurs, sug-
gesting that the change in performance can indeed be attributed to the violation rather than other factors
possibly affecting performance. Also, because covenants are written on some of the ratios used as perfor-
mance measures in Figure 2, it is highly probable that the violation occurs as a result of the deterioration
in these ratios. In what follows, the effect of a covenant violation on firm performance in isolation of
other factors is examined with more detail, and is coupled with country-specific variables, which I will
shortly describe, to understand how firms and creditors react to different institutional factors at the time
of a violation.
Table 4 presents country level statistics and loan characteristics grouped by legal origin. LLSV
(1998) group countries based on the origin of their legal system into English, French, German and
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Scandinavian legal origin groups, with French law being the weakest at providing legal protection to
shareholders and creditors, while English legal origin lies at the other extreme. The table shows that the
median loan size varies from $75 million to $121 million in developing economies such as Thailand,
Indonesia and China, to roughly $1 billion in developed economies such as Germany and Sweden. It
is also worth noting that the average loan size is the smallest for the French Origin group, consistent
with the evidence documenting that countries with stronger creditor protection have more favorable loan
terms such as bigger loan amounts, extended maturities and reduced spreads (Qian and Strahan, 2007;
Bae and Goyal, 2009).
The average number of covenants per contract is the highest for the French legal group, though the
highest median number of covenants per contract is recorded in Germany. The average number of vio-
lations is comparable in both the English and French legal origin groups, while this number is lower for
Scandinavian origin countries and considerably higher for German origin. The share of secured loans
ranges from 0% in a number of countries such as Thailand and Japan to a high of 45% in Canada. Av-
erage maturity ranges between 11 and 87 months, with the shortest average maturity observable in the
French origin group (54 months) and the longest maturities observable in developed countries such as
Germany and Sweden, also consistent with the aforementioned studies.
The last column of Table 4 reports statistics for the JLEI measure which proxies for judicial integrity
within a country. Consistent with the literature, countries belonging to the French legal group have the
weakest judicial protection on average (LLSV, 1998). The strongest judicial protection is observed in
the Scandinavian origin group and exceeds the average score of the English origin group, although the
United Kingdom’s score is one of the highest among the countries in my sample. It is worth noting
though that while Finland and Sweden both scored 1 out of 4 with 4 being the highest level of legal
protection in LLSV (1998)’s creditor rights score, both countries’ scores are the highest scores in my
sample in the World Bank’s 2004 JLEI measure, and equal to the United Kingdom’s, which at the time
of LLSV (1998) recorded a score of 4 on creditor rights protection.
Finally, Table 5 reports summary statistics for the capital structure variables used in the analysis -
namely net debt issuance as an outcome variable, leverage and covenant control variables used as con-
trols in the regression analysis, and other control variables used in the robustness checks. Covenant
control variables contain the major accounting ratios on which covenants are written in financial con-
tracts and hence make it possible to control for the variation in variables that are correlated with both
covenant violations and new debt issuance. The other control variables are additional controls that I use
in the robustness tests and are derived from additional covenants contained in financial contracts that are
relevant to the analysis, from the empirical capital structure literature (Frank and Goyal, 2009) and from
90
related covenant violations literature (Chava and Roberts, 2008).
The table presents statistics for both the Covenants Sample, and the full DealScan-WorldScope sam-
ple. Statstics are reported for both samples in order to mitigate the concern of potential biases in the data
and results that could be caused by the non-random selection procedure employed in the construction
of the Covenants Sample. The table reveals similar characteristics of the firms in both samples, with
the statistics reported for both samples being somehow comparable especially for the leverage ratio and
the bulk of the covenant control variables. Net debt issuance is however significantly higher for the
covenants sample. The mean market-to-book ratio on the other hand is smaller for the Covenants Sam-
ple, and so is the average Contract Amount which is almost half the size of the DealScan-WorldScope
sample. Average and median loan maturity are closely comparable for both samples. Appendix Table
A6 reproduces Table 5 for the sample including U.S. firms. Compared to U.S. firms, international firms
issue on average 45% less debt. Both samples have comparable average firm size with average log of
total assets of 6.6 for international firms vs. 6.13 for U.S. firms. My firms are however 25% bigger on
average than sample firms use by Chava and Roberts (2008) whose average log of total assets is 4.9 for
a similar sample period.
Table 6 reports the same statistics as Table 5, for the Covenants Sample, grouped by whether the firm
is in violation (Violators) or not in violation (Non-Violators) of at least one of the current ratio, net worth,
tangible net worth, capital expenditures or EBITDA covenants. The table shows a sharp decline in net
debt issuance both in terms of mean and median for the Violators group. As a matter of fact, following a
covenant violation, net debt issuance seems to drop by close to 14%, a decline that is both economically
and statistically significant. Investments also exhibit a statistically significant decline of 1.9% follow-
ing a covenant violation. The difference in the averages of other capital structure determinants is also
statistically significant with the exception of asset tangibility. The current ratio, net worth and tangible
net worth averages are obviously significantly lower for the Violators group consistent with my sample
selection procedure. Interest expense on the other hand is higher for the Violators group with strong
statistical significance, indicating that creditors tend to increase interest payments following a technical
default.
However, consistent with finding by Chava and Roberts (2008), some heterogeneity can be observed
in certain firm characteristics affecting capital structure; while the market-to-book ratio and cash flows
are significantly lower for the Violators group, the leverage ratio is significantly higher for the same
group. The variations in these variables will be controlled for while performing the regression analysis
so that the effect of violations on capital structure is properly isolated and not affected by these conflicting
firm characteristics.
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Table 4.4
Summary Statistics for Loan-Level and Country-Level Variables
The table reports country-level information on loan characteristics by borrower country, grouped by legal origin (English, French, German, and
Scandinavian). Loan information was obtained from DealScan. The table surveys 810 financial contracts (1,310 loans) originated between 1996 and
2011 in 28 different countries excluding the United States. Loans made to financial firms were dropped (SIC 6000-6999). The sample only consists of
financial contracts having a financial covenant restricting the current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, capital expenditures or EBITDA. All refers to the
whole sample of country level observations. Contracts represents the number of contracts per country, Loans is the number of loans per country. Lenders
represents the median number of lenders per financial contract per country. Secured represents the number of secured financial contracts per country.
Maturity (Months) is the median maturity per contract per country expressed in months. Loan Size is the median contract amount denominated in USD and
expressed in millions. Covenants represents the median number of covenants per contract per country. Violations represents the total number of financial
covenant violations per country. Firms is the number of distinct firms in each country; and Firm-Years is the number of firm-year observations by country.
JLEI is the World Bank measure for Judicial/Legal Effectiveness in a certain country and is scaled to take values between 0 and 10. Group Mean equals
the simple average of the group statistics.
Country N-Contracts N-Loans N-Lenders Secured Maturity Loan Size N-Covenants N-Violations Firms Firm-Years JLEI
All 810 1,310 9 382 60 83.663 3 366 518 2,016 –
ENGLISH
Australia 8 19 8 3 60 364 2.5 0 8 26 8.9
Bermuda 3 5 35 3 60 250 5 0 1 4 –
Canada 67 108 5 49 48 160 4 37 37 171 8.2
Hong Kong 103 133 12 8 42 100 2 33 58 298 8.2
India 30 48 11 8 63 100 1 6 21 121 6.0
Ireland 4 13 12 1 222.5 1,958 6.5 8 2 13 7.8
Israel 1 1 1 1 11 1 3 0 1 1 7.3
Malaysia 5 9 12 3 70 250 2 8 4 26 7.8
Singapore 29 45 9 6 36 50 2 19 21 100 9.0
South Africa 5 9 7 3 48 150 5 3 3 13 7.1
Thailand 2 2 16 0 36 69 2.5 1 2 4 5.3
United Kingdom 38 70 8 17 60 470 3.5 33 19 100 9.2
Group Mean 24.583 38.500 11.333 8.500 63.042 326.874 3.250 12.333 14.750 73.083 7.709
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FRENCH
Argentina 1 2 12 1 60 1,000 6 6 1 6 1.2
Chile 2 2 1.5 1 48 207 5.5 0 2 2 6.6
France 6 13 33 4 51.5 710 5 9 4 22 7.6
Indonesia 27 37 13 4 36 75 1 48 20 87 4.0
Italy 2 5 8 2 71 214 4 0 2 3 4.1
Mexico 3 4 7 1 60 116 4 15 2 16 3.0
Philippines 6 7 24 0 60 175 2.5 3 3 19 1.8
Group Mean 7.667 11.333 14.417 2.000 54.417 249.464 3.667 12.500 5.500 24.833 4.043
GERMAN
China 11 13 11 1 36 121 2 9 8 31 4.2
Germany 10 25 7 7 86.5 982 7.5 20 6 41 8.6
Japan 3 3 1 0 24 17 1 1 3 6 7.6
Korea (South) 2 2 9 0 60 150 1 0 1 8 4.8
Poland 1 1 10 0 84 350 3 0 1 7 1.8
Taiwan 430 717 8 252 60 58 4 92 282 863 6.5
Group Mean 89.200 149.600 7.000 51.8 62.9 311.241 3.300 22.600 58.600 185.000 5.583
SCANDINAVIAN
Finland 1 1 10 0 60 146 4 0 1 1 9.2
Norway 6 6 13 3 66 500 3 5 3 14 8.7
Sweden 4 10 20 4 84 1,000 3.5 10 2 13 9.3
Group Mean 5.000 8.000 16.500 3.500 75.000 750.000 3.250 7.500 2.500 13.500 9.067
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4.4 The Effect of Covenant Violations and Legal Enforcement on Financing Decisions
4.4.1 Empirical Approach
My main empirical strategy follows the methodology employed by Chava and Roberts (2008) consist-
ing in a regression discontinuity data design. A regression discontinuity design is defined such as the
probability of receiving treatment varies in a discontinuous fashion as a function of certain underlying
variables (Hahn, Todd and Van Der Klaauw, 2001). In my context, the treatment is defined as covenant
violations and the control corresponds to non-violations.
In identifying covenant violations, I compare whether the observed values of the current ratio, net
worth, tangible net worth, capital expenditures and EBITDA are in compliance with the covenant thresh-
olds specified in the terms of the contract for each firm-year observation. The regression discontinuity
design in this case is observable in the fact that the function mapping the distance between the ob-
served value of the accounting variable and the specified covenant threshold is discontinuous (Chava
and Roberts, 2008). More specifically, I define my treatment variable, Covenant Violation (CVit), in the
following manner:
CVi,t =

1 zi,t - z0i,t < 0
0 otherwise
where i and t refer to firm and year respectively, zi,t is the observed value of the current ratio, net worth,
tangible net worth, capital expenditures or EBITDA and z0i,t is the covenant threshold specified in the
contract. Consequently, I define my base empirical model as follows:
Net Debt Issuancet = α0+β0CVi,t−1+β1JLEI+β2 (CVi,t−1) .(JLEI)+β3Xi,t−1+ηi+νi+ εi,t
where Net Debt Issuancet is defined as the change in total book debt between t-1 and t scaled by lagged
total assets, ηi is industry fixed effects, νi is year fixed effects, εi,t is a random error term and Xi,t−1 is a
vector of control variable.
The vector Xi,t−1 of controls consists of covenant control variables and covenant interaction vari-
ables. Covenant control variables contain ratios on which covenants are written. I include ratios that are
most commonly encountered in the financial contracts in my sample. I also include covenant interac-
tion variables because many covenants are written on combinations of variables (e.g. debt to cash flow,
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Table 4.5
Summary Statistics
The table presents summary statistics for two samples of firm-year observations. The DealScan-WorldScope Sample is obtained by matching DealScan loans with data
from WorldScope for non-financial firms between the years 1996 and 2011 in 28 countries excluding the United States. The Covenants Sample is a subsample of the
DealScan-WorldScope Sample containing financial covenants conditional on having a financial covenant restricting either the current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth,
capital expenditures or EBITDA. Each entry reports the number of observations N, mean, the median, the standard deviation SD, and the 10th and 90th percentile for
each variable. Variables are defined in the Appendix.
Covenants Sample DealScan-WorldScope Sample
N Mean SD 10th Median 90th N Mean Median
Capital Structure Variables
Net Debt Issuance / Total Assets 1,841 0.063 0.989 -0.102 0.018 0.214 2,201 0.028 0.003
Leverage Ratio 1,894 0.359 0.607 0.107 0.321 0.571 2,917 0.368 0.322
Covenant Control Variables
Current Ratio 1,899 1.597 0.881 0.776 1.425 2.494 2,921 1.616 1.366
Net Worth / Total Asset 1,904 0.422 0.191 0.158 0.417 0.653 2,900 0.408 0.412
Tangible Net Worth/Total Assets 1,912 0.588 2.691 0.061 0.427 0.675 2,924 0.561 0.388
Interest Expense / Total Assets 1,849 0.019 0.040 0.003 0.011 0.038 2,819 0.021 0.013
Cash Flow/Total Assets 1,819 -0.022 0.115 -0.096 -0.008 0.053 2,771 -0.026 -0.009
Cash / Total Assets 1,911 0.125 0.096 0.026 0.107 0.245 2,886 0.114 0.088
Other Control Variables
Market-to-Book Ratio 1,846 22.780 94.187 0.788 3.344 48.729 2,712 36.002 4.499
CapEx / Total Assets 1,883 0.073 0.083 0.010 0.051 0.160 2,839 0.069 0.045
EBITDA/Total Assets 1,842 0.102 0.145 -0.001 0.093 0.202 2,810 0.110 0.101
Asset Tangibility 1,910 0.386 0.214 0.093 0.368 0.681 2,935 0.388 0.376
Loan Characteristics
Loan Amount ($Millions) 1,950 254.817 485.957 22.144 89.472 600.000 3,016 567.906 125.000
Loan Maturity (Months) 2,016 46.242 38.510 12.000 36.000 72.000 3,130 46.001 36.000
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Table 4.6
Impact of Covenant Violations
The table presents summary statistics for a panel of 518 firms, 2,016 firm-years observations, from 1996 to 2011 in 28 countries. The sample is constructed by merging
DealScan with WorldScope, excluding financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), and keeping only contracts that have a financial covenant restricting the current ratio, net worth,
tangible net worth, capital expenditures or EBITDA. Statistics are classified into two groups based on whether the firm-year observation is classified as being in violation
(Violators) or not in violation (Non-Violators) of at least one of the five aforementioned covenants. Each entry reports the number of observations N, mean, the median
and the standard deviation SD. Variables are defined in the Appendix.
Violators Non-Violators
N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD Difference
Capital Structure Variables
Net Debt Issuance / Total Assets 308 -0.106 -0.017 1.322 1,224 0.030 0.016 0.355 (0.000)
Leverage Ratio 313 0.406 0.351 0.297 1,277 0.317 0.306 0.197 (0.000)
Covenant Control Variables
Current Ratio 313 1.293 1.092 0.760 1,264 1.676 1.476 0.913 (0.000)
Net Worth / Total Asset 313 0.308 0.307 0.201 1,281 0.443 0.433 0.182 (0.000)
Tangible Net Worth/Total Assets 314 0.411 0.269 1.804 1,289 0.702 0.448 3.273 (0.064)
Interest Expense / Total Assets 309 0.028 0.018 0.029 1,244 0.015 0.010 0.017 (0.000)
Cash Flow/Total Assets 304 -0.042 -0.021 0.142 1,224 -0.014 -0.004 0.093 (0.000)
Cash / Total Assets 313 0.096 0.078 0.074 1,273 0.133 0.111 0.105 (0.000)
Other Control Variables
Market-to-Book Ratio 305 15.362 3.022 46.742 1,220 32.372 4.000 160.908 (0.034)
CapEx / Total Assets 310 0.053 0.036 0.057 1,252 0.072 0.047 0.080 (0.000)
EBITDA/Total Assets 309 0.085 0.082 0.110 1,240 0.101 0.095 0.093 (0.004)
Asset Tangibility 312 0.378 0.356 0.211 1,288 0.383 0.366 0.219 (0.378)
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cash interest). The main covenant control variables included in the regressions are: the lagged leverage
ratio, the lagged net worth to assets ratio, the lagged tangible net worth to assets ratio, the lagged and
contemporaneous interest expense to lagged assets ratio, the lagged current ratio, the lagged and contem-
poraneous cash flow to lagged assets ratio and the lagged cash to assets ratio. The interaction terms are:
the lagged leverage ratio with the lagged tangible net worth to assets ratio, the lagged leverage ratio with
the lagged cash flow to assets ratio, and the lagged cash to assets ratio with the lagged interest to assets
ratio to reflect the Debt to Tangible Net Worth, Debt to Cash Flow and Cash Interest ratios.
My main parameter of interest is β2, the coefficient on the interaction term between covenant viola-
tion and the judicial quality in a country. I observe the coefficient β0 on covenant violations in isolation
first to check how it relates to previous literature about the impact of violations on financing policy;
then I examine β2 which illustrates the joint effect of a violation and country-specific determinants. The
analysis that follows provides evidence on whether the level of development of the judicial system in
a country, the enforcement of laws, and the protection of contracts mitigates or rather exacerbates the
effect of a covenant violation on financing policy.
4.4.2 Graphical Analysis
As a preliminary exercise, Figure 3 examines the effect of a covenant violation on capital structure
graphically. Panel A and B present the medians for net debt issuance and leverage in event time where
time 0 on the x-axis indicates the year of violation. Note that, in order to properly isolate the effect of a
covenant violation on capital structure variables, I impose that the violation be the first experienced by a
certain firm during the sample period. This restriction is lifted however while performing the regression
analysis to include all recorded violations.
Panel A shows that while the flow of debt capital fluctuates in the years prior to a covenant violation
and does not really exhibit a clear trend, firms experience a very steep decline in net debt issuance in the
year following a covenant violation. As a matter of fact, net debt issuance falls from 3% to -3% in the
year immediately after the violation, a sharp drop of 200%. This trend starts to revert though after the
first year and net debt issuance recovers persistently for up to four years after the violation. This recovery
is however slow and net debt issuance is significantly lower, four years after the violation, than what it
was in the four years leading up to the violation, including the year of the violation itself.
The median book leverage ratio, as depicted in Panel B, also drops immediately following a covenant
violation, though this decline is not as pronounced as in the case of net debt issuance. Median book
leverage falls from 42% to 39%, an overall decline of 8%. Unlike net debt issuance however, the leverage
ratio continues to fall in the four years following the violation to a level lower than what it was in the
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Figure 4.3. The Effect of a Covenant Violation on Capital Structure. The figure reports median
values for net debt issuance scaled by total assets (Panel A) and leverage (Panel B) before and after a
new covenant violation. A new covenant violation is a violation for a firm that is violating a covenant for
the first time during the sample period.
year right before the violation and even lower than the leverage ratio levels in up to four years preceding
the year of the violation. The median leverage ratio is reduced by 17% between the first and the fourth
year following the violation compared to a reduction of 3% between the year of violation and the year
immediately following the violation.
Overall, the results in Panel A and B suggest that covenant violations do affect capital structure in
my sample in a comparable way to what has been found in the literature for different samples. While
certain studies suggest that violations are not entirely responsible for changes in leverage ratios which
are rather affected by within firm variations (Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008), and that it is unlikely
that a highly levered firm will become a low levered firm in relative terms because of a violation (Roberts
and Sufi, 2009a), the effect that violations have on net debt issuance is quite discernible and significantly
large. In what follows, I analyze the changes in net debt issuance in my sample following a covenant
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violation with more scrutiny in reference to previous findings in the literature; and more importantly, I
further extend previous studies by examining whether the quality of the judicial system in a country does
somehow affect the changes in net debt issuance observed following a covenant violation.
4.4.3 Results
Table 7 reports results for the Covenants Sample focusing solely on the impact of violations on capi-
tal structure and hence excludes the judicial effectiveness variable and the interaction between covenant
violations and judicial effectiveness. All specifications include industry and year fixed effects. The base-
line model results in specification (1) of Panel A show that a covenant violation results in 2.5% drop
in net debt issuance. This result is strongly significant statistically even after removing fixed effects.
Specification (2) shows that net debt issuance falls from 2.6% below the firm mean (CVt) to 3.4% below
in the year following a covenant violation (CVt−1), an overall decline of just over 30%.
The specification in column (2), in addition to the one reported in column (3), also include all con-
temporaneous values of the covenant control variables. Adding these contemporaneous controls causes
the magnitude of the coefficient on covenant violation to increase by roughly 52% and the adjusted R2 to
increase by 33%. These additional controls also strongly improve the statistical significance of the coef-
ficient on covenant violations which becomes significant at the 1% level compared to a 5% significance
level in column (1).
The specification in column (4) adds the three interaction terms previously mentioned to the specifi-
cation in column (3). This addition has little impact on the magnitude and significance of the estimated
covenant violation coefficient and the adjusted R2. Specification (5) includes the higher order controls
of the covenant control variables. These controls are the squared and cubic terms of each of the covenant
control variables. Adding these terms causes the magnitude of the estimated covenant violation coeffi-
cient to drop slightly but does not affect its statistical power and causes the adjusted R2 to increase by a
little amount.
Finally, specification (6) includes contemporaneous controls, covenant interaction variables, higher
order controls and default distances for the current ratio and net worth covenants. The addition of these
default distances is an attempt to further isolate the discontinuity at the point of violation by adding
smooth functions of the distance from the default threshold to the specification (Chava and Roberts,
2008). Because of a limited number of observations containing either a capital expenditures covenant or
EBITDA covenant, I restrict the default distance variables to the current ratio and net worth covenants
(both net worth and tangible net worth). As such, I define the current ratio and net worth distances,
Default Distance (CR) and Default Distance (NW) respectively, in the following manner:
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Table 4.7
Covenant Violations and Net Debt Issuance
Fixed effect regressions of net debt issuance on covenant violation indicators and covenant control vari-
ables. The sample is the result of the intersection between DealScan and WorldScope and consists of
2,016 firm-year observations between 1996 and 2011 in 28 countries excluding the United States. Fi-
nancial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and loans that do not contain a covenant restricting the current ratio,
net worth, tangible net worth, capital expenditures or EBITDA are excluded. All specifications include
the lagged values of control variables and the current values of Interest and Cash flow. Contempora-
neous Controls indicates if the current values of all controls variables are included in the specification.
Covenant Interaction Variables include three interaction terms: the lagged leverage ratio with the lagged
tangible net worth to assets ratio, the lagged leverage ratio with the lagged cash flow to assets ratio, and
the lagged cash to assets ratio with the lagged interest to assets ratio. Higher Order Controls refers to
the second and third powers of the control variable. Default Distance refers to the smooth functions of
the distance from the actual variable to the covenant threshold for both the current ratio and net worth
covenants. All specifications have fixed industry effects, robust standard errors, and year indicators.
Panel A reports results for the net debt issuance while Panel B reports regression results of the first dif-
ference analogs of the variables in Panel A. p-values are in parentheses. All variables are defined in the
Appendix. Omitted variables are replaced by -.
Panel A: Net Debt Issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant Violationt−1(CV) -0.025 -0.034 -0.038 -0.039 -0.029 -0.044
(0.041) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.088)
Covenant Violationt – -0.026 – – – –
– (0.123) – – – –
Leveraget−1 -0.036 -0.677 -0.660 -0.683 -0.687 -0.757
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net Wortht−1/Total Assetst−1 0.038 0.413 0.379 0.395 0.432 0.569
(0.455) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tangible Net Wortht−1/Total Assetst−1 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.000 -0.006 0.059
(0.530) (0.610) (0.894) (0.994) (0.018) (0.643)
Interestt−1/Total Assetst−1 -4.121 -1.881 -1.900 -2.059 -2.535 -1.960
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.001) (0.220)
Current Ratiot−1 -0.010 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.024
(0.168) (0.812) (0.485) (0.555) (0.391) (0.055)
Cash Flowt−1/Total Assetst−1 0.230 0.039 0.073 0.088 0.139 0.420
(0.000) (0.215) (0.035) (0.048) (0.002) (0.036)
Casht−1/Total Assetst−1 -0.010 -0.038 -0.016 -0.120 -0.060 -0.316
(0.859) (0.582) (0.793) (0.183) (0.473) (0.033)
Contemporaneous Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interactions No No No Yes Yes Yes
Higher Order Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Default Distance No No No No No Yes
Number of Observations 1,424 1,283 1,422 1,422 1,422 486
R2 0.552 0.751 0.732 0.734 0.758 0.672
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Table 4.7 - Continued
Panel B: Change in Net Debt Issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant Violationt−1(CV) -0.118 -0.121 -0.080 -0.085 -0.091 -0.096
(0.017) (0.024) (0.034) (0.044) (0.073) (0.012)
Covenant Violationt – 0.029 – – – –
– (0.624) – – – –
Leveraget−1 1.480 0.816 1.724 1.715 1.758 0.688
(0.012) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Net Wortht−1/Total Assetst−1 -0.463 -0.857 -0.571 -0.454 -0.475 -0.404
(0.009) (0.000) (0.022) (0.062) (0.076) (0.003)
Tangible Net Wortht−1/Total Assetst−1 0.005 -0.034 0.001 0.005 0.007 -0.817
(0.835) (0.265) (0.967) (0.855) (0.793) (0.001)
Interestt−1/Total Assetst−1 -4.436 -0.497 -6.353 -7.451 -4.997 9.668
(0.275) (0.791) (0.126) (0.201) (0.399) (0.050)
Current Ratiot−1 0.018 0.060 0.038 0.045 0.052 0.040
(0.594) (0.221) (0.420) (0.346) (0.350) (0.044)
Cash Flowt−1/Total Assetst−1 -0.521 -0.389 -0.556 -0.569 -0.604 -0.498
(0.030) (0.000) (0.006) (0.034) (0.065) (0.037)
Casht−1/Total Assetst−1 0.190 0.365 0.348 -0.340 -0.454 0.512
(0.242) (0.033) (0.077) (0.341) (0.262) (0.007)
Contemporaneous Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interactions No No No Yes Yes Yes
Higher Order Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Default Distance No No No No No Yes
Number of Observation 1,348 1,216 1,348 1,348 1,348 470
R2 0.317 0.314 0.337 0.34 0.349 0.265
Default Distance (CR)≡ ICurrentRatioi,t × (CurrentRatioi,t −CurrentRatio0i,t)
Default Distance (NW)≡ INetWorthi,t × (NetWorthi,t −NetWorth0i,t)
where CurrentRatioi,t and NetWorthi,t are the observed values for the current ratio and net worth/tangi-
ble net worth respectively for firm i at year t, CurrentRatio0i,t and NetWorth
0
i,t are the specified covenant
thresholds as specified by the terms of the contracts for the current ratio and net worth/tangible net worth
respectively and ICurrentRatioi,t and INetWorthi,t are indicator variables that take the value of 1 if the corre-
sponding firm-year observation has a covenant written on the current ratio or the net worth respectively
(Chava and Roberts, 2008).
Specification (6) includes both the level values of the default distance and higher order values
(squared and cubic), though removing the latter has little effect on the results. The coefficients on these
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Table 4.8
Covenant Violations, Judicial Effectiveness, and Net Debt Issuance
Fixed effect regressions of net debt issuance on covenant violation indicators, country legal effectove-
ness, and covenant control variables. The sample is the result of the intersection between DealScan
and WorldScope and consists of 2,016 firm-year observations between 1996 and 2011 in 28 countries
excluding the United States. Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and loans that do not contain a covenant
restricting the current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, capital expenditures or EBITDA are excluded.
All specifications include the lagged values of control variables and the current values of Interest and
Cash flow. Contemporaneous Controls indicates if the current values of all controls variables are in-
cluded in the specification. Covenant Interaction Variables include three interaction terms: the lagged
leverage ratio with the lagged tangible net worth to assets ratio, the lagged leverage ratio with the lagged
cash flow to assets ratio, and the lagged cash to assets ratio with the lagged interest to assets ratio. Higher
Order Controls refers to the second and third powers of the control variable. Default Distance refers to
the smooth functions of the distance from the actual variable to the covenant threshold for both the cur-
rent ratio and net worth covenants. All specifications have fixed industry effects, robust standard errors,
and year indicators. Panel A reports results for the net debt issuance while Panel B reports regression re-
sults of the first difference analogs of the variables in Panel A. p-values are in parentheses. All variables
are defined in the Appendix. Omitted variables are replaced by -.
Panel A: Net Debt Issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CV * JLEI 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.009 0.034
(0.051) (0.007) (0.032) (0.005) (0.067) (0.043)
Covenant Violationt−1(CV) -0.104 -0.132 -0.129 -0.152 -0.095 -0.272
(0.018) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.015) (0.023)
Judicial/Legal Effectiveness (JLEI) -0.015 -0.010 -0.008 -0.010 -0.006 0.002
(0.024) (0.016) (0.042) (0.010) (0.122) (0.828)
Covenant Violationt – – -0.027 – – –
– – (0.123) – – –
Leveraget−1 -0.365 -0.661 -0.681 -0.678 -0.685 -0.744
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net Wortht−1/Total Assetst−1 0.038 0.381 0.415 0.401 0.436 0.551
(0.457) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tangible Net Wortht−1/Total Assetst−1 0.000 0.000 0.006 -0.001 -0.007 0.070
(0.509) (0.960) (0.611) (0.884) (0.016) (0.592)
Interestt−1/Total Assetst−1 -4.140 -1.902 -1.869 -2.186 -2.597 -2.044
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.205)
Current Ratiot−1 -0.010 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.024
(0.173) (0.393) (0.718) (0.427) (0.324) (0.055)
Cash Flowt−1/Total Assetst−1 0.227 0.075 0.041 0.095 0.142 0.427
(0.000) (0.030) (0.173) (0.034) (0.001) (0.029)
Casht−1/Total Assetst−1 -0.005 -0.015 -0.039 -0.123 -0.063 -0.294
(0.924) (0.807) (0.573) (0.171) (0.452) (0.047)
Contemporaneous Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covenant Interactions Variables No No No Yes Yes Yes
Higher Order Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Default Distance No No No No No Yes
Number of Observations 1,424 1,422 1,283 1,422 1,422 486
R2 0.551 0.73 0.749 0.731 0.757 0.714
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Table 4.8 - Continued
Panel B: Change in Net Debt Issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CV * JLEI 0.062 0.062 0.038 0.057 0.063 0.143
(0.084) (0.049) (0.079) (0.033) (0.020) (0.003)
Covenant Violationt−1(CV) -0.549 -0.509 -0.382 -0.481 -0.530 -1.054
(0.045) (0.028) (0.032) (0.016) (0.007) (0.001)
Judicial/Legal Effectiveness (JLEI) -0.010 -0.008 0.003 -0.008 -0.014 0.011
(0.557) (0.659) (0.880) (0.614) (0.329) (0.680)
Covenant Violationt – – 0.036 – – –
– – (0.523) – – –
Leveraget−1 1.475 1.717 0.826 1.713 1.750 0.679
(0.010) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Net Wortht−1/Total Assetst−1 -0.489 -0.615 -0.886 -0.500 -0.530 -0.339
(0.005) (0.011) (0.000) (0.035) (0.040) (0.021)
Tangible Net Wortht−1/Total Assetst−1 0.007 0.004 -0.034 0.007 0.008 -0.807
(0.761) (0.865) (0.253) (0.769) (0.753) (0.001)
Interestt−1/Total Assetst−1 -5.006 -6.975 -1.239 -7.716 -5.281 8.119
(0.225) (0.096) (0.494) (0.180) (0.367) (0.096)
Current Ratiot−1 0.020 0.042 0.062 0.048 0.057 0.043
(0.545) (0.384) (0.215) (0.315) (0.310) (0.032)
Cash Flowt−1/Total Assetst−1 -0.549 -0.582 -0.412 -0.592 -0.648 -0.544
(0.030) (0.006) (0.000) (0.032) (0.050) (0.025)
Casht−1/Total Assetst−1 0.202 0.360 0.370 -0.302 -0.428 0.368
(0.213) (0.067) (0.029) (0.384) (0.278) (0.029)
Contemporaneous Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covenant Interactions Variables No No No Yes Yes Yes
Higher Order Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Default Distance No No No No No Yes
Number of Observations 1,348 1,348 1,216 1,348 1,348 470
R2 0.319 0.338 0.318 0.341 0.351 0.237
default distance variables are not reported in the table, but the estimation shows that the current ratio dis-
tance is both highly economically and statistically significant which indicates that the distance from the
covenant threshold might contain information about future financing decisions relating to the issuance
of debt. The net worth distance however is both economically and statistically insignificant. In terms
of other coefficients, the inclusion of the default distance to the specification increases the magnitude
of the estimated coefficient on covenant violation but causes the statistical significance to fall slightly
though the coefficient remains highly significant. The addition of the default distances also causes the
adjusted R2 to slightly decrease as compared to models (3)-(5) though it remains fairly high above the
R2 in column (1).
Overall, the addition of all these controls does not affect the covenant violation coefficient in terms
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of magnitude and significance, and causes the R2 to increase over the baseline model indicating that all
these additional controls have significant predictive power.
Panel B presents results from the first difference analogs of the specifications in Panel A. In other
words, the panel reports estimation results of the change in debt issuance as it is affected by a covenant
violation while controlling for the changes in the covenant control variables. The inclusion of this panel
is inspired by the graphical analysis in Figure 3 where it is evident that net debt issuance suffers a sharp
decline right after a covenant violation suggesting that a first difference estimation may illustrate the
effect of a covenant violation on net debt issuance with more precision. The estimation results reported
in Panel B are in line with the results reported in Panel A highlighting a negative effect of a covenant
violation on net debt issuance that is both highly economically and statistically significant.
Table 8 replicates table 7 but adds the JLEI variable as a proxy for the judicial integrity in a cer-
tain country, and the interaction between covenant violation and JLEI as an estimate of the difference in
the response of creditors to covenant violations in different countries. Panel A of the table reports the
estimation results for net debt issuance. As with Table 7, all specifications include fixed industry and
year effects. The inclusion of these country-specific indicators does not alter the estimated coefficient
on covenant violation. The coefficient on covenant violation remains negative and highly significant;
the inclusion of the JLEI variable increases the magnitude of the covenant violation coefficient however,
emphasizing the negative effect a violation has on net debt issuance. The variations in net debt issuance
remain highly explained by the included right-hand side variables with adjusted R2 of more than 50% for
the baseline model in specification (1) and considerably increasing with the inclusion of more controls
in a way that is closely comparable to Panel A of Table 7.
Interestingly, while the coefficient on JLEI is mostly negative and significant, the coefficient on the
interaction between covenant violation and JLEI is overall positive with high statistical significance in all
specifications. This result indicates that while a covenant violation causes net debt issuance to decline,
the presence of strong judicial enforcement can offset the negative effect of that violation on financing
policy and mitigate the resulting drop in net debt issuance. As a matter of fact, while net debt issuance
declines by 10.4% in the year following a covenant violation as shown in column (1), the country effect
associated with this violation offsets this decline by 1.1%, resulting in an overall drop of 9.3%. Very
similar results are observable in the remainder of the specifications, with comparable magnitudes of the
covenant violation coefficient in specifications (1) through (5), with the exception of specification (6)
where the coefficient almost doubles in magnitude. The offsetting effect of the interaction is also com-
parable in all specifications and roughly accounts for 10% of the decline caused by a covenant violation
in almost all cases.
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In Panel B, as with Panel B of Table 7, the results are estimated on first difference analogs of the
variables in Panel A. The results reported in this panel are widely comparable to the results in Panel A; a
covenant violation has a negative impact on the change in net debt issuance, an effect that is mitigated by
strong legal enforcement in a country. All results are strongly statistically and economically significant
and all specifications have high explanatory power.
Tables A7 and A8 of the appendix rerun the specifications in Tables 7 and 8 respectively on the sam-
ple including both international and U.S. firms and generate similar results to those obtained with the
Covenants Sample.
In summary, covenant violations are observed to have a negative effect on financing policy that is
translated through an estimated 10% decline in net debt issuance in the year following a technical default
in an international setting. This effect is however mitigated by country specific characteristics. I find
that in countries with stronger judicial systems, the negative impact of a covenant violation is alleviated
by close to 10%. These findings are consistent with the control allocation theories whereby covenants
play a disciplinary role and a covenant violation entails the transfer of control from borrowers to credi-
tors who interfere in the decision making of the violating firm and alter its financing policy. However, in
countries where the rights of creditors are protected by underlying laws and strong institutions, creditors’
disciplinary role after a violation is not as pronounced and therefore the creditors’ impact on financing
policy is not as detrimental. In short, covenant violations affect the stock of debt more radically for firms
in countries with poor legal protection of creditors.
4.5 Robustness Tests
4.5.1 Alternative Enforcement Measures
The results observed in Table 8 show that a strong legal enforcement system, as measured by JLEI,
could alleviate the negative effect that a covenant violation has on capital structure. To test the robustness
of these results, in this section I consider the following six alternative measures for JLEI as they appear
in the literature interchangeably to proxy for legal enforcement:
1. The Rule of Law Index: This index measures the law and order tradition in a country. The index
reflects the willingness of citizens in a country to accept the established institutions and respect the
laws in the resolution of disputes. The index is produced by the International Country Risk (ICR)
rating agency and takes values between 0 and 10 with higher scores translating into sound political
institutions, a strong judicial system, and clear regulations defining the succession of power; and
lower scores indicating the resistance of new government leaders to take on the obligations of the
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Table 4.9
Legal Enforcement Variables
The table describes the variables used as alternative measures to the Judicial/Legal Effectiveness variable. All
variables proxy for the quality of legal enforcement in each of the 28 countries used in the analysis. The first
column gives the name of the variable used, the second column defines the variable and how it is measured, and
the third column states the source from which the variable was collected.
Variable Description Source
Rule of Law Index Measures the law and order tradition in a
country. Produced by the country-risk rating
agency International Country Risk (ICR). The
index takes values between 0 and 10, where
lower scores indicate less tradition for law and
order.
LLSV (1998)
Corruption Index An indicator of the level of corruption in a
government. Developed by the Political Risk
Services, ICR, and scales between 0 and 10
where lower scores indicate higher levels of
corruption. Lower scores generally highlight
the likelihood of high government officials
demanding illegal payments in the form of
bribes.
LLSV (1999)
Efficiency of the Judicial System Index Assesses the judicial integrity in a certain
country in the way it affects business, for-
eign firms in particular. The index is produced
by the Business International Corporation and
ranges between 0 and 10, with lower scores in-
dicating less efficient legal environments.
LLSV(1998)
Property Rights Index An index compiled by the Heritage Founda-
tion/Wall Street Journal under the Index of
Economic Freedom. The index was rescaled to
take values between 0 and 10 where lower rat-
ings refer to lower protection of private prop-
erty. Used by LLSV (1999) to account for the
degree of legal protection of private property,
the degree of government enforcement of laws
that protect private property, the probability of
government expropriation of private property
and the country’s legal protection of private
property.
Index of Economic
Freedom; the Her-
itage Foundation
website.
Risk of Expropriation Index Assesses the risk of “outright confiscation”or
“forced nationalization”by the government.
Developed by the ICR and takes values be-
tween 0 and 10 with lower scores indicating
higher risks.
LLSV(1998)
Repudiation of Contracts Index Assesses the risk of a repudiation, postpone-
ment or scaling down of a contract by gov-
ernment due to budget cutbacks, indigeniza-
tion pressure, government change or the lat-
ter’s economic and social priorities. Compiled
by the ICR with ratings between 0 and 10
where lower scores indicate a higher risk.
LLSV(1998)
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previous regime and the resorting to physical force or illegal ways to resolve conflicts (Knack and
Keefer, 1995). I obtain the values of this index from the online data of LLSV (1998).
2. The Corruption Index: This index measures the level of corruption in a government. The index
is developed by the Political Risk Services agency and ranks from 0 to 10 with lower ratings
generally indicating that high government officials, as well as the majority of the lower levels of
government, accept illegal payments that are manifested in the form of bribes aimed at tampering
with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, policy protection and loans
(LLSV, 1999). The data on this index is obtained through the online data of LLSV (1999).
3. The Efficiency of the Judicial System Index: This is the counterpart of my JLEI variable as it is
measured by the Business International Corporation country-risk rating agency. The index as-
sesses how business, and in particular foreign firms, is affected by the efficiency and integrity of
the judicial environment in a certain country. The index is measured on a scale from 0 to 10 with
higher scores implying superior legal efficiency levels (LLSV, 1998). The values for this index
were also downloaded from the online data published by LLSV (1998).
4. The Property Rights Index: This index rates the level of protection of property rights in a coun-
try. The index assesses the degree of legal protection of private property, the degree to which
the government protects and enforces laws that preserve private property rights, the likelihood of
government expropriation of private property, and the legal protection of private property of the
country in question (LLSV, 1999). The index takes a scale from 0 to 10 with higher scores indi-
cating better protection of property rights, and is obtained from the Index of Economic Freedom
compilation found on The Heritage Foundation website.
5. The Risk of Expropriation Index: The index measures the risk of “outright confiscation”of privately-
owned businesses or the threat of “forced nationalization”reflecting in the gradual seizing of pri-
vate property rights by the government of a certain country (LLSV, 1998). The index is developed
by the International Country Risk (ICR) country-risk rating agency and takes values between 0
and 10 with lower values indicating a higher risk. This index is obtained from LLSV (1998).
6. The Repudiation of Contracts Index: This index, also developed by the International Country Risk
(ICR) country-risk rating agency, has a scale going from 0 to 10 where lower scores translate into
higher risks of repudiation. The risk of repudiation is defined as the threat of the modification of
a contract through either postponement, scaling down or invalidation, as a consequence of budget
cuts, government changes, indigenization pressure or change in social priorities (LLSV, 1998).
This index is also obtained from LLSV (1998).
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Table 4.10
Correlations of Legal Enforcement Measures
The table presents the pairwise correlations between the variables used as alternative measures to the
Judicial/Legal Effectiveness variable. All variables proxy for the quality of legal enforcement in each of
the 28 countries used in the analysis. p-values are between parenthesis. Definitions of the variables are
in Table 9.
JLEI
Rule of
Law
Corruption
Index
Judicial
Efficiency
Property
Rights
Expropriation
Risk
Rule of Law 0.639
(0.000)
Corruption Index 0.845 0.796
(0.000) (0.000)
Judicial Efficiency 0.897 0.486 0.828
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Property Rights 0.910 0.802 0.866 0.863
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Expropriation Risk 0.578 0.881 0.649 0.374 0.666
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Contract Repudiation 0.578 0.919 0.683 0.378 0.732 0.868
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 9 presents a brief summary of the definitions and sources of these alternative proxies of legal
enforcement. Table 10 exhibits the pair-wise correlations between the different proxies of legal enforce-
ment including the original JLEI measure. Correlations between these different proxies are generally
high. The correlations are all positive and very strongly significant. Focusing on the JLEI column, it
becomes obvious that this measure is very highly positively and significantly correlated with all other
proxies of legal enforcement which shows that the rule of law index, the corruption index, the property
rights index, the efficiency of the judicial system index, the risk of expropriation index and the repudi-
ation of contracts index are just other faces of the JLE Index. In other words, countries with stronger
judicial environments also have better enforcement of law and order, lower corruption in governments,
stronger protection of private property rights, a lower risk of government expropriation of private prop-
erty and a lower risk of contract repudiation.
In Table 11, I replicate specification (4) of Table 8 with the different proxies for legal enforcement.
The estimated coefficients on these proxies and the coefficients on covenant violation and the interaction
of the latter two variables are the only coefficients reported in the table to save space. Panel A reports
results for net debt issuance as dependent variable while Panel B reports the same results for the change
in net debt issuance.
Column (1) of Panel A shows the results of including the rule of law index as a proxy for legal
enforcement. Concurrently with findings in Table 8, the estimated coefficients on covenant violation
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Table 4.11
Robustness Tests - Alternative Proxies for Legal Enforcement
Fixed effect regressions of net debt issuance on covenant violation indicators, alternative measures of legal enforce-
ment, and the interaction of covenant violation with these measures. The sample is the result of the intersection
between DealScan and WorldScope and consists of 2,016 firm-year observations between 1996 and 2011 in 28
countries excluding the United States. Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and loans that do not contain a covenant
restricting the current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, capital expenditures or EBITDA are excluded. All speci-
fications have fixed industry effects, robust standard errors and year indicators. Covenant Control Variables include
the leverage ratio, the net worth to assets ratio, the tangible net worth to assets ratio, the interest to assets ratio, the
current ratio, the cash flow to assets ratio and the cash to assets ratio, and are all lagged. Contemporaneous Con-
trols indicates if the current values of all controls variables are included in the specification. Covenant Interaction
Variables include three interaction terms: the lagged leverage ratio with the lagged tangible net worth to assets
ratio, the lagged leverage ratio with the lagged cash flow to assets ratio, and the lagged cash to assets ratio with the
lagged interest to assets ratio. The coefficients on these three sets of controls are not reported to save space. Panel
A reports results for the net debt issuance while Panel B reports regression results of the first difference analogs
of the variables in Panel A. p-values are in parentheses. All variables are defined in the Appendix and Table 9.
Omitted variables are replaced by -.
Panel A: Net Debt Issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant Violation (CV) -0.146 -0.141 -0.140 -0.135 -0.201 -0.208
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.026) (0.005)
Rule of Law Index (RLI) -0.008 – – – – –
(0.051) – – – – –
CV * RLI 0.014 – – – – –
(0.020) – – – – –
Corruption Index (CI) – -0.007 – – – –
– (0.083) – – – –
CV * CI – 0.014 – – – –
– (0.012) – – – –
Judicial Efficiency Index (JEI) – – -0.003 – – –
– – (0.393) – – –
CV * JEI – – 0.013 – – –
– – (0.025) – – –
Property Rights Index(PRI) – – – -0.007 – –
– – – (0.034) – –
CV * PRI – – – 0.013 – –
– – – (0.007) – –
Risk of Expropriation Index (REI) – – – – -0.012 –
– – – – (0.131) –
CV * REI – – – – 0.018 –
– – – – (0.068) –
Repudiation of Contracts Index (RCI) – – – – – -0.014
– – – – – (0.035)
CV * RCI – – – – – 0.020
– – – – – (0.021)
Covenant Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemporaneous Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covenant Interaction Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,408 1,422 1,408 1,422 1,408 1,408
R2 0.733 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.734 0.733
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Table 4.11 - Continued
Panel B: Change in Net Debt Issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covenant Violation (CV) -0.648 -0.751 -0.755 -0.535 -0.378 -0.691
(0.020) (0.002) (0.001) (0.015) (0.386) (0.056)
Rule of Law Index (RLI) -0.001 – – – – –
(0.939) – – – – –
CV * RLI 0.071 – – – – –
(0.028) – – – – –
Corruption Index (CI) – -0.011 – – – –
– (0.525) – – – –
CV * CI – 0.090 – – – –
– (0.003) – – – –
Judicial Efficiency Index (JEI) – – -0.010 – – –
– – (0.429) – – –
CV * JEI – – 0.086 – – –
– – (0.002) – – –
Property Rights Index(PRI) – – – -0.009 – –
– – – (0.519) – –
CV * PRI – – – 0.063 – –
– – – (0.023) – –
Risk of Expropriation Index (REI) – – – – 0.039 –
– – – – (0.506) –
CV * REI – – – – 0.033 –
– – – – (0.491) –
Repudiation of Contracts Index (RCI) – – – – – 0.003
– – – – – (0.945)
CV * RCI – – – – – 0.071
– – – – – (0.079)
Covenant Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemporaneous Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covenant Interaction Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,335 1,348 1,335 1,348 1,335 1,335
R2 0.340 0.341 0.342 0.342 0.340 0.340
and the rule of law index are negative and significant, while the estimated coefficient on the interaction
between these two variables is positive and significant indicating that the stronger the law and order tra-
dition in a country, the less severely creditors respond to a covenant violation. In column (2), the results
show a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction between covenant violation and the cor-
ruption index, both negative and significant. Column (3) uses the judicial efficiency index as measured
by the Business International Corporation. The coefficient on this index is negative but not significant,
however, the estimated coefficient on covenant violation is negative and significant, and the estimated
coefficient on the interaction between the judicial efficiency index and covenant violation is positive and
significant at the 5% level, consistent with previous findings. Column (4) employs the property rights
index which is derived from a number of other indices; the property rights index addresses the likelihood
of expropriation of private property, the independence of the judicial system, the existence of corruption
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within the judicial system, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts (Heritage
Foundation, 2013). The estimated coefficient on the interaction of this index with covenant violation is
positive and significant at the 1% level, with the coefficients on both interacted variables negative and
statistically significant. Finally, columns (5) and (6) present results for the risk of expropriation and the
risk of contract repudiation as inverse measures of legal enforcement. Higher scores on these two indices
indicate lower risks and hence stronger legal enforcement. As with the rest of the proxies, the estimated
coefficients on the interaction of these two proxies with covenant violation respectively are positive and
significant; reaffirming previous findings that stronger legal enforcement in a country plays a role in mit-
igating the adverse effect of a covenant violation on net debt issuance.
Panel B repeats the above analysis on the first difference analogs of the specifications in Panel A.
The results are closely comparable whereby the interaction between the different proxies and covenant
violation is positive and statistically significant almost everywhere, except for the estimated coefficient
on the interaction between the risk of expropriation index and covenant violation that comes out positive
but not statistically significant.
4.5.2 Additional Control Variables
Table 12 includes additional controls affecting capital structure beyond those presented in Table 8.
Some of these measures are directly related to my study, while others have been previously used in the
literature as direct determinants of financing. Six new variables are added as right hand side variables
in my specification: (i) Capital Expenditures, (ii) EBITDA, (iii) the Market-to-Book Ratio, (iv) Asset
Tangibility, (v) Number of Covenants and (vi) Sweep Covenants.
Capital Expenditures and EBITDA are added as covenant control variables. Financial covenants
written on these two variables appear in credit agreements and are used when constructing my sample;
however their occurrence is not as frequent as the rest of the financial covenants. They are scaled by
total assets and added to the model specifications to check if the results hold with their inclusion. The
ratio of EBITDA to total assets, otherwise known as profitability, was also used by Rajan and Zingales
(1995) as a determinant of capital structure. The predictions for the effect of this ratio on capital structure
are conflicting. Myers and Majluf (1984) predict a negative relationship between capital structure and
profitability as internal funds take priority over debt in firms’ financing decisions, while Jensen (1986)
predicts a positive relationship in the presence of an effective market for corporate control. Rajan and
Zingales (1995) find a negative relationship between profitability and capital structure.
The market-to-book ratio and the asset tangibility ratio are also taken from Rajan and Zingales (1995)
as determinants of capital structure. The market-to-book ratio proxies for growth opportunities and
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Table 4.12
Robustness Tests - Additional Controls
Fixed effect regressions of net debt issuance on covenant violation indicators, country legal effectiveness,
and the interaction of covenant violation with legal effectiveness. The sample is the result of the inter-
section between DealScan and WorldScope and consists of 2,016 firm-year observations between 1996
and 2011 in 28 countries excluding the United States. Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and loans that
do not contain a covenant restricting the current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, capital expenditures
or EBITDA are excluded. All specifications have fixed industry effects, robust standard errors, and year
indicators. Panel A reports results for the net debt issuance while Panel B reports regression results of the
first difference analogs of the variables in Panel A. p-values are in parentheses. All variables are defined
in the Appendix. Omitted variables are replaced by -.
Panel A: Net Debt Issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CV * JLEI 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
(0.098) (0.049) (0.057) (0.052) (0.034) (0.047)
Covenant Violationt−1(CV) -0.091 -0.103 -0.100 -0.104 -0.104 -0.098
(0.033) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.013) (0.020)
Judicial/Legal Effectiveness (JLEI) -0.010 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.015 -0.014
(0.082) (0.021) (0.036) (0.040) (0.019) (0.032)
Leveraget−1 -0.378 -0.364 -0.376 -0.373 -0.368 -0.372
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net Wortht−1/Total Assetst−1 0.014 0.033 0.040 0.021 0.039 0.033
(0.761) (0.518) (0.401) (0.702) (0.430) (0.510)
Current Ratiot−1 -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.009
(0.233) (0.111) (0.132) (0.275) (0.123) (0.143)
Cash Flowt−1/Total Assetst−1 0.234 0.207 0.200 0.229 0.224 0.226
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interestt−1/Total Assetst−1 -3.966 -4.186 -4.117 -4.070 -4.113 -4.077
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CapExt−1/Total Assetst−1 0.330 – – – – –
(0.000) – – – – –
EBITDAt−1/Total Assetst−1 – 0.056 – – – –
– (0.400) – – – –
Market-to-Book Ratiot−1 – – 0.000 – – –
– – (0.015) – – –
Asset tangibilityt−1 – – – 0.058 – –
– – – (0.107) – –
Number of Covenants – – – – -0.003 –
– – – – (0.472) –
Sweep Covenants – – – – – -0.027
– – – – – (0.137)
Number of observations 1,423 1,423 1,369 1,424 1,424 1,424
R2 0.572 0.552 0.554 0.552 0.552 0.554
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Table 4.12 - Continued
Panel B: Change in Net Debt Issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CV * JLEI 0.062 0.063 0.061 0.062 0.062 0.061
(0.090) (0.078) (0.090) (0.084) (0.084) (0.086)
Covenant Violationt−1(CV) -0.545 -0.551 -0.536 -0.550 -0.545 -0.544
(0.051) (0.042) (0.049) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046)
Judicial/Legal Effectiveness (JLEI) -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010
(0.564) (0.546) (0.601) (0.526) (0.571) (0.560)
Leveraget−1 1.485 1.475 1.523 1.506 1.478 1.475
(0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Net Wortht−1/Total Assetst−1 -0.436 -0.429 -0.385 -0.431 -0.435 -0.434
(0.007) (0.007) (0.022) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Current Ratiot−1 0.027 0.030 0.027 0.024 0.027 0.027
(0.433) (0.355) (0.425) (0.500) (0.425) (0.410)
Cash Flowt−1/Total Assetst−1 -0.542 -0.418 -0.821 -0.578 -0.563 -0.558
(0.038) (0.099) (0.007) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030)
Interestt−1/Total Assetst−1 -5.099 -5.061 -4.444 -5.758 -5.097 -5.137
(0.239) (0.224) (0.294) (0.199) (0.228) (0.224)
CapExt−1/Total Assetst−1 -0.025 – – – – –
(0.969) – – – – –
EBITDAt−1/Total Assetst−1 – -0.332 – – – –
– (0.240) – – – –
Market-to-Book Ratiot−1 – – 0.002 – – –
– – (0.357) – – –
Asset tangibilityt−1 – – – -0.220 – –
– – – (0.393) – –
Number of Covenants – – – – 0.018 –
– – – – (0.380) –
Sweep Covenants – – – – – 0.003
– – – – – (0.960)
Number of observations 1,347 1,347 1,307 1,347 1,348 1,348
R2 0.319 0.321 0.329 0.322 0.319 0.319
should be negatively correlated with capital structure since firms expecting high future growth should
rely more on equity financing. The relationship between asset tangibility and capital structure on the
other hand is expected to be positive since tangible assets would serve as collateral and hence reduce
the risk of agency costs, and would also retain more value in liquidation which encourages creditors to
extend more debt to borrowers (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
The additional two variables I include are used by Chava and Roberts (2008) and are related to the
number of covenants contained in credit agreements. Number of covenants counts the total number of
covenants in a contract, while sweep covenants counts the number of sweep provisions. Sweep covenants
could be an asset sale sweep, equity sweep, debt sweep or excess cash flow sweep and specify the per-
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centage of the proceeds from an asset sale, debt or equity issuance or excess cash flows that should be
dedicated to the repayment of the loan.
Column (1) of Panel A reports a positive and statistically significant coefficient on capital expendi-
tures. The coefficient on EBITDA is also positive, as per the market for corporate control prediction;
however this coefficient is not statistically significant. The coefficient on the market-to-book ratio has
negligible magnitude, and the coefficient on asset tangibility is positive, as predicted by the literature, yet
statically insignificant. Similarly the coefficients on both measure of covenants count are insignificant
and are both negative. The results in the table however show that the inclusion of any of these additional
controls does not alter the results previously found; the estimated coefficient on covenant violation re-
mains negative and statistically significant in all specifications in Panel A, and the same applies to the
interaction of covenant violation with JLEI, which returns a positive and statistically significant coeffi-
cient in the presence of these additional controls.
Panel B reproduces the same specifications for the first difference analogs of the variables in Panel A.
The signs and significance of the coefficients on all these additional controls in Panel B are not consistent
with the results in Panel A, however, this does not affect the signs and significance of the coefficients
on covenant violation and the interaction of the latter with JLEI, which remain in line with the results in
Panel A and the rest of this study.
4.6 Covenant Violations and Corporate Policies
While previous sections essentially focused on the effect of covenant violations in different judicial
environments on financing policy, this section examines the impact of these variables on the different
corporate policies of violating firms.
The traditional view of corporate governance solely emphasizes the ability of equityholders to di-
rectly or indirectly influence managerial decision-making through the appointment of an independent
board of directors. In that setting, corporate lenders are thought not to intervene and only take action
when the firm fails to cover its payments and hence is in a state of default (Townsend, 1979; Gale and
Hellwig, 1985; Hart and Moore, 1998). This traditional view has largely dominated the corporate gover-
nance literature, and while the role of creditors in affecting corporate policy has been widely discussed
theoretically, very little empirical evidence exists to support the theory (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012) propose an alternative view of governance under which creditors are able
to influence managerial decisions way before the occurrence of a default state. As a matter of fact, cred-
itors begin to actively intervene in corporate governance when a firm’s performance starts to deteriorate
well ahead of bankruptcy and hence the role they play is equally important to the role equityholders play
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Figure 4.4. The Effect of a Covenant Violation on Corporate Policies. The figure reports median
values for a number of corporate policy measures in the years surrounding a new covenant violation. A
new covenant violation is a violation for a firm that is violating a covenant for the first time during my
sample period.
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in the governance of firms. Through the use of covenants, creditors can exert a kind of pressure on man-
agers and influence corporate governance. Covenant violations give creditors the same contractual rights
as do payment defaults and hence violations give creditors a strong hand in negotiating post-violation
which often leads to more rigid contractual restrictions on borrowers.
In what follows, I examine the effect of covenant violations and legal enforcement on corporate
policy. More specifically, as independent variables in Table 13, I employ three measures of investment
policy: total assets, property, plant and equipment (PPE) and capital expenditures; three measures of
financial policy: total debt, cash to assets and shareholder payouts; and two measures of performance:
sales and net income.
Figure 4 plots the changes in investment policy, financial policy and performance measures. The fig-
ure sketches the means and medians of the aforementioned measures from four years before a covenant
violation occurs to four years after. The graphs are plotted on new violations only to isolate their the
effect on the various measures hereby examined. The first three panels plot the changes in the growth
rates of total assets and PPE respectively, and the changes in capital expenditures scaled by total assets.
The panels show declines in all these investment measures for at least two years following a covenant
violation. The average growth rate of assets generally increases in the four years leading up to the vi-
olation, peaks in the year of violation, but then experiences a sharp drop in the year immediately after
the violation, then a smoother drop is recorded between year one and year two after the violation, before
it starts recovering with a straight increase into year four. The trend in the mean growth rate of PPE is
very much comparable to that observed for total assets; there is a climb that culminates at the time of
violation, followed by a two-year drop which reverses from that point onwards. The median growth rate
of PPE however drops again between year three and year four. Capital expenditures in general exhibit an
overall downward sloping trend though a slight increase can be recorded in the two years preceding the
violation which reverses into a sharp drop in the year right after the violation and continues for another
year, and then slightly recover in the third year following the violation before starting to decline again.
Since covenants are written on the maximum level of allowed capital expenditures a borrower can under-
take, the increase in capital expenditures from two years prior to the violation up to the year of violation
could explain the occurrence of the subsequent covenant violation.
The first three columns of Table 13 report results for these three investment measures. In Panel A, I
solely examine the effect of a covenant violation on these measures without including the effect of legal
enforcement. Consistent with previous literature and the trends observed in Figure 4, total assets, PPE
and capital expenditures experience a decline in the year following a covenant violation indicating in-
creased investment conservatism. These results are both economically and statistically significant. Panel
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B shows that the estimated coefficient on the interaction of covenant violation with total assets, PPE and
capital expenditures respectively has a positive sign. This interaction however is statistically significant
for both total assets and PPE, but not significant for capital expenditures. These results reiterate findings
in previous sections about the role of strong legal enforcement in alleviating creditors’ response to a
covenant violation. The response of capital expenditures to legal enforcement may be explained by the
fact that credit agreements often contain a covenant explicitly restricting capital expenditures and hence
provide creditors with a contractual mechanism to limit investments in the wake of a covenant violation
(Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2009).
Figure 4 also reveals a decline in financial policy measures following a covenant violation. Total
debt increases steadily from four years prior to the violation up until the year of the violation before it
drops sharply for two straight years after the violation, then reverses slightly in the third and fourth years
following the violation. The liquidity of violators, as depicted by the cash to assets ratio, increases in
the four years preceding a violation up until a year before the violation when it sharply drops until the
year of violation. In the year following the violation, liquidity levels off a bit compared to the previous
year’s sharp decline, but still experiences a slight fall before it recovers and starts growing after the first
year following the violation. Dividends also exhibit a downward sloping trend from four years before the
violation up until the year of the violation, although the sharpest decline is recorded in the year follow-
ing the violation. After that, dividends pick up slightly; though looking at the median payouts, dividends
seem to be equal to 0 from the time of violation to four years thereafter, which can be explained by a total
reduction in shareholders’ payouts imposed by creditors as a disciplining action following a violation.
Table 13 reports the effect of a covenant violation on total debt, the cash to assets ratio and divi-
dends, and confirms the increase in financial conservatism following a covenant violation observed in
the plots. Panel A reports a decline in all three financial policy measures that is statistically significant.
The negative coefficients on total debt and shareholder payouts are consistent with previous literature.
Total debt declines as a result of the decline in net debt issuance, which causes a reduction in the stock
of outstanding debt for violating firms. Dividends also decline following a violation as creditors impose
restrictions on shareholders payout (Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2012). This decline in payouts however was
previously found to result in an increase in the cash to assets ratio which I find to also decline following
a violation. Although the plot of the cash to assets ratio is somehow comparable to previous findings
(Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2012), the small area of decline observable between year 0 and year 1 is probably
the cause of the negative coefficient reported in Table 13 since in the regression analysis I examine the
changes in liquidity a year after a covenant violation has occurred. This slight decline in the cash to
assets ratio in the first year after the violation could be explained by an acceleration of the payments on
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the part of creditors after the occurrence of the technical default.
Panel B reveals that the presence of a sound legal system in a country alleviates the detrimental
impact that a covenant violation has on total debt and cash to assets. The coefficients on the interac-
tion of covenant violation with both total debt and the cash to assets ratio respectively are positive and
significant at the 5% level. The estimated coefficient on the interaction between covenant violation and
dividends conveys similar information, having a positive sign; however, this coefficient is not statistically
significant.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 13 examine the reaction of some accounting-based measures
of performance to a covenant violation. The last two panels of Figure 4 perform the graphical analysis
corresponding to the results reported in these two columns. Although sales grow in the three years pre-
ceding a covenant violation, they drop in the year following the violation before starting to grow again.
Net income on the other hand experiences an overall decline in the four years prior to a covenant viola-
tion and plummets at the time of violation before strongly picking up in the year following the violation
and carrying the upward trend into the four years following the violation. The results reported in the
last two columns of the table are consistent with the observations in Figure 4. Panel A reveals that sales
decline following a covenant violation as previously noted by Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012). This decline
has strong statistical significance at the 5% level. On the other hand, net income experiences an increase
following a violation with strong statistical significance suggesting an improvement in firm performance
and value. The results in Panel B show that the positive effect of a good legal environment in the presence
of a covenant violation is also observable for firm performance as it has a positive effect on sales and
net income. However, while this effect is significant at the 5% level for net income, it is not statistically
significant at all for sales.
Overall, the results in this section reconfirm the results produced in previous sections while examin-
ing the combined effect of a covenant violation and the quality of legal institutions on net debt issuance.
Covenant violations are used by creditors to discipline managers when deteriorating performance is
alarming and hence play a role in the governance of organizations and help increase firm value. This
corporate governance role played by creditors happens outside of payment default states as creditor in-
terference and the changes associated with it do not only happen in the case of imminent bankruptcy or
payment default. In most cases, violations are observed to have a negative effect on a firm’s investment
and financial indicators, and are found to increase investment and financial conservatism, but are also
found to increase firm value. In an environment where institutional quality is high and rules are properly
enforced however, the disciplining role of creditors is not found to be as pronounced as with an environ-
ment where legal enforcement is weak; the negative effect of covenant violations on various investment
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Table 4.13
Covenant Violations and Corporate Policies
Fixed effect regressions of covenant violation indicators and country legal effectiveness on a group of firm investment, financial and accounting policy indicators. The
sample is the result of the intersection between DealScan and WorldScope and consists of 2,016 firm-year observations between 1996 and 2011 in 28 countries excluding
the United States. Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and loans that do not contain a covenant restricting the current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, capital expenditures
or EBITDA are excluded. The dependent variables are the change in assets, change in property, plant and equipment, change in investments, change in total debt, change
in total dividends, change in cash holdings, change in sales, and change in net income. All specifications have fixed industry effects, robust standard errors and year
indicators. Panel A presents regressions of the dependent variables on covenant violation only while Panel B repeats the same regressions with the addition of the
interaction between covenant violation and country legal effectiveness. p-values are in parentheses. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
Panel A: Covenant Violations
∆ Ln(Assets) ∆ Ln(PPE) ∆ Investments ∆ Ln(Debt) ∆ Dividends ∆ Cash ∆ Ln(Sales) ∆ Net Income
Covenant Violationt−1(CV) -0.058 -0.076 -0.018 -0.088 -0.009 -0.009 -0.057 0.041
(0.047) (0.014) (0.008) (0.048) (0.084) (0.037) (0.049) (0.016)
Leveraget−1 0.232 0.547 -0.041 1.748 0.014 -0.050 0.078 -0.295
(0.010) (0.000) (0.477) (0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.674) (0.000)
Net Wortht−1/Total Assetst−1 -0.077 -0.207 -0.059 -2.249 -0.013 -0.126 -0.021 0.182
(0.465) (0.195) (0.002) (0.000) (0.148) (0.000) (0.880) (0.000)
Interestt−1/Total Assetst−1 -2.000 -5.980 0.188 -11.586 -0.119 0.308 0.716 2.302
(0.035) (0.000) (0.636) (0.000) (0.165) (0.005) (0.682) (0.000)
Current Ratiot−1 0.003 -0.012 -0.006 -0.010 0.002 0.001 0.027 0.016
(0.801) (0.414) (0.125) (0.791) (0.121) (0.693) (0.063) (0.107)
Casht−1/Total Assetst−1 0.195 -0.766 -0.088 0.430 0.001 0.896 0.076 -0.080
(0.141) (0.001) (0.016) (0.410) (0.964) (0.000) (0.625) (0.212)
Number of Observations 1,456 1,455 1,448 1,456 1,424 1,456 1,456 1,456
R2 0.225 0.200 0.082 0.354 0.059 0.780 0.203 0.217
119
Table 4.13 - Continued
Panel B: Interaction
∆ Ln(Assets) ∆ Ln(PPE) ∆ Investments ∆ Ln(Debt) ∆ Dividends ∆ Cash ∆ Ln(Sales) ∆ Net Income
CV * JLEI 0.044 0.041 0.001 0.055 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.020
(0.000) (0.006) (0.571) (0.048) (0.587) (0.025) (0.429) (0.043)
Covenant Violationt−1(CV) -0.367 -0.370 -0.026 -0.482 -0.021 -0.036 -0.126 -0.099
(0.000) (0.000) (0.064) (0.007) (0.466) (0.006) (0.139) (0.070)
Judicial/Legal Effectiveness (JLEI) -0.029 -0.038 0.000 -0.056 0.003 -0.002 -0.013 -0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.790) (0.007) (0.043) (0.081) (0.119) (0.103)
Leveraget−1 0.248 0.562 -0.041 1.769 0.014 -0.048 0.082 -0.288
(0.005) (0.000) (0.484) (0.000) (0.063) (0.000) (0.663) (0.000)
Net Wortht−1/Total Assetst−1 -0.086 -0.212 -0.059 -2.255 -0.014 -0.127 -0.021 0.177
(0.407) (0.184) (0.002) (0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.880) (0.000)
Interestt−1/Total Assetst−1 -2.117 -6.081 0.185 -11.720 -0.128 0.297 0.696 2.245
(0.026) (0.000) (0.645) (0.000) (0.139) (0.007) (0.692) (0.000)
Current Ratiot−1 0.006 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 0.002 0.001 0.028 0.017
(0.628) (0.539) (0.131) (0.875) (0.123) (0.628) (0.054) (0.083)
Casht−1/Total Assetst−1 0.197 -0.763 -0.088 0.434 0.000 0.896 0.077 -0.079
(0.127) (0.001) (0.016) (0.403) (1.000) (0.000) (0.620) (0.215)
Number of Observations 1,456 1,455 1,448 1,456 1,424 1,456 1,456 1,456
R2 0.220 0.190 0.082 0.353 0.038 0.779 0.205 0.218
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and financial measures is alleviated by the presence of strong law and order in a country, hence empha-
sizing the role of governments in the protection of investors and providing the latter with incentives to
finance borrowers.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter examines how incentive conflicts coupled with a strong judicial environment affect fi-
nancing policy ex-post. Following the optimal contracting theory, the allocation of control rights to
creditors as a means to mitigate incentive conflicts entails changes in financing policy following a tech-
nical default. Similarly, financial contracts and the supply of debt capital are affected ex-ante by the level
of legal enforcement in a country. With better legal protection, creditors are able to contain the risk of
borrowers because of the assurance that in the event of default they will be able to claim collateralized
assets and preserve the value of their claims. This plays an important role in giving creditors incentive to
extend more debt and impose more favorable terms in contract ex-ante knowing that their rights are pro-
tected by the law. In countries where creditor rights are not strongly enforced and are subject to corrupt
institutions, creditors resort to cutting credit facilities and imposing very strict contract terms to control
borrower risk.
On a sample of 810 loan contracts entered by 518 firms in 28 countries, I find that financial policy
is indeed altered by covenant violations. In the year following the violation, I find that net debt issuance
drops sharply by 10.4%. This decline however is found to be less severe and compensated for in coun-
tries that benefit from a strong judicial system. More specifically, the stronger the legal enforcement of
contracts in the country, the less severe the effect of the violation on net debt issuance. Indeed, judicial
efficiency counterbalances the 10.4% drop in net debt issuance by 1.1%. These results are robust to the
inclusion of a number of control variables and other proxies of legal enforcement, and also hold when
examining the reaction of various financial and investment policy measures to judicial efficiency ex-post.
These findings raise very important macroeconomic questions. While covenant violations are quite
common, creditors’ observed response to these violations is putting a restraint on firms’ financing ac-
tivity and on the level of investment, especially in developing economies were institutional quality is
weakest. This in turn impedes private sector development and hence slows down economic activity and
growth in countries that need it most. The implications of these findings are very serious and highlight
the need for policy reform in developing economies in order to increase investor confidence and address
issues such as transparency, institutional integrity, establishing a strong bankruptcy framework, swift
court processes and an easier resolution of financial distress, to promote the flow of capital into these
economies and foster economic activity and private sector development.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis has provided evidence of the importance of the ex-ante allocation of control rights to
creditors in affecting corporate financing policy both ex-ante and ex-post. The analysis has centered on
understanding the empirical implications of the financial contracting theory and on examining the influ-
ence of creditor control on capital structure when different industry and country level characteristics are
involved.
Traditionally, the agency theory and the optimal contracting theory have preached the allocation of
control rights to creditors to ease firms’ access to financing. These control rights are generally contingent
on firm performance and are immediately transferred from borrowers to creditors in the case of alarm-
ing financial results or imminent distress, hence the perceived role of creditors in affecting borrowers’
financing policy. However, much of the financial contracting theory has associated creditor control with
a bias toward liquidation in the resolution of financial distress. This bias entails a lack of interest on
creditors’ part to default strategically or promote the efficient reorganization of viable firms. These liq-
uidation bias theories however fail to justify the frequent recurrence of creditor control rights in credit
agreements and the inclination of creditors in control in the real world to reorganize viable firms out of
court. In addition, recent theoretical research has introduced investor protection mechanisms in modeling
creditors’ decisions over the liquidation vs. reorganization of distressed firms. This stream of research
has predicted that, in the presence of strong investor protection, creditors in control have incentive to take
distressed firms toward efficient reorganization as this would allow a large share of the firm’s reorgani-
zation value to be pledged to these creditors. Existing empirical work has examined the role of investor
protection in firms’ access to financing and has provided evidence that strong investor protection plays a
role in helping creditors secure loans in bigger amounts and on more favorable terms. In the empirical
literature examining the predictions underlying the financial contracting theory and investor protection
mechanisms, no study provides evidence of how the financing policies of borrowers are affected by the
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presence of creditor control conditional on different levels of investor protection. This thesis has filled
the gaps in the literature by providing evidence of how the ex-ante allocation of control rights to creditors
affects borrowers’ financing policies and the resolution of financial distress depending on the quality of
investor protection mechanisms. The evidence is presented both at industry level and at country level.
In Chapter 2, to motivate the empirical analysis, I presented a model of financial contracting which
allows debt contracts to allocate control rights and the pledgeability of cash flows to vary. The model
delivered two main predictions: (1) Ex-post, creditor control should be associated with an increased
likelihood of resolving financial distress out of court relative to filing for bankruptcy, particularly in in-
dustries where cash flows are easier to collateralize; (2) Ex-ante, creditor control should be associated
with an increased use of leverage, particularly in industries where cash flows are easier to collateralize.
Empirically, the chapter tested prediction (1) of the model using two non-overlapping samples of firms
in distress, one where firms had poor financial performance, and one where firms had issued junk bonds.
Results across both samples confirm that out-of-court restructuring of troubled firms is more common in
firms with creditor control, and this is more observable in industries with high cash flow pledgeability.
The presence of creditor control has been also found to promote successful emergence from Chapter 11
proceedings in both samples though the characteristics of subsequent reorganization differ across the two
samples.
Chapter 3 tested the second prediction of the model presented in Chapter 2 empirically through the
use of a large sample of private credit agreements. The empirical tests aimed at understanding whether
the way in which control rights affect the resolution of financial distress ex-post, as documented in
Chapter 2, influence capital structure decisions ex-ante. The chapter surveyed a sample of 4,598 U.S.
firms between 1996 and 2011 and examined the relationship between the presence of creditor control
and leverage levels. The analysis also accounts for the level of cash flow pledgeability in an industry
as introduced in Chapter 2. Results show that the ex-ante allocation of control rights does indeed affect
capital structure as leverage ratios are observed to be higher in firms with creditor control, particularly in
industries where cash flow pledgeability is higher. Endogeneity issues were also tackled in this chapter
whereby creditor control was instrument using an S&P500 index inclusion indicator. The statistical and
economic robustness of my results was not altered following this test and others that were introduced
throughout the chapter.
Finally, Chapter 4 took the analysis from industry to country level by examining the ex-post effect of
control rights on financing decisions depending on different institutional factors. The chapter examined
the different responses of creditors to a financial covenant violation in 28 different countries excluding
the U.S., though the same findings still hold with the inclusion of U.S. firms in the sample. The goal of
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this analysis was to understand whether a high level of institutional quality in a country, as proxied by
judicial effectiveness, complements or substitutes for creditors’ intervention in borrowers financing pol-
icy following a covenant violation after U.S.-based studies had found that debt issuance declines sharply
in the wake of a technical default. The findings of this chapter provide evidence that a high level of legal
efficiency alleviates the negative response of creditors to a covenant violation on debt issuance activity as
the drop in net debt issuance is found to be less pronounced in countries with better judicial quality. This
chapter’s implications were re-tested using a number of different measures of institutional quality and
contract enforcement without significantly affecting the results and bottom line of the analysis. The find-
ings of this chapter are also observable on various measures of financial and investment policy implying
that proper contract enforcement reduces financial and investment conservatism following a technical
default and consequently improves firm performance.
In conclusion, this thesis has emphasized the role of creditor control in affecting borrowers’ capital
structure choices both ex-ante and ex-post. Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that, generally speaking, creditor
control is beneficial as it helps firms secure more financing ex-ante and also contributes to a more ef-
ficient resolution of financial distress whether in court or out of court. This however does in no way
suggest that creditor control is equally beneficial across all firms regardless of their specific characteris-
tics and investment opportunities. In addition, this thesis has reiterated the importance of the protection
of creditor rights, be it through collateral at firm and industry level or through the formal institution of
legal measures at a country-level. Creditors are more incentivized to lend and trust their debtors’ viability
in industries/countries where they are more protected. The findings in this thesis are at the intersection
of literatures including among others the literature on financial contracting, capital structure, the resolu-
tion of financial distress, investor protection, international lending and corporate governance; however,
my thesis bridges the gap between these different literatures and contributes by being the first study to
examine the different patterns of resolution of financial distress associated with the ex-ante allocation of
control rights, by documenting how the implications of the allocation of control rights on capital struc-
ture are dependent on the ease of collateralizability of borrowers’ assets, and finally, in relating ex-post
outcomes of control rights allocation to country-level institutional factors and the implications of the lat-
ter on financing and investment policy. This in turn raises very important economic questions as to how
the intervention of creditors in the absence of strong investor protection might be impeding economic
activity especially in countries that need it most, and puts a question mark on the kind of reforms needed
to give incentive to creditors and other investors to take part in the economic development of these coun-
tries and promote economic growth.
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APPENDIX
Variable Definitions – Compustat
This appendix explains the construction of variables needed for the Compustat sample analysis. All
item numbers figuring below refer to annual Compustat data items. EBITDA, R&D, Tangible Assets
and Book Debt are all scaled by Total Assets to find the values of profitability, asset tangibility and book
leverage respectively. Dividends are scaled by Book Equity and Market Equity to find Book Dividends
and Market Dividends respectively. Advertising Expense and Tax Credit are scaled by Total Sales and
Total assets respectively. The Market-to-Book (MTB) is the ratio of Market Equity to Book Equity.
Total Assets = item 6
EBITDA = item 13
Dividends = item 21
R&D = item 46
Total Sales = item 12
Tangible Assets = item 8
Credit Rating = item 280
Advertising Expense = item 45
Earnings per Share = item 58
Tax Credit = item 208
Size = Log(Sales)
Book Debt = Long Term Debt (item 9) + Debt in Current Liabilities (item 34)
Book Value of Equity = Total Assets (item 6) - Total Liabilities (item 181) - Preferred Stock
Liquidating Value (item 10) + Deferred Tax (item 35) + Convertible Debt (item 79) if preferred stock
liquidating value is not missing, otherwise (item 10) is replaced by Preferred Stock Redemption Value
(item 56)
Market Value of Equity = Common Shares Outstanding (item 25) * Share Price (item 199)
Quasi Market Leverage = Book Debt / (Total Assets - Book Equity + Market Equity)
Firm Age = Log (1+ Current Year - Min(IPO Year; First Link Year with CRSP))
Volatility = Standard deviation of annual changes in earnings(t−1;t−4)/Total Assets
Abnormal EPS = (earningst - earningst−1)/Share Price (item 199)
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Variable Definitions – WorldScope
This appendix explains the construction of variables needed for the WorldScope sample analysis.
All item numbers figuring below refer to annual data items. Tangible Assets (PPE), Book Debt, Common
Shareholders’ Equity are all scaled by Total Assets to give the values of Asset Tangibility, Leverage and
Net Worth respectively. Tangible Net Worth, Cash Flow, Interest Expense, Cash, Dividends and Net
Income are all also scaled by Total Assets.
Total Assets = WC02999
EBITDA = WC18198
Dividends = WC05376
Total Sales = WC01001
Tangible Assets = WC02501
Cash = WC02001
Interest Expense = WC01251
Net Income = WC01651
Common Shareholders’ Equity = WC03501
Book Debt = Short Term Debt (WC03051) + Long Term Debt (WC03251)
Net Debt Issuance = (Book Debtt - Book Debtt−1)/Total Assetst−1
Market-to-Book Ratio = Market Capitalization (WC08005)/Common Equity (WC03501)
Current Ratio = Current Assets (WC02201)/Current Liabilities (WC03101)
Tangible Net Worth = Common Equity - Intangible Assets (WC02649)
Cash Flow = EBITDA - Interest Expense - Taxes (WC01451) - Common Dividends
Investments = Capital Expenditures (WC04601)/Total Assets
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Table A1
Outcomes of Chapter 11
The table presents the different outcomes faced by a group of firms that filed for Chapter 11 between
1996 and 2011. The sample consists of 179 bankruptcy cases and was constructed by merging the UCLA
Bankruptcy Research Database with the intersection between Compustat and DealScan. The outcomes
of Chapter 11 were collected manually from firm filings with the SEC. Senior Creditor Protected in
Reorganization is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the senior creditor is either repaid in full or is
given equity. Senior Creditor Renegotiates is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the senior creditor
prolongs maturity or suffers a distressed exchange where Distressed Exchange takes the value of 1 if the
senior creditor is given a new security in exchange of the old one. DIP refers to debtor-in-possession
financing. Percentage of firms is presented between parentheses below the actual count. Panel A reports
statistics for prepackaged chapter 11 cases while Panel B repeats the same statistics for non-prepackaged
cases. p-values for the results of the test of difference in proportions are in parentheses in the last column.
Panel A: Prepackaged Bankruptcy
Creditor Control No Creditor Control Z-Test
Emerge 35 36 (0.487)
(92.11%) (92.31%)
Conditional On Emergence
Senior Creditor Protected in Reorganization 22 19 (0.195)
(62.86%) (52.78%)
Senior Creditor Repaid in Full 15 6 (0.008)
(42.86%) (16.67%)
Senior Creditor Given New Equity 9 13 (0.172)
(25.71%) (36.11%)
Percent of Equity to Senior Creditor (Mean) 88.22% 81.85% (0.343)
– –
Senior Creditor Unaffected 1 3 (0.159)
(2.86%) (8.33%)
Senior Creditor Repaid Less Than Full and No Equity 0 3 (0.041)
(0.00%) -(8.33%)
Senior Creditor Renegotiates 15 11 (0.141)
(42.86%) (30.56%)
Senior Creditor Prolongs Maturity 11 6 (0.073)
(31.43%) (16.67%)
Junior Impaired 10 20 (0.012)
(28.57%) (55.56%)
Distressed Exchange 4 5 (0.378)
(11.43%) (13.89%)
CEO Turnover 21 16 (0.073)
(60.00%) (44.44%)
DIP Facility 23 16 (0.036)
(65.71%) (44.44%)
DIP From Senior Creditor 10 8 (0.269)
(28.57%) (22.22%)
DIP From New Creditor in Control 7 3 (0.263)
(20.00%) (8.33%)
DIP From Other Creditor 6 5 (0.061)
(17.14%) (13.89%)
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Table A1 - Continued
Panel B: Non-Prepackaged Bankruptcy
Creditor Control No Creditor Control Z-Test
Emerge 46 24 (0.018)
(76.67%) (57.14%)
Conditional On Emergence
Senior Creditor Protected in Reorganization 31 12 (0.078)
(67.39%) (50.00%)
Senior Creditor Repaid in Full 22 10 (0.236)
(47.83%) (41.67%)
Senior Creditor Given New Equity 10 2 (0.074)
(21.74%) (8.33%)
Percent of Equity to Senior Creditor (Mean) 85.09% 46.74% (0.113)
– –
Senior Creditor Unaffected 1 0 (0.227)
(2.17%) (0.00%)
Senior Creditor Repaid Less Than Full and No Equity 2 3 (0.099)
(4.35%) (12.50%)
Senior Creditor Renegotiates 10 6 (0.379)
(21.74%) (25.00%)
Senior Creditor Prolongs Maturity 5 3 (0.449)
(10.87%) (12.50%)
Junior Impaired 13 8 (0.305)
(28.26%) (33.33%)
Distressed Exchange 5 3 (0.449)
(10.87%) (12.50%)
CEO Turnover 27 17 (0.294)
(58.70%) (70.83%)
DIP Facility 36 19 (0.390)
(78.26%) (79.17%)
DIP From Senior Creditor 14 4 (0.110)
(30.43%) (16.67%)
DIP From New Creditor in Control 19 13 (0.110)
(41.30%) (54.17%)
DIP From Other Creditor 3 2 (0.242)
(6.52%) (8.33%)
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Table A2
Chapter 11 Cases and Resolution
The table illustrates 141 Chapter 11 cases that had a creditor in control and successfully emerged from bankruptcy. The sample was constructed by merging
the UCLA Bankruptcy Research Database with the intersection between Compustat and DealScan for the years 1996 until 2011. The outcomes of Chapter
11 were collected manually from firm filings with the SEC. Resolution of Chapter 11 provides a brief description of how the Chapter 11 case was resolved
for firms that successfully emerged from bankruptcy and that had creditor in control at the time of filing.
Company Name Resolution of Chapter 11
US AIRWAYS GROUP INC
Filed August 11, 2002. Emerged March 18, 2003. Claims and interests divided against each of the Debtors into
classes according to their relative seniority and other criteria and same treatment provided for each claim or interest of
a particular class unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less favorable treatment of its claim or
interest. Full payment of all allowed administrative and priority claims, and the distribution of shares of new equity
in reorganized US Airways Group to unsecured creditors of the Debtors in satisfaction of their allowed claims. US
Airways Group’s existing subordinated creditors and equity security holders are not entitled to any distribution under
the Plan of Reorganization.
BRUNOS INC
Filed February 2, 1998. Debtors in possession. The Bankruptcy Court required that with respect to each impaired class
of creditors and equity security holders, each holder in such class will, pursuant to the plan, receive at least as much
as such holder would receive in a liquidation. The Proposed Plan of Reorganization provides that (i) all prepetition
debt, other than capitalized lease obligations, would be eliminated, (ii) general unsecured creditors would receive cash
payments in an amount equal to 26% of the agreed value of their claims, (iii) holders of the Company’s prepetition bank
debt would receive substantially all of the shares of common stock of the reorganized company, and (iv) no payments
would be made to holders of the Company’s Senior Subordinated Notes or to holders of shares of the Company’s
existing common stock. Approved on October 15, 1999.
MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVICES INC
Filed March 11, 2003. Emerged January 5, 2004. The Company was recapitalized. Secured bank loans were paid in full,
and other indebtedness (i.e., two classes of notes and general unsecured creditor claims) and the then-existing equity
interests in Magellan were cancelled in exchange for the distributions provided for by the reorganization. Entered
new credit agreement. The proceeds of the term loan, together with other existing funds, were used to repay in full
the Company’s senior secured bank indebtedness under its previous credit agreement. Issued new senior notes as
a replacement of old ones. Holders of the Company’s previously outstanding 9% Senior Subordinated Notes and
holders of general unsecured creditor claims received approximately 97 percent of the Ordinary Common Stock of the
reorganized Company.
CONSTAR INTERNATIONAL INC
Filed December 30, 2008. Emerged May 29, 2009. Holders of Senior Subordinated Notes would receive 100% of the
new Common Stock of the reorganized Company in exchange of discharge of the notes. Holders of Allowed Admin-
istrative Claims, Priority Tax Claims, Other Priority Claims, and Other Secured Claims would receive full payment
in cash. Debtors in possession credit facility converted into exit facility. Holders of senior secured floating notes de-
celerated and reinstated in full. Other secured claim can choose to be decelerated and reinstated in full or delivery of
collateral or paid fully in cash. General Unsecured Claims would receive full payment in cash. Common stockholders
get nothing.
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ACTERNA CORP
Filed May 6, 2003. Debtor in possession. Conversion of the Senior Secured Credit Facility into 100% of the equity of the reorganized
firm subject to dilution through warrants, in addition to secured note and term loan. Warrants given to senior secured convertible
note holders in exchange of cancellation of these notes. Partial payment to general unsecured creditors. No recovery for common
stockholders.
GENERAL MOTORS CO
Debtor in possession agreement with UST and EDC. GM Company formed by UST and 363 sale under bankruptcy code acquired
all assets of old GM
GUILFORD MILLS INC
Filed March 13, 2002 after agreement with debtors to restructure senior debt. Debtors in possession. Emerged October 4, 2002. The
Company’s senior secured debt was discharged, and was replaced with new senior notes. All of the Company’s old common stock
was canceled and replaced with new common stock of which approximately 90% goes to senior lenders as partial consideration for
the debt reduction described above. Vendors were paid in cash. Debtor-in-possession credit agreement was cancelled and replaced
by revolving facility. Board of directors changed.
HARVARD INDUSTRIES INC
Filed May 8, 1997. Debtors in possession. Emerged November 24, 1998. All pre-petition unsecured debt at pre-reorganization
Harvard was converted into equity of post-reorganization Harvard in the form of common stock. Preferred Stock and existing
common stock receive warrants to acquire approximately 5% of the New Common Stock. The Company issued $25 million of 14
1/2% Senior Secured Notes and $115 million senior secured credit facility. Proceeds used to: refinance the senior and junior debtor-
in-possession credit facilities that provided financing to the Company while the Company was in bankruptcy proceedings and other
corporate purposes.
HEILIG-MEYERS CO
Filed August 16, 2000. Debtors in possession financing agreement. Closed stores and converted to RoomStore. Emerged on June 1,
2005. Issued approximately 9,835,000 shares of Common Stock to the Unsecured Claims Reserve which were then distributed from
the Reserve to 731 initial holders in November 2006 in accordance with the terms of the Plan, resulting in approximately $64,400 in
liabilities being discharged.
INTERMET CORP
Filed September 29, 2004. Debtors in possession. Emerged in November 9, 2005. Debtor-in-possession credit facility and holders of
administrative, priority and tax claims paid in full as will holders of lender claims that arose prior to the Debtors’ chapter 11 petition.
Holders of general unsecured claims (including bondholder claims, trade claims, claims arising from the rejection of contracts and
other claims choose to receive either new common stock or cash. Holders of general unsecured claims that are equal to or less than
$125,000 receive cash equal to a fixed percent of their unsecured claims. Stockholders receive nothing.
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SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP
Filed January 6, 2009. Emerged June 30, 2010. Debtors in possession credit agreement. Board of directors unchanged. All of
the existing secured debt of the Debtors would be fully repaid with cash. All of the existing unsecured debt and claims against us,
including all of the outstanding unsecured senior notes, would be exchanged for common stock of the Reorganized Smurfit-Stone. all
of Smurfit-Stone’s existing equity securities would be cancelled and existing shareholders of Smurfit-Stone’s common and Preferred
Stock would receive no distribution on account of their shares. Assets sold for the repayment in cash of the secured and unsecured
debt obligations of the Canadian Debtors.
SEARS HOLDINGS CORP
Filed January 22, 2002. Debtors in possession financing facility. Approved April 23, 2003. Emerged May 6, 2003. Holders of
pre-petition bank debt received 40 cents for each dollar of debt, holders of pre-petition notes and debentures, trade creditors, service
providers and landlords with lease rejection claims received the stock of the reorganized company. Bond debt holders entered
investment agreement in which they invest at least $140 million in exchange for stock in the reorganized company and up to $60
million for a convertible note of the reorganized company. Also, cash received from pre-petitioned loans was used to purchase
additional shares of common stock in the reorganized company. The share of the bond holders in the company stock will be slightly
higher than 50%.
LACLEDE STEEL CO
Filed November 30, 1998. Debtors in possession. Emerged on December 29, 2000. Under the terms of the Plan all of the Company’s
previously outstanding preferred and common stock has been cancelled. The Company’s hourly and salaried pension plans have
been terminated, and the obligations have been assumed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). New replacement
plans have been established effective January 1, 2001. The PBGC will receive new common stock, making it the Company’s largest
stockholder. Other unsecured creditors will also receive new common stock.
NORTHWESTERN CORP
Filed September 14, 2003. Debtor-in-possession. Reorganization effective November 1,2004. Holders of senior unsecured notes
received 28.3 million shares of new common stock in exchange for $898.3 million in allowed claims; Holders of TOPRS received
2.3 million shares of new common stock and warrants for an additional 4.4 million shares of common stock in exchange for $321.1
million in allowed claims. The warrants may be exercised for a period of three years from the effective date; Holders of QUIPs, were
allowed to select either of the following: (i) receive a pro rata share of 0.5 million shares of new common stock, plus warrants with
the same terms as the warrants distributed to the TOPRS, in exchange for their claims, including any litigation claims, or (ii) continue
the litigation and receive a distribution based on a Class 9 claim, if any, based only upon final resolution of the QUIPs Litigation.
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LEE ENTERPRISES INC
Filed December 12, 2011. Debtors in possession. Reorganization approved January 23, 2012, effective January 30. Debt was fully
refinanced. Entered new credit agreement.
OGLEBAY NORTON CO
Filed February 23, 2004. “The Company intends to seek emergence from Chapter 11 as rapidly as possible with a new, de-levered
capital structure that will enable the Company to move forward on its strategic operating plan.”On January 31, 2005, the Company
and all of its direct and indirect wholly-owned subsidiaries emerged from protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
pursuant to the Company’s Plan of Reorganization (the “Plan”). Agreement with a majority of the holders of its $100,000,000 Senior
Subordinated Notes to exchange their notes for equity. Approval for the Company to utilize cash collateral and to borrow up to
$40,000,000 from a $75,000,000 debtor-in-possession (DIP) credit facility. The Company accepted a commitment for a new credit
facility that, among other things, would retire its existing bank debt.
ONEIDA LTD
Filed March 19, 2006. Debtors in possession. Court approved of debtor in possession financing facility for the payment of permitted
pre-petition claim, working capital needs, letters of credit and other general corporate purposes. The reorganization provides gener-
ally that the holders of the Company’s Tranche A debt will be fully repaid, the holders of its Tranche B debt will receive the equity
of the Company, most pre-petition unsecured claims will be paid upon emergence, and the existing equity, common and preferred,
will receive no distribution and will be cancelled. The Company has a commitment for financing upon exit from the bankruptcy
proceedings (the “Exit Financing”) with Credit Suisse.
PAYLESS CASHWAYS
Filed for bankruptcy for the purpose of restructuring action. Filed July 21, 1997 and operated as debtor-in-possession. Plan approved
on November 19, 1997 and effective December 2, 1997. New board of directors appointed. Secured bank group received payment of
fees and interests, also net cash proceeds from the sale of collateral used to secure the debt, also 54% of common stock of reorganized
firm of which lenders received common stock in exchange of new 150M revolving credit facility. Claims of vendors and suppliers
exchanged for 41% of common stock.
SEITEL INC
Filed July 21, 2003. Creditors chose reorganization.. Reorganization filed on January 17, 2004. Approved by senior creditors and
major shareholders. Confirmed by court on march 18, 2004. Plan is to pay all outstanding claims. New senior credit facility to fund
working capital needs. Debtors took control of the firm (debtors in possession). Company issued warrants that were exercised and
was a source of cash which was used to repay pre-petition claims.
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TOKHEIM CORP
Filed on August 28, 2000. Reorganization approve October 4, 2000, effective October 20, 2000. Entered new credit agreement and
used to repay all bank loans. Gave warrants on around 700,000 shares of common stock and some preferred stock. Senior creditors
received 88% of company shares (around 5 million). Junior creditors received 2% of equity.
USG CORP
Filed June 25, 2001. DIP facility approved. No covenants mentioned. Emerged June 20, 2006. All creditors, including allowed
claims of general unsecured creditors, were paid in full, with interest where required. Shareholders of the Corporation retained their
shares, and were given the right to purchase, at $40.00 per share, one new common share of the Corporation for each share owned.
There was no creditor in control or credit problem. The company had no covenants. The company mainly filed for bankruptcy to
resolve certain disputes relating to increasing costs of health and personal injury employee related issues.
CHIQUITA BRANDS INTL INC
Filed November 28, 2001. Emerged March 19, 2002. Conversion of the $861 million of Old Notes and $102 million of accrued and
unpaid interest thereon into $250 million of senior notes and 95.5% of the new common stock. Previously outstanding preferred,
preference and common stock is being exchanged for 2% of the New Common Stock and 7-year warrants to purchase up to 25% of
the New Common Stock. Amended controlling credit facility which increasing credit limit. Included covenants.
WINN-DIXIE STORES INC
Filed February 21, 2005. DIP facility approved. Contains covenants. Emerged November 21, 2006. Amended and restated existing
creditor in control credit agreement. DIP facility rolled over under the creditor agreement upon emergence. Notes were cancelled
and replaced with common stock. Existing equity claims were cancelled.
ZENITH ELECTRONICS CORP
Filed August 23, 1999. Emerged November 9, 1999. LGE and Citi controlling creditors. LGE was a major shareholder of Zenith
and held subordinated debentures. LGE exchanged approximately $165.7 million of its claims for restructured senior notes. The
company’s $103.5 million of subordinated debentures and related accrued interest were exchanged for $50.0 million of new senior
debentures maturing in November 2009. The company entered into a three-year $150.0 million exit financing facility with Citi (with
controlling creditor) after cancelling the DIP facility. Both contain covenants. The company and LGE entered into a new $60.0
million credit facility. Also contains covenants similar to those in the exit credit facility. The company’s old common stock and
treasury stock were canceled. LGE converted $200.0 million of the company’s debt and extended- term payables with LGE into 100
percent of the company’s new common stock, and as a result, the company became a wholly-owned subsidiary of LGE.
FRUIT OF THE LOOM LTD -CL A
Filed December 29, 1999. DIP facility approved. Contains covenants. Company emerged through being acquired by Berkshire
Hathaway on April 30, 2002. Fruit of the Loom stopped posting SEC form due to change in status. Nothing is mentioned in
Berkshire reports about Fruit of the Loom’s debt or reorganization.
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EXIDE TECHNOLOGIES
Filed April 15, 2002. DIP Facility approved. Contained covenants. Emerged April 21, 2004.Senior notes, Convertible notes, equity
interests, warrants, options or contract rights to purchase or acquire such interests at any time, were canceled. 25,000,000 shares
of new common stock were issued as well as warrants initially exercisable for 6,250,000 shares of new common stock. Holders
of pre-petition Senior Secured Global Credit Facility (in control) claims received collectively 22,500,000 shares of new common
stock. Holders of general unsecured claims received collectively 2,500,000 shares of new common stock and Warrants to purchase
6,250,000 shares of new common stock. Holders of administrative claims, claims derived from the Company’s $500 million secured
super priority debtor-in-possession credit agreement and priority tax claims are being paid in full in cash pursuant to the terms of the
Plan. They were financed using newly entered senior secured credit facility.
WARNACO GROUP INC
Filed June 11, 2001. DIP financing approved. Contained covenants. Emerged February 4, 2003. Company entered into exit financing
facility contained covenants. Common stock was cancelled and no distribution to holders. General unsecured claims received 2.55%
of equity. pre-petition secured lenders (control – $2.2 billion) received $106.1 million in cash, notes in the principal amount of
$200.0 million and approximately 96.26% (43,318,350 shares) of the New Common Stock. Preferred security holders received 0.6%
of new common stock. Administrative and priority claims were repaid in cash fully. The reorganization resulted in the forgiveness
of approximately $2.5 billion of the Company’s pre-petition debt and other liabilities.
IMPERIAL SUGAR CO
Filed January 16, 2001. Emerged August 29, 2001. Restructured credit agreement containing covenants with existing creditors in
control pre-petition. Holders of common stock prior to reorganization received an aggregate of 200,000 shares of common stock,
representing 2.0% of the common equity in the reorganized company, and 7-year warrants to purchase an aggregate of 1,111,111
additional shares of common stock, representing 10.0% of the reorganized company on a diluted basis. Holders of the Subordinated
Debt and certain other unsecured creditors received 9,800,000 shares of common stock representing 98% of the common equity in
the restructured entity in satisfaction of their debt obligations. Trade creditors were given the option of receiving $5,000 or 10% of
their claim in cash, in lieu of receiving common stock. They had DIP (no covenants mentioned) which was replaced by restructured
credit agreement.
WEIRTON STEEL CORP Filed May 19, 2003. DIP facility. Contains covenants. Purchased by ISG. Stopped filing.
APS HOLDING CORP -CL A
Filed February 2, 1998. DIP facility obtained from existing creditor. Contains covenants. Stopped filing. Plan of Reorganization not
found.
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KCS ENERGY INC
Filed January 18, 2000. Emerged January 30, 2001. The Company repaid its two bank credit facilities (in control) in full, paid past
due interest on its Senior and Senior Subordinated Notes, including interest on interest, and repaid $60.0 million of Senior Notes.
Trade creditors were paid in full and shareholders retained 100% of their common stock, subject to dilution from conversion of
the new convertible preferred stock. All the payment were made through a newly secured exit facility in the form of a production
payment (sort of advance payments on future productions of proved gas and oil reserves to be delivered over 5 years). Renewed some
senior notes and senior subordinated notes. Amended senior notes contain covenants.
EAGLE FOOD CENTERS INC
Filed February 29, 2000. Emerged August 7, 2000. The Bankruptcy Case was commenced in order to implement a financial restruc-
turing of the Company that had been pre-negotiated with holders of approximately 29% of the principal amount of the Company’s
Senior Notes due April 15, 2000. The Company replaced the Senior Notes with new notes that mature on April 15,2005 bear an
interest rate of 11%, and a $15 million repayment of outstanding principal by the Company . In addition, the Company agreed to
issue 15% of fully-diluted common stock of the Company (1,930,420 shares) to the holders of the Senior Notes, of which 10% will
be returned to the Company if the Company is sold or the debt is retired prior to October 15, 2001. If the Company is sold or the
debt is retired prior to October 15, 2002, 5% of the common stock will be returned to the Company. None of the common stock
will be returned to the Company if the Company is not sold or the debt retired prior to October 15, 2002. Amended existing credit
agreement with existing creditor in control. Has covenants.
LEAR CORP
Filed July 7, 2009. Emerged November 9, 2009. Pre-petition common stock was extinguished, and no distributions were made
to former shareholders. Pre-petition debt securities and pre-petition primary credit facility were cancelled. Entered new credit
facility (became new creditor in control) after emergence which it used to pay back DIP facility (no covenants mentioned). Contains
covenants. A secondary credit facility was issues to repay old primary credit facility (in control at the time) and subordinated priority.
Also has covenants. Pre-petition debt securities (senior notes) received 64.5% of equity and warrants.
GENEVA STEEL HOLDINGS CORP
Filed February 1, 1999. DIP facility approved and replaced old credit facility (controlling creditor) and contained covenants. Emerged
December 8, 2000. Preferred stock rights were terminated. Unsecured claims received stock of the emerging firms. Creditors who
were owed $5,000 or less will receive a cash payment equal to 40% of their claim, and trade creditors who were owed in excess of
$5,000 could elect to receive $2,000, rather than shares of common stock in the Company. Secured creditor (in control) repaid in full
with the new credit facility.
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COHO ENERGY INC
Filed August 23, 1999. “The bankruptcy petitions were filed to facilitate the restructuring of our long term debt and to protect us
while we develop a solution to our capital needs with the banks, bondholders and potential investors”. Emerged March 31, 2000.
Borrowed $183.0 million under a new revolving credit facility with a new bank group and borrowed $72.0 million under subordinated
notes and issued 2,694,841 shares of new common stock, representing 14.4% of our new common stock, as in exchange for these
notes. The repayment of borrowings and interest due under the old bank credit facility (control shareholder). Conversion of the old
bonds (senior subordinated notes) into 15,362,107 shares of new common stock, representing 82% of new common stock. No DIP
mentioned. New credit agreement contains covenants.
APPLIED EXTRUSION TECH
Filed December 1, 2004. Emerged January 24, 2005. DIP facility which was transferred to exit revolving facility with same creditor
in control containing covenants. The existing credit with control creditor was amended. The Company’s 10 34 percent senior will
receive 100 percent of the common equity of the reorganized private Company and new senior notes to be issued by the reorganized
private Company. Noteholders of less than $500,000 in principal amount (“small”beneficial holders) have the option of receiving
either cash in an amount of $0.51 per $1.00 of their claims or new securities of the reorganized Company. All of the Company’s
existing stock will be canceled.
USA MOBILITY INC
Filed December 6, 2001. Emerged May 29, 2002. The holders of Senior Notes and the lenders under the credit agreement (credi-
tors in control) will receive in Senior Secured Notes and Senior Subordinated Secured Notes as well as 15,133,098 shares of new
common stock and 100% of the cash available for distribution. Unsecured creditors will receive in the aggregate 3,600,000 shares
of new common stock plus a distribution equal to the net proceeds collected from potential avoidance and recovery actions under
the Bankruptcy Code. Holders of common and preferred equity interests will receive no distributions under the plan and all equity
interests in Arch will be cancelled. DIP credit facility with covenants from existing creditors in control.
ALLIED HOLDINGS INC
Filed July 31, 2005. DIP approved and used to repay old creditors in control. Contained covenants. Emerged May 18, 2007.
DIP facility converted into senior secured credit agreement upon emergence (new creditor in control). Other secured claims were
either paid in cash, received the collateral or reinstated. Holders of unsecured claims received common stock on a pro rata basis.
Stockholders receive nothing.
TRISM INC
Filed September 16, 1999. DIP facility approved and replaced pre-petition revolving facility of creditor in control. Emerged Decem-
ber 9, 1999. DIP was repaid in full upon emergence. Secured exit financing facility with no covenants. Senior subordinated notes
were converted into new notes + 95% of the equity of the new firm. Old stockholders received 5% of the new equity.
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GALEY & LORD INC
Filed February 19, 2002. DIP facility contains covenants, obtained from creditor in control who own pre-petition senior credit facility.
Emerged February 10, 2003. The Company’s senior secured debtholders (in control) would exchange approximately $300 million
in pre-petition secured debt for a combination of cash, a secured note in the amount of $130 million and 99% of the outstanding
equity of the emerging parent company; Exit financing of up to $70 million of which approximately $30 million would be drawn
upon emergence (from different creditor than controlling); Holders of the Company’s $300 million subordinated senior notes would
receive 1% of the outstanding equity of the emerging parent company and certain warrants to purchase up to an aggregate of 10%
of the common stock of the emerging parent company exercisable only upon the occurrence of certain events; and The Company’s
existing securities, including its outstanding capital stock, will be cancelled.
NATIONAL VISION INC
Filed April 5, 2000. Emerged may 31, 2001. Secured DIP financing from same controlling creditor. Was replaced by exit facility
from different creditor when it expired at emergence. Exit facility contains covenants. Unsecured claims ($125 million) were
converted into new secured notes ($120 million) and common stock. They are subordinated to the company’s credit facility (creditor
in control). Shareholders receive nothing.
NU-KOTE HOLDING INC -CL A
Filed November 6, 1998. Secured lenders (in control) wanted to liquidate but the company refused. Emerged on November 30, 2000.
Secured claims in the amount of $15,000,000 were retained and secured by the assets of the Registrant and certain of the Registrant’s
subsidiaries. All administrative and priority claims were paid in full. Payment of 20% of each unsecured claim. Equity holders
receive nothing. DIP financing confirmed. Contains covenants.
CHART INDUSTRIES INC
Filed July 8, 2003. Senior debt restructuring plan (creditor in control). Emerged September 15, 2003. Under the Reorganization Plan,
the Company’s senior debt of $255.7 million and related interest and fees of $1.9 million were converted into a $120.0 million secured
term loan, with the balance of the existing senior debt being cancelled in return for an initial 95 percent equity ownership position
in the Reorganized Company. DIP converted to revolving credit facility. DIP obtained from senior lenders. Contains covenants.
All common stock, warrants, options and other rights to acquire the Company’s common stock were cancelled, and the Company’s
former stockholders received five percent of the initial equity of the Reorganized Company and the opportunity to acquire up to an
additional five percent of equity through the exercise of new warrants.
SUPERMEDIA INC
Filed March 31, 2009. Emerged December 31, 2009. Creditors in control debt cancelled upon emergence and new senior secured
loans issued with same creditors in partial satisfaction of pre-petition debt. Contains covenants. Senior notes were cancelled.
Creditors in control received 85% of new common stock and senior notes holders received the remaining 15%. No DIP facility.
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HAYES LEMMERZ INTL INC
Filed December 5, 2001. Emerged June 3, 2003. DIP approved. Contains covenants. Old equity holders received nothing. Holders
of allowed claims (senior notes) received an amount in cash, new common stock, preferred stock and warrants. Creditors in control
existing credit facility was amended and reinstated. Contains covenants. The company also issued new senior notes. The proceeds
from the notes and exit facility were used to repay, among others, the DIP facility and prepetition lenders.
PILLOWTEX CORP
Filed November 14, 2000. DIP approved with creditors in control. Contains covenants. Emerged May 24, 2002. All equity claims in
the pre-petition company were cancelled. DIP facility was transferred into exit secured term loan and pre-petition outstanding claims
were cancelled in exchange for common stock. Unsecured claims were cancelled in exchange of cash, common stock and warrants.
Industrial bonds were reinstated.
WESTPOINT STEVENS INC
Filed June 1, 2003. DIP facility approved. Contained covenants. Creditors in control were unimpaired and will receive their full
value claims at maturity or the emergence date whichever is later. Other secured claim holders will either receive 90% in cash of the
value of their claims, or the sale value of collateral, or the collateral itself, or a note with periodic payments with PV = value of the
claim. Subordinated notes holders will receive common stock in exchange for their notes.
THERMADYNE HOLDINGS CORP
Filed November 19, 2001. Defaulted on senior subordinated notes (not creditor in control). DIP facility approved. Contains
covenants. Interest payments continued during bankruptcy proceedings to creditor in control but not principal repayments. Emerged
May 23, 2003. Total debt was reduced to approximately $220.0 million, as compared to the nearly $800.0 million in debt and
$79.0 million in preferred stock outstanding at the time of filing. Priority claims and administrative and tax claims and other secured
claims were unaffected and were to be repaid in full in due course. Pre-petition senior secured lenders. Creditors in control exchanged
their approximately $365.0 million in debt and outstanding letters of credit for cash, 94.5% of new common stock, $180.0 million
in indebtedness under the senior secured term loan facility and warrants. General Unsecured Creditors were entitled to distributions
of cash equal to the lesser of (1) a holder’s pro rata share of $7.5 million and (2) fifty percent (50%) of such holder’s claim. Senior
subordinated notes holders exchanged their notes for 5.5% of new common stock and warrants. Junior notes holders received no
distribution. Existing stock holders received nothing.
GRAND UNION CO
Filed June 24, 1998. Emerged August 5, 1998. New board of directors elected. Senior notes were eliminated and were given
30,000,000 shares of new common stock. Old preferred and common stock holders got warrants and their old claims were cancelled.
Entered new credit facility (new creditor in control) upon emergence whose proceeds were used to pay DIP facility which in turn
was used to repay old creditors in control.
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AMERICAN HOMESTAR CORP
Filed January 11, 2001. Emerged October 3, 2001. All equity interests were cancelled. Administrative and priority claims incurred
during bankruptcy proceedings were paid in full. Holders of unsecured claims of $10,000 or less were entitled to receive a small
payment in cash (typically 10% or 20% of the amount of their claim) and received stock in the reorganized company. With regards
to secondary secured claim, the company could either return the collateral to claim holders or repay the principal plus interest over
a certain period of time. The creditors in control accepted to forgive some of the debt and entered a new credit arrangement with
debtors. Contains covenants. Over 90% of the debt was forgiven. No DIP.
MOVIE GALLERY INC
Filed October 16, 2007. Emerged May 20, 2008. Existing equity was cancelled. Senior credit facility owned by creditor in control
was amended and restated. Also entered conversion agreement with creditor in control whereby debtors were given additional term
loans which they exchanged into a fair share of common stock. DIP approved by creditors other than those in control and was
fully repaid upon emergence. Holders of senior notes had their claims cancelled and were given majority shares in the reorganized
company.
TREND-LINES INC -CL A
Filed August 11, 2000. Emerged October 17, 2001. Creditors in control were paid in full for their outstanding balance and entered
into new revolving exit facility with debtors which was used to repay the preceding facility. Contained covenants. Holders of secured
claims received some or all of the collateral securing the lease, cash in the amount of the sale of the collateral, or any other treatment
agreed upon between parties. If the value of the collateral was less than the total amount of the claim then the difference was treated
as unsecured claim which received a pro rata share (in accordance with other unsecured claim holders) of $2 million in cash and
5,280,000shares of new common. Other priority claims were paid in full. Other convenience claim holders with value below $2,000
will receive 25% of the value of their clam. Stockholders received nothing. No DIP.
ASSISTED LIVING CONCEPTS INC
Filed October 1, 2001. Emerged January 1, 2002. Unsecured creditors were given pro rata senior secured notes and junior secured
notes, in addition to 96% of the shares of the reorganized company common stock. The remaining 4% were given to the com-
pany’s existing stockholders. DIP facility approved provided by existing controlling creditor. Upon emergence, the DIP facility was
aggregated into the existing credit facility of the creditor in control. The facility contains covenants. DIP had no covenants.
LORAL SPACE & COMMUNICATIONS
Filed July 15, 2003. Emerged November 21, 2005. The company emerged debt-free. All secured claim holders were paid in full.
93.5% of new issued common stock was distributed to unsecured creditors in addition to 99% of preferred stock. The remaining
shares were kept aside to cover disputed claims. Senior secured notes were issued upon emergence and contained covenants. No DIP
facility.
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FORCENERGY INC
Filed March 21, 1999. Emerged February 15, 2000. Secured trade claimants included in accounts payable and accrued liabilities
received either cash payments (of between 80-100% of their claim, depending on priority), or a 3 1/2 year interest-bearing trade
note payable. Holders of unsecured claims received New Common Stock. Senior subordinated notes holders were cancelled and
given majority shares in the new common stock. The company also entered upon emergence into a new senior credit facility with
its creditors in control that replaced the pre-petition one whose claims were fully satisfied. Old equity holders were given pro rata
shares in the remainder of the company’s new equity in addition to warrants. No DIP facility.
PARACELSUS HEALTHCARE CORP
Filed September 15, 2000. Emerged May 25, 2001. Shares of common stock held by existing equity holders will be canceled and
rendered null and void. Additionally, all principal and interest outstanding on the Notes and allowed general unsecured claims will
be exchanged for New Notes in the aggregate principal amount of $130.0 million, a cash payment, and 100.0% of the new common
stock issued by the reorganized firm. Creditors in control were not affected. No DIP.
POLYMER GROUP INC
Filed May 11, 2002. DIP facility approved but never used. Contained covenants. Emerged March 5, 2003. Pre-petition Credit
Facility of creditors in control was restructured and included a payment of $50.0 million, creditors in control also received payment
of 100% of the proceeds from sale of one of the subsidiaries, and a minimum $5.0 million additional prepayment out of existing
cash-on-hand. Senior Subordinated Notes were retired as well as other unsecured claims and received pro rata share of Common
Stock in exchange for each $1,000 of their allowed claim. Old common stockholders received warrants.
WEBLINK WIRELESS INC
Filed May 23, 2001. DIP facility provided by creditors in control (No covenants mentioned). Emerged July 15, 2002. All the cash
pay notes, $17.8 million of the PIK (payable in kind) notes, 2,403,000 shares of new common stock of the reorganized company and
an estimated $7 million of cash would be distributed to the Company’s secured creditors (in control). The remaining $2.2 million
of the PIK notes, 297,000 shares of new common stock of the reorganized company and warrants to purchase 12 million shares of
new common stock would be distributed to the Company’s unsecured creditors. The current equity holders of the Company would
receive no distributions and all currently outstanding equity securities (and all options, warrants or rights to acquire equity securities)
would be canceled.
RCN CORP
Filed May 27, 2004. Emerged December 21, 2004. Unsecured note holders received 98% of new equity and warrants. Old stock-
holders received warrants. An exit facility was entered with new creditor in control and convertible subordinated notes were issued.
The proceeds from the exit facility and notes issuance were to repay old creditors in control. Credit facility contains covenants. No
DIP facility.
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GENTEK INC
Filed October 11, 2002. Bankruptcy was filed after inability to amend credit facility of creditors in control. DIP facility approved
from creditor in control. Replaced by revolving credit facility upon emergence. Emerged November 10, 2003. Board of directors
replaced. Creditors in control initially received approximately 81 percent of the common stock of the reorganized Company, $60
million in cash and $216.5 million principal amount of senior term notes issued by the Reorganized Company in exchange for
$300 million revolving facility and approximately 13 percent of the common stock of the Reorganized Company and $33.5 million
principal amount of senior term notes issued by the Reorganized Company in exchange for $500 million term loans; holders of
general unsecured claims and trade vendor claims who elected to receive equity in the Reorganized Company on account of their
claims received a pro rata distribution of up to approximately 2 percent, in the aggregate, of the common stock of the Reorganized
Company and warrants to purchase additional shares of the common stock of the Reorganized Company; holders of general unsecured
claims and trade vendor claims that elected not to receive equity of the Reorganized Company received an amount in cash equal to
the lesser of (A) 6 percent of each such holder’s allowed claim or (B) each such holder’s pro rata share of $5 million; holders of
unsecured claims relating to the Company’s existing bonds received approximately 4 percent of the common stock of the Reorganized
Company and warrants to purchase additional shares of the common stock of the Reorganized Company. Common stockholders get
nothing.
MCLEODUSA INC -CL A
Filed January 31, 2002. Emerged April 16, 2002. Notes were cancelled and in exchange were given $670 million in cash (out
of an initial value of $3 billion), shares Preferred Stock, which is convertible into 15% of Common Stock and 5-year warrants to
purchase Common Stock. Preferred stock holders were given common stock. Common stockholders were given new common
stock. Creditors in control were not affected and were repaid for a portion of their debt as they requested and amended the original
agreement. No DIP facility. The company entered into an exit credit facility which became superior to the old creditors in control.
Both the old credit agreement and new exit facility contain covenants.
SEABULK INTERNATIONAL INC
Filed September 8, 1999. Emerge December 15, 1999. The holders of the $300.0 million of senior notes received 98.0% of common
stock in exchange for their notes; The holders of the $115.0 million of trust preferred securities received 2.0% of common stock and
Warrants in exchange for their securities; former stockholders received warrants. Creditor in control claims were unaffected. New
credit exit facility was issued. Used to pay outstanding loans. Contains covenants. DIP facility issued with same creditors in control
and replaced old credit facility. Repaid using exit facility.
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DURA AUTOMOTIVE SYS -CL B
Filed October 30, 2006. DIP facility approved. Contained covenants. Used to repay controlling creditor revolving credit facility.
Emerged June 27, 2008. Notes, stock, instruments, certificates, and other documents evidencing the Senior Notes Claims, Subordi-
nated Notes Claims, Convertible Subordinated Debentures Claims, Convertible Trust Guarantees and Equity Interests were cancelled
and given over 80% of new common stock in exchange. Entered new secured revolving credit facility that contained covenants with
other creditor than those that provided DIP.
METALS USA INC
Filed November 14, 2001. Emerged October 31, 2002. Unsecured creditors received 20,000,000 shares of new common stock at
$0.01 each in exchange for the cancellation of $367.3 million of their debt. Old equity claims were cancelled and holders received
warrants. DIP facility approved and extended by old creditors in control and retired through borrowing under new credit facility
entered upon emergence. New credit facility contains covenants. The DIP facility was used to pay old creditors in control. DIP
contained covenants.
SPECTRUM BRANDS HOLDINGS INC
Filed February 3, 2009. Emerged August 28, 2009. All equity was cancelled. Senior subordinated notes received common stock
and new notes. DIP participants also received equity in respect of the equity fee earned under the facility. Creditors in control credit
agreement was reinstated and amended. DIP was transformed into exit facility under the same senior credit agreement with creditors
in control. The agreement contained covenants.
XO HOLDINGS INC -CL A
Filed June 17, 2002. Emerged January 16, 2003. $1.0 billion of loans under the Pre-Petition Credit Facility of creditors in control
were converted into $500.0 million of outstanding principal amount under a New Credit Agreement and creditors in control were
given 95% of the new firm common stock. All unsecured notes were cancelled and given 5% of the new firm common stock and
warrants. All equity was cancelled. New credit agreement contains covenants. No DIP.
NATIONSRENT INC
Filed December 17, 2001. Emerged May 14, 2003. DIP approved and provided by creditors in control. Contained covenants.
Creditors in control would receive 95% of common stock, preferred stock, and subordinated notes. Unsecured claim holders received
5% common stock and $300,000 in cash. Equity holders get nothing. Entered into exit facility. The company stopped filing and was
eventually acquired by sunbelt rentals.
U S CONCRETE INC
Filed April 29, 2010. Emerged August 31, 2010. Holders of old common stock received warrants. All obligations under notes were
cancelled and received common stock instead. DIP facility approved and paid in full upon emergence (No covenants mentioned).
The DIP served to repay old creditors in control in full. A new credit agreement (contained covenants – new creditor in control) was
entered and some new notes were issued.
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BB LIQUIDATING INC
Filed September 23, 2010. Senior secured lenders (in control) were paid cash made through asset sale. The company had to transfer
from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 because it looked like it was not going to be able to meet its obligations. The company was purchased
by Dish Network on April 6, 2011 which assumed all of BB’s liabilities. The company had entered into a DIP facility. Dip facility
was terminated because company defaulted on it.
WILTEL COMMUNICATIONS GROUP
Filed April 22, 2002. Emerged October 15, 2002. Creditors in control entered new credit agreement with the company which
combined the old loans under previous credit facility. Contained covenants. Part of this previous facility was paid to the creditors
in control. Some debt obligations were discharged. Total balance was $975 million. All defaults prior to bankruptcy were forgiven.
$250 million were repaid before emergence. Upon emergence $350 million were repaid and the remainder was kept under the exit
credit facility. Senior notes were discharged in exchange for common stock.
CLASSIC COMMUNICATIONS INC
Filed November 13, 2001. DIP facility approved. Contained covenants. Priority non-tax claim holders will receive cash in full
satisfaction of the value of their claims. Creditors in control will receive New Term A Notes, which is a $60,000,000 term loan
secured by a First Priority Lien on all the Reorganized Debtors’ Assets and New Term B Notes, which are new secured notes to
be issued in an aggregate principal amount of approximately $83,579,000, and will be secured by a First Priority Lien on all the
Reorganized Debtors’ Assets, and the Prepetition Bank Group Payment, which is approximately $20,000,000 to be shared among
creditors who wish to participate in the revolving credit facility. Other secured and convenience claims were unimpaired. Unsecured
claim holders will receive 25% of their claim and common stock.
FLAG TELECOM GROUP LTD
Emerged October 9, 2002. Equity holders received nothing. Senior notes holders received cash, new notes and 5% of the new issued
equity. Other subordinated note holders received 63% of the new issued equity. Creditors in control received 26% of the new issued
equity and retained the $82 million they seized prior to the bankruptcy proceedings. Trade creditors reinstated their claims, received
negotiated cash amounts and shares.
VISTEON CORP
Filed May 28, 2009. Emerged October 1, 2010. All current equity claims were cancelled. Rights offering of reorganized firm raised
$1.25 billion in cash. Entered into exit financing facility containing covenants. Creditors in control claims were settled using cash
from exit facility and rights offering. Other secured claims were also settled in cash. Note holders received majority new common
stock in exchange for cancellation of their notes in addition to warrants. Old common stock holders were given minority shares in
the company and warrants. Certain pre-petition unsecured claims were reinstated. DIP facility approved and fully paid back.
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ENERGY PARTNERS LTD
Filed May 1, 2009. Emerged September 21, 2009. Creditors in control were repaid in full using money issued through new credit
facility entered upon emergence in addition to the issuance of new senior subordinated secured notes. Common stockholders received
5% of new company common stock. Holders of senior notes received 95% of the new common stock of the emerging company in
exchange for cancellation of their notes. No DIP. New creditors in control exit facility had covenants.
FAIRPOINT COMMUNICATIONS INC
Filed October 26, 2009. Emerged January 24, 2011. Creditors in control received in full and complete satisfaction of their Pre-
Petition Claims: a pro rata share of a $1,000.0 million exit term loan facility and a pro rata share of certain cash payments and a pro
rata share of 23,620,718 shares of new common stock, par value $0.01 per share and a pro rata share of a 55% interest in the FairPoint
Litigation Trust. Unsecured claims holders (notes) received in full satisfaction of their claims: a pro rata share of 2,101,676 shares
of New Common Stock and a pro rata share of a 45% interest in the Litigation Trust and a pro rata share of warrants. Holders of
unsecured claims receive payment in full in the amount of their claims. The exit facility contains covenants and became the creditor
in control. The exit facility was originally a DIP facility converted later into exit facility.
XERIUM TECHNOLOGIES INC
Filed March 30, 2010. Emerged May 25, 2010. Old equity claims were cancelled and given new equity equivalent to a reverse split
of 20 to 1 in addition to warrants. Creditors in control amended and restated their credit facility (was $603,590,000 and got reduced
to $410,000,000 – also lost control to exit facility). In addition to that, they received their pro rata shares of $10 million in cash and
$140 million in principal amount of term notes and 83% of new common stock. DIP approved and converted into exit facility upon
emergence (new creditor in control). Contains covenants.
SILICON GRAPHICS INTL CORP
Filed May 8, 2006. Emerged October 17, 2006. Equity holders received nothing. DIP financing approved; terminated upon emer-
gence and paid through cash collected from rights offering and exit facility. Entered exit facility containing covenants (new creditors
in control). Secured claims notes holders received 40% of the common stock. DIP used to repay pre-petition creditors in control in
full. DIP no covenants mentioned.
SPANSION INC
Filed March 1, 2009. Emerged May 10, 2010. Current equity holders received nothing. Senior unsecured notes were cancelled and
received common stock. Senior secured revolving credit facility (creditor in control) repaid in full. Senior secured floating rate notes
holders were given cash raised through exit financing facility (new creditor in control) which fully repaid their claims and share
offerings. New exit facility contains covenants. No DIP.
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Table A3
Correlations of the Determinants of Capital Structure
The table presents the pairwise correlations between the variables used as determinants for capital struc-
ture. The correlations are estimated on a sample of 34,655 firm year observations resulting from the
intersection of all Compustat firms excluding financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), all DealScan firms and
Nunn (2007)’s contract intensity measures between 1996 and 2011. p-values are between parenthesis.
All variables are defined in the Appendix.
Creditor
Control
Collateral
Intensity
Leverage Market-to-Book
Ratio
Profitability Firm Size
Collateral Intensity 0.129
(0.000)
Leverage 0.192 0.287
(0.000) (0.000)
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.030 -0.124 -0.311
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability 0.182 0.140 0.051 0.102
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Size 0.278 0.289 0.147 0.027 0.606
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Asset Tangibility 0.108 0.533 0.325 -0.121 0.153 0.262
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Table A4
Regression Estimations of the Determinants of Capital Structure
OLS Regressions of book leverage on creditor control, collateral intensity, market-to-book ratio, asset tangibility, profitability, firm size, book dividends, market dividends,
R&D expenditures, credit rating, advertising expense, firm age, volatility, tax credit and abnormal returns. Coefficients are estimated on a sample of 34,655 firm year
observations resulting from the intersection of all Compustat firms excluding financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), all DealScan firms and Nunn (2007)’s contract intensity
measure between 1996 and 2011. Models (1) and (5) are simple OLS regressions. Models (2) and (6) estimate Fama-MacBeth regressions with Newey-West standard
errors. Models (3) and (7) fix industry effects with robust standard errors clustered by industry. Models (4) and (8) run fixed firm effects with robust standard errors
clustered by firm. All models have time fixed effects. p-values are between parentheses. All independent variables are all lagged. All variables are defined in the
Appendix. Omitted variables are replaced by -.
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Creditor Control 0.071 0.066 0.054 0.024 0.044 0.048 0.037 0.029
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Collateral Intensity 0.105 0.101 – – 0.076 0.075 – –
(0.000) (0.000) – – (0.000) (0.000) – –
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Asset Tangibility 0.192 0.189 0.226 0.150 0.135 0.145 0.160 0.165
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Profitability -0.254 -0.255 -0.254 -0.138 -0.176 -0.172 -0.159 -0.067
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012)
Firm Size 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.010
(0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.181) (0.003) (0.010) (0.054) (0.126)
R&D – – – – -0.218 -0.204 -0.150 0.020
– – – – (0.000) (0.003) (0.054) (0.781)
R&D Dummy – – – – 0.036 0.035 0.020 0.002
– – – – (0.000) (0.000) (0.100) (0.929)
Credit Rating – – – – 0.131 0.128 0.131 0.059
– – – – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Advertising/Sales – – – – -0.111 -0.007 -0.516 -0.619
– – – – (0.487) (0.957) (0.050) (0.071)
Firm Age – – – – 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.075
– – – – (0.736) (0.873) (0.825) (0.002)
Volatility – – – – 1.184 1.382 1.378 1.221
– – – – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tax Credit – – – – -13.058 -20.359 -11.168 -0.116
– – – – (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.970)
Abnormal EPS – – – – 0.012 0.020 0.011 0.003
– – – – (0.173) (0.105) (0.058) (0.572)
Book Dividends – – – – 0.299 0.715 -0.019 0.527
– – – – (0.354) (0.075) (0.970) (0.208)
Market Dividends – – – – -0.667 -2.117 -0.395 -0.079
– – – – (0.209) (0.013) (0.552) (0.853)
Robust Standard Errors Yes Newey-West Yes Yes Yes Newey-West Yes Yes
Robust SE Clustering By Time – By Industry By Firm By Time – By Industry By Firm
Year Fixed Effects Yes – Yes Yes Yes – Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No – No Yes No – No Yes
Industry Fixed Effects No – Yes No No – Yes No
Estimation – Fama-MB Within Within – Fama-MB Within Within
Number of Observations 33,759 33,759 33,100 33,759 9,231 9,231 9,155 9,231
R2 21.19% 19.41% 18.37% 17.14% 20.62% 31.70% 27.43% 19.58%
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Table A5
Regression Estimations of the Determinants of Capital Structure
OLS Regressions of book leverage on creditor control, collateral intensity, the interaction of creditor control and collateral
intensity, market-to-book ratio, asset tangibility, profitability, firm size, book dividends, market dividends, R&D expenditures,
credit rating, advertising expense, firm age, volatility, tax credit, abnormal returns and the interaction of the market-to-book
ratio, asset tangibility, size and profitability with creditor control . Coefficients are estimated on a sample of 34,655 firm year
observations resulting from the intersection of all Compustat firms excluding financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), all DealScan
firms and Nunn (2007)’s contract intensity measure between 1996 and 2011. All models are with industry fixed effects, time
fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by industry. p-values are between parentheses. All independent variables are
all lagged. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Omitted variables are replaced by -.
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Creditor Control * Collateral Intensity 0.022 0.027 0.056 0.115
(0.256) (0.273) (0.046) (0.005)
Creditor Control 0.046 0.026 0.167 0.079
(0.000) (0.014) (0.294) (0.011)
Collateral Intensity 0.053 0.148 0.048 0.150
(0.203) (0.057) (0.249) (0.053)
Market-to-Book Ratio * Creditor Control – – 0.003 0.006
– – (0.205) (0.058)
Asset Tangibility * Creditor Control – – -0.107 -0.149
– – (0.003) (0.005)
Profitability * Creditor Control – – 0.113 0.129
– – (0.002) (0.036)
Firm Size * Creditor Control – – 0.004 -0.013
– – (0.142) (0.030)
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.010 -0.007 -0.010 -0.008
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Asset Tangibility 0.226 0.156 0.241 0.177
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.003)
Profitability -0.254 -0.171 -0.254 -0.176
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Size 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.008
(0.020) (0.030) (0.036) (0.023)
R&D – -0.152 – -0.152
– (0.059) – (0.055)
R&D Dummy – 0.022 – 0.023
– (0.092) – (0.068)
Credit Rating – 0.126 – 0.130
– (0.000) – (0.000)
Advertising/Sales – -0.559 – -0.551
– (0.035) – (0.034)
Firm Age – -0.002 – -0.002
– (0.906) – (0.882)
Volatility – 1.422 – 1.410
– (0.000) – (0.000)
Tax Credit – -6.450 – -6.588
– (0.000) – (0.000)
Abnormal EPS – 0.000 – 0.000
– (0.266) – (0.256)
Book Dividends – -0.023 – -0.076
– (0.965) – (0.887)
Market Dividends – -0.436 – -0.407
– (0.520) – (0.557)
Robust Standard Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust SE Clustering By Industry By Industry By Industry By Industry
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 33,100 9,338 33,100 9,338
R2 18.38% 27.96% 18.63% 28.17%
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Table A6
Summary Statistics
The table presents summary statistics for a sample of 14,744 firm-year observations in 29 countries including the United States, resulting from the
intersection of all DealScan loans between 1996 and 2011, and financial information from WorldScope. Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded,
and so are loans that do not contain a covenant restricting the current ratio, net worth, capital expenditures or EBITDA. The statistics are presented for the
whole sample and then for the subsample of Non-U.S. borrowers and the subsample of U.S. borrowers. Each entry reports the number of observations N,
mean, the median, and the standard deviation SD. Variables are defined in the Appendix.
All Borrowers Non-U.S. Borrowers U.S. Borrowers
N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD
Capital Structure Variables
Net Debt Issuance / Total Assets 13,989 0.103 0.000 5.657 1,829 0.060 0.016 0.988 12,160 0.110 0.000 6.056
Leverage Ratio 14,622 0.310 0.287 0.299 1,894 0.359 0.321 0.607 12,728 0.303 0.280 0.218
Covenant Control Variables
Current Ratio 14,389 1.968 1.661 1.449 1,899 1.597 1.425 0.881 12,490 2.024 1.714 1.509
Net Worth / Total Asset 14,632 0.389 0.419 0.362 1,904 0.422 0.417 0.191 12,728 0.384 0.419 0.380
Interest Expense / Total Assets 14,159 0.026 0.019 0.028 1,849 0.019 0.011 0.040 12,310 0.027 0.021 0.025
Cash Flow/Total Assets 14,129 -0.042 -0.015 0.174 1,819 -0.022 -0.008 0.115 12,310 -0.046 -0.016 0.181
Cash / Total Assets 14,619 0.091 0.051 0.109 1,893 0.127 0.104 0.100 12,726 0.086 0.042 0.110
Other Variables
Market-to-Book Ratio 14,574 4.466 1.590 45.305 1,846 22.780 3.344 94.187 12,728 1.810 1.494 31.758
Total Assets ($Millions) 14,650 1464.30 498.70 2602.70 1,922 2,013.10 682.60 2,977.90 12,728 1,381.50 477.50 2,531.10
Total Sales ($Millions) 14,650 1258.10 486.90 2021.50 1,922 1,399.30 471.10 2,295.60 12,723 1,236.70 488.00 1,976.00
157
Table A7
Covenant Violations and Net Debt Issuance
Fixed effect regressions of net debt issuance on covenant violation indicators and covenant control variables. The sample is the result of the intersection
between DealScan and WorldScope and consists of 14,744 firm-year observations between 1996 and 2011 in 29 countries including the United States.
Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and loans that do not contain a covenant restricting the current ratio, net worth, tangible net worth, capital expenditures or
EBITDA are excluded. All specifications include the lagged values of control variables and the current values of Interest and Cash flow. Contemporaneous
Controls indicates if the current values of all controls variables are included in the specification. Covenant Interaction Variables include three interaction
terms: the lagged leverage ratio with the lagged tangible net worth to assets ratio, the lagged leverage ratio with the lagged cash flow to assets ratio, and
the lagged cash to assets ratio with the lagged interest to assets ratio. Higher Order Controls refers to the second and third powers of the control variable.
All specifications have fixed industry effects, robust standard errors, and year indicators. Panel A reports results for the net debt issuance while Panel B
reports regression results of the first difference analogs of the variables in Panel A. p-values are in parentheses. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
Omitted variables are replaced by -.
Panel A: Net Debt Issuance Panel B: Change in Net Debt Issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Covenant Violationt −1(CV) -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.029 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
Leveraget −1 -0.116 -0.240 -0.200 -0.205 0.379 0.520 0.532 0.533
(0.018) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.097) (0.077) (0.081) (0.083)
Net Wortht −1/Total Assetst−1 -0.024 -0.020 -0.011 -0.012 0.005 0.005 0.052 0.051
(0.243) (0.230) (0.284) (0.410) (0.480) (0.646) (0.385) (0.453)
Interestt−1/Total Assetst−1 -0.954 -0.665 -0.538 -0.602 -0.873 -2.073 -2.521 -2.529
(0.113) (0.132) (0.030) (0.031) (0.281) (0.141) (0.166) (0.162)
Current Ratiot−1 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.261) (0.080) (0.029) (0.035) (0.438) (0.605) (0.854) (0.860)
Cash Flowt−1/Total Assetst−1 0.024 0.015 -0.102 -0.103 -0.034 -0.047 -0.025 -0.022
(0.013) (0.006) (0.114) (0.102) (0.040) (0.060) (0.444) (0.513)
Casht−1/Total Assetst−1 -0.026 -0.005 -0.023 -0.017 0.036 0.055 -0.199 -0.034
(0.150) (0.738) (0.403) (0.546) (0.463) (0.335) (0.430) (0.250)
Contemporaneous Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Interactions No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Higher Order Controls No No No Yes No No No Yes
Number of Observations 12,133 12,126 12,126 12,126 11,539 11,539 11,539 11,539
R2 0.156 0.264 0.323 0.327 0.075 0.096 0.099 0.099
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Table A8
Covenant Violations, Judicial Effectiveness, and Net Debt Issuance
Fixed effect regressions of net debt issuance on covenant violation indicators, country legal effectiveness, and covenant control variables. The sample is
the result of the intersection between DealScan and WorldScope and consists of 14,744 firm-year observations between 1996 and 2011 in 29 countries
including the United States. Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and loans that do not contain a covenant restricting the current ratio, net worth, tangible net
worth, capital expenditures or EBITDA are excluded. All specifications include the lagged values of control variables and the current values of Interest
and Cash flow. Contemporaneous Controls indicates if the current values of all controls variables are included in the specification. Covenant Interaction
Variables include three interaction terms: the lagged leverage ratio with the lagged tangible net worth to assets ratio, the lagged leverage ratio with the
lagged cash flow to assets ratio, and the lagged cash to assets ratio with the lagged interest to assets ratio. Higher Order Controls refers to the second and
third powers of the control variable. All specifications have fixed industry effects, robust standard errors, and year indicators. Panel A reports results for
the net debt issuance while Panel B reports regression results of the first difference analogs of the variables in Panel A. p-values are in parentheses. All
variables are defined in the Appendix. Omitted variables are replaced by -.
Panel A: Net Debt Issuance Panel B: Change in Net Debt Issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
CV * JLEI 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.081 0.081 0.079 0.079
(0.055) (0.031) (0.004) (0.002) (0.100) (0.080) (0.072) (0.075)
Covenant Violationt−1(CV) -0.143 -0.147 -0.163 -0.169 -0.685 -0.691 -0.670 -0.671
(0.048) (0.028) (0.003) (0.002) (0.096) (0.076) (0.069) (0.071)
Judicial/Legal Effectiveness (JLEI) -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 -0.005 0.081 -0.013 -0.014
(0.115) (0.107) (0.053) (0.023) (0.751) (0.485) (0.490) (0.482)
Leveraget−1 -0.118 -0.242 -0.200 -0.206 0.372 0.509 0.520 0.521
(0.015) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.091) (0.076) (0.081) (0.083)
Net Wortht−1/Total Assetst−1 -0.024 -0.021 0.011 -0.012 0.005 0.004 0.047 0.047
(0.240) (0.227) (0.299) (0.439) (0.504) (0.690) (0.415) (0.469)
Interestt−1/Total Assetst−1 -0.941 -0.654 -0.546 -0.619 -0.914 -2.076 -2.478 -2.487
(0.123) (0.146) (0.029) (0.027) (0.260) (0.141) (0.164) (0.156)
Current Ratiot−1 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.314) (0.081) (0.029) (0.037) (0.402) (0.513) (0.748) (0.751)
Cash Flowt−1/Total Assetst−1 0.024 0.015 -0.104 -0.105 -0.034 -0.046 -0.024 -0.022
(0.015) (0.008) (0.111) (0.100) (0.034) (0.055) (0.439) (0.514)
Casht−1/Total Assetst−1 -0.026 -0.005 -0.024 -0.019 0.034 0.050 -0.019 -0.032
(0.140) (0.749) (0.388) (0.501) (0.473) (0.361) (0.457) (0.292)
Contemporaneous Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Covenant Interactions Variables No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Higher Order Controls No No No Yes No No No Yes
Number of Observations 12,133 12,126 12,126 12,126 11,539 11,539 11,539 11,539
R2 0.157 0.266 0.324 0.329 0.083 0.102 0.105 0.105
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